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Abstract 
The first part of this thesis examines the role of highly-leveraged institutions in 
creating vulnerability in the financial system. By applying the framework of Kiyotaki 
and Moore (1997), Chapter 2 shows that when an asset price bubble bursts which cuts 
the value of land being used as collateral, the sudden fall in collateral value can create 
the possibility that firms' net worth is entirely wiped out and the whole financial 
system collapses. This is due to the powerful feedback effects where forced selling 
further depresses prices, setting in motion a downward spiral of asset prices and loan 
recalls. We then show how wholesale financial collapse can be avoided by co- 
ordinated loan roll-overs in the form of a general financial freeze; and how the 
breathing space gained in this way can be used to arrange for loan write-downs or 
capital injections. In Chapter 3, the degree of corporate leverage is analysed more 
explicitly by introducing margin requirements into the model and two types of 
adverse shocks are examined numerically, an asset bubble bursting and a sudden rise 
in real interest rates. We find that when the economy is highly leveraged, a small 
shock to real interest rates can have powerful impacts on asset prices and cause 
widespread bankruptcy of the credit-constrained sector. To shed light on the recent 
debate on the role of prudential regulatory policies in mitigating the impact of a 
bubble bursting, we show that relaxing margin requirements can be used as a form of 
`regulatory forbearance' for avoiding and/or reducing the knock-on effects. 
The second part of the thesis is a case study of Thailand. Chapter 4 provides a detailed 
account of Thailand economic developments from 1988 to 1998; it is argued that the 
nature of Thai financial crisis lied in the profound boom and bust in real estate sector 
which played a central role in creating tensions in the financial system and ultimately 
causing severe contraction of the economic activity. Chapter 5 explores some key 
issues relating to systemic bankruptcy of the corporate sector in aftermath of the Thai 
crisis. We show that when the efficiency of legal system is taken into account 
(particularly the built-in delay involved in the judicial process), a creditor-oriented 
bankruptcy law may effectively turn into debtor-friendly regime. In the case of large- 
scale debt crisis, while such build-in delay may help preventing fire-sales of assets, it 
can also create efficiency losses as efficient firms are prevented from being 
restructured. This suggests the need for a quick resolution. It is argued that the out-of- 
court restructuring framework used in Thailand -- by giving restructuring priority to 
large and viable firms that have the most impacts on the economy -- can help increase 
efficiency in resolving systemic debt problems. 
V ill 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Since Irving Fisher's (1933) `debt-deflation' explanation of the Great Depression, financial 
factors, such as borrower net worth, have been considered an important element of output 
fluctuations. This theme was treated in a seminal paper by Bernanke (1983) and formally 
modelled by Bernanke and Gertler (1989, hereafter BG) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 
hereafter KM). While BG and KM both emphasise the central role of the endogenous 
evolution of borrower's net worth in macroeconomic dynamics, the channels affecting net 
worth of the borrowers are different. In BG, adverse temporary shocks are amplified and 
propagated through the cash flows of the borrower: in KM, the main source of net worth 
fluctuations comes from changes in asset prices. 
Recognition that the presence of credit-market imperfections could play a similar role in 
the recent emerging market crises has led to a growing literature on the subject. ' In 
particular, one strand of the `third generation' crisis models of the Asian crisis has been 
developed to capture the role of `balance sheet effects' derived from currency mismatches. 
For example, Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerj ee (2001) and Krugman (1999) construct an 
open economy version closely in spirit of BG, i. e. credit limit depends on cash flow of the 
borrowers who have debt in domestic and foreign currency. They show that a sudden 
currency depreciation increases firms' debt repayment in foreign currency; hence their 
1 See, for example, Arellano and Mendoza (2002) for current developments. 
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profits decline, which in turn tightens the borrowing constraint. A fall in investment and 
output then reduces demand for domestic currency and leads to further depreciation. 
In this thesis, however, the analysis is restricted to a closed economy and the theme 
explored is not the problem posed by the currency composition of domestic firms' debt. 
Instead our purpose is to examine the vulnerability of highly-leveraged firms to changes in 
asset prices and to see how this might lead to a collapse of the financial system. 
Interestingly, Krugman (2001, p. 2) notes that "third-generation currency crisis models are 
actually not very specific to currency crises: the mechanisms for speculative attack and 
self-fulfilling pessimism that these model identify... suggests ... that a 
fourth-generation 
crisis model may not be a currency crisis model at all; it may be a more general financial 
crisis model in which other asset prices play the starring role. " 
In Thailand, there is a strong evidence of land price bubble prior to the crisis; from 1985 to 
1996, prices grew at the rate of over 35 percent per year. To put this into perspective, land 
prices in Tokyo rose 2.6 times within 5 years from 1985 to 1990 (before they burst in 
1991) while value of land in Bangkok recorded a phenomenal increase of around 20 times 
over the same period. While the consequences of asset price collapse have varied widely 
across countries, it is evident that crashes in real estate markets tend to have more impact 
on real economic activity than those in equity markets (Hunter et al., 2003). Real estate 
(especially in form of land) is widely used as collateral for loans in many emerging market 
countries: so a rise in land prices facilitates more borrowing; but when prices fall, the 
process of unwinding leveraged positions can give rise to financial collapse. 
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Figure 1.1 below suggests that financial leverage played an important role in explaining the 
depth of the crisis in Asia. By plotting real GDP growth deviation from trend in 1998 
against average debt to equity ratio of listed companies in 1996, we see that output 
contraction was more severe for countries which had high initial levels of financial 
leverage. 
Figure 1.1: Corporate leverage and the `balance sheet' effect 
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Source: Thaicharoen and Kiatikomol (2002). 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, we outline the structure of the thesis and then 
provide a brief literature review with respect to the Asian financial crisis. 
1.2 Outline of the thesis 
This dissertation is divided into two main parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) is a 
theoretical study on the role of highly-leveraged institutions in creating fragility to the 
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financial system. The second part (Chapters 4 and 5) is a detailed case study of Thailand, 
examining developments in financial sector and property markets from the boom period 
during 1987-96 to the crisis in 1997-8, and discussing macroeconomic implications of 
bankruptcy law reform in aftermath of the crisis. 
1.2.1 A study of corporate leverage and financial fragility 
In Chapter 2, we study how corporate leverage can create systemic risk of financial 
collapse and find that not only high leverage reduces the capacity of credit-constrained 
firms to bear the initial negative shocks, but the efforts to repay loans can generate the 
powerful `knock-on effects' which can rapidly turn illiquidity into insolvency. Specifically, 
the situation we examine is what would happen if asset price bubble bursts which cuts the 
value of land being used as collateral; by applying the framework of Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), we show that the sudden fall in collateral value can create the possibility that 
firms' net worth is entirely wiped out and the whole financial system collapses. 
Note that there are both negative and positive effects at work following asset price shocks. 
First is direct negative effect, as mentioned above, due to capital losses from initial 
bursting bubble and the subsequent knock-on effects from fire-sales. Second is an indirect 
positive effect, not explicitly discussed in KM, - the efficiency gain on remaining land. The 
first may lead to complete collapse; but, if not, the second permits complete recovery. The 
The positive effect comes from the fact that a fall in land prices enables the credit- 
constrained sector to exploit the profit-opportunity which arises from the difference 
between the total returns from using land by this sector and the user cost of land 
determined by the unconstrained sector; hence allowing credit-constrained firms to 
gradually rebuild their net worth back to its long-run equilibrium. 
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Because their efforts drive down land prices and cause bankruptcy, lenders trying to recall 
loans impose externalities on others willing to restructure debts. A financial freeze is one 
way of solving this collective action problem, because during the freeze, no loans are 
recalled and any arrears of interest are rolled over, so there need be no fire-sale disposals 
of land. Another form of stabilisation is the provision of temporary finance by existing 
lenders. So long as borrowers are still solvent after the initial shock, temporary financing 
can reduce (or avoid) the multiplier or knock-on effects that come from the dumping of 
assets in a scramble for liquidity; and so it can prevent illiquidity becoming insolvency. 
Firms cannot continue rolling over interest in this fashion forever; so financial 
restructurings to reduce debt are required. Temporary relaxation of margin requirements 
can nevertheless help stabilisation - as we discuss in the next chapter. 
Chapter 3 takes further steps towards developing a framework that is suitable for 
quantitative analysis. In the homogenous KM model presented in Chapter 2, the largest 
size of asset price shocks (consistent with a return to the long-run equilibrium) is 
minuscule, compared to what goes on in the real world. With setting interest rates as high 
as 50 percent, the `exact solution' of the non-linear KM model yields the maximum shock 
of only 1.8 percent. The reason is that knock-on effects turn out to be very powerful; by 
selling about a quarter of land, the knock-on effects are 6 times relative to the initial fall in 
land prices. A non-homogeneous model with reduced sensitivity of land prices to land 
sales proves more robust to shocks. 
A key innovation in this chapter is the inclusion of a `margin requirement' (where lenders 
only lend up to some fraction of present discounted value of collateral). This allows us to 
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examine the effects of corporate leverage on financial stability more explicitly. By varying 
margin requirements, we show that the higher is the degree of financial leverage, the 
higher is the impacts of monetary policy shocks on asset prices. 
Two numerical exercises are considered; temporary shocks to asset prices and to real 
interest rates. In the former, our simulations show that reducing leverage increases the 
stability of the financial system. As to the second type of shock, i. e. the impact of an 
unexpected temporary rise in real interest rates, we find that knock-on effects in this case 
turn out to be much stronger than those of asset price shocks (given that shocks to asset 
prices and interest rates lead to the same initial drop in net worth). The sudden increase in 
interest expenses of existing short-term debt obligations leads the credit-constrained firms 
to sell land to satisfy the margin requirements which causes asset prices to drop 
unexpectedly as in the case of asset price shocks. But there is an additional reinforcing 
effects, namely that higher rate of interest when used to discount the future value of land 
tighten the credit constraint further. 
In Aghion et al. (2000), the proportion of foreign-currency debt (and the sensitivity of 
credit supply to changes in interest rates) plays a key role in determining whether raising 
interest rate might help stabilising exchange rates in the midst of the crisis. While our 
modified model falls short on this `open economy' dimension, the analysis suggests that 
the degree of corporate leverage would also be of similar importance and needs to be taken 
into accounts. If most firms are highly leveraged, the use of high interest rates to stabilise 
exchange rates can lead to widespread bankruptcy. This brings to mind a critical comment 
made by Joseph Stiglitz (2002, p. 110) on policy during the Asian crisis, namely that: "At 
the heart of the analysis of macroeconomy should have been an analysis of what an 
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increase in interest rates would do to the chances of default and to the amount that creditors 
can recover in the event of default. " [italics in original] From this perspective, the 
framework used here could provide an alternative approach to study monetary policy with 
bankruptcy. [Indeed, in their later work presented at Clarendon Lecture, Kiyotaki and 
Moore (2001) have developed a micro-founded framework to study monetary policy under 
credit-constrained environment and made a remark that: "Monetary economics may be 
displaced by Liquidity Economics - which is what I guess Keynes and Tobin would want. " 
(p. 33). ] 
In recent years, there has been a lively debate on what policy instruments can be used in 
controlling asset price bubbles and in mitigating the impact of a bubble's bursting (see, in 
particular, a conference proceedings edited by Hunter et al., 2003). In fact, the debate is 
conducted on two levels; first, whether monetary policy should target asset prices and 
second, what prudential regulatory actions can be taken. In the former case, Bernanke and 
Gertler (1999) argue that monetary policy should not react to changes in asset prices 
(except that they signal changes in expected inflation). However, Cecchetti, Genberg and 
Wadhwani (2003) argue that when there are adverse shocks in asset markets, a policy of 
`leaning against the wind' of asset price changes may help, even though it is very difficult 
to apply. 
In light of the practical difficulties in identifying and appropriately reacting to asset bubble 
with monetary policy, Hunter et al. (2003, p. xxii-xxiii) note that "prudential policy offers 
possibly the best line of defense". To this end, a number of microeconomic policies have 
been proposed. For example, Goodhart (2003) suggests, among other things, that margin 
requirements can be used as `automatic stabiliser' so that when prices increase, margin 
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requirements should be increased (i. e. tightening borrowing constraint) and when prices 
fall, they should be reduced. This suggestion appears to fit well in the context of our 
modified model where we show that temporarily relaxing the margin rules when the 
bubble bursts can help mitigate the credit crunch. How much relaxation is required 
depends on the initial level of leverage in the credit-constrained sector. Two closely related 
papers, i. e. Aiyagari and Gertler (1999) and Mendoza and Smith (2002) study how credit 
constraints can produce overshooting in asset prices; but their analyses do not examine 
policy actions to reduce the impacts. 
1.2.1 The Case of Thailand 
The 1997/8 Asian financial crisis has often analysed as a single episode from a set of 
common factors. The typical `stylised' story runs as follows. First came financial sector 
deregulation and capital accounts liberalisation in early 1990s; this encouraged large 
inflows of short-term foreign capital, resulting in a profound boom in asset prices and a 
rapid accumulation of foreign-currency-denominated debt in private sector. The crisis 
came with a `sudden stop' of capital flows, leading to the collapse of the fixed exchange 
rate regime, and a sharp contraction of the economy. 
Although most, if not all, of the third generation models of crisis are built to investigate 
these phenomena. They have focussed on difference aspects. First is the focus on moral 
hazard in financial markets, where implicit government bailout-guarantees to banks lead to 
over-borrowing and over-investment (Krugman, 1998 and McKinnon and Pill, 1996); and 
it is government limited capacity to honour such guarantees (i. e contingent large fiscal 
liabilities) that makes the crisis `inevitable' (Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo, 2001; 
Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubin, 1998; and Dooley, 2000). 
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Second is the view that the Asian economies essentially fall into the victim of investor 
pessimism that makes the financial panics become `self-fulfilling'. The source of 
vulnerability comes from the balance sheets of financial institutions i. e. maturity and 
currency mismatches (Change and Velasco, 1998; and Radelet and Sachs, 1998). The third 
aspect is that the crisis should be interpreted as a result of a negative shock that gets 
amplified by a `financial accelerator mechanism'. 2 The main concern here is the net worth 
of domestic firms i. e. high leverage and unhedged foreign currency debt exposure (Aghion, 
Bacchetta and Banerjee, 2000; Edison, Luangaram and Miller, 2000; Krugman, 1999). 
Insights from all three theories are very useful to understand the potential sources of the 
problems in Asia, each country in Asia; but each country in Asia has its own institutional 
characteristics which help to explain differences in the nature and severity of the crisis. For 
example, Indonesia suffered the sharpest depreciation in the region. As noted by Miller and 
Luangaram (1998), this was mainly due to the capital flight not by foreign creditors but 
from the ethnic Chinese minority who controlled the majority of Indonesia's largest 
companies. Fearing for the loss of their lives as well as their assets, they rushed for the exit 
when the currency began to fall. The regulatory policy of partial bank closures then 
generated bank panic on the whole financial system. 
In Chapter 4, we take a careful look at the case of Thailand from the boom period during 
1987-96 to the crisis in 1997/8. We find that both moral hazard and financial panic 
accounts appeared to play a role in the Thai crisis but through different types of financial 
2 The term used by Bernanke et al. (1996), defined as the amplification of an initial shock brought about by 
changes in credit-market conditions. 
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institutions. Problems in finance companies are caused by moral hazard. The case for 
financial panics from foreign investors applies most to commercial banks. 
The reason for this was due mainly to un-balanced and inadequate supervision and 
regulation between these two types of financial institutions. Finance companies were 
subject to less stringent regulation and supervision compared with commercial banks. 
When the authorities allowed finance companies to apply for a highly profitable banking 
license on the basis of asset size (i. e. the bigger they are, the higher chance they will 
become bank), their main incentive was to expand their assets as quickly as possible; and 
this was done by offering high interest rates to attract domestic funds so as to finance 
cyclical sectors especially real estate firms. In effect, they increased their share of domestic 
sources of funds. But the establishment of BIBF allowed the banks to attract cheaper funds 
from overseas, and pushed banks to toward short-term foreign borrowings3, this in turn 
made them more vulnerable to a sudden reversal of capital flows and to exchange rate risk. 
As a result, while nominal GDP grew four-fold from 1985 to 1995 and total assets in 
commercial banks expanded five and a half times in nominal terms, assets in finance 
companies expanded by almost 12 times. At the same time, land prices in Thailand grew at 
the rate of over 35 percent per . year. 
During the first five-year period, from 1985 to 1990, 
the value of land in Thailand recorded a phenomenal increase of around 20 times (as 
compared to 2.6 times increase in land prices in Japan during the same period before the 
Japanese bubble burst in 1991. ) 
3 Note that the share of foreign liabilities to total borrowing in commercial banks had risen substantially from 
6 percent at the beginning of 1993 to 22 percent at the end of 1996. On the other hand, foreign borrowing by 
finance companies was less than 10 percent of their total sources of funds. 
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The detailed account of the Thai crisis provided in Rajan (2001) focuses on the collapse of 
Thai baht. Specifically he argues that the currency crisis in Thailand should be seen at two 
distinct phases; it was "originally pushed into devaluation by secularly deteriorating 
fundamentals, but it was then pulled into outright economic collapse by an international 
bank panic", (p. 69). We argue, however, that the nature of Thai financial crisis lies in the 
profound boom and bust in the real estate sector which played a central role in creating 
tensions on the financial system and causing the severe contraction of the economic 
activity. 
The implication of our account of the Thai case is that there was unique equilibrium of the 
crisis in real estate sector and finance companies but not for the commercial banks where 
collapse needs not have happened. 4 Consequently, policy to deal with problems in finance 
companies and in commercial banks should have been different, i. e. insolvent finance 
companies needed to be closed down while banks needed liquidity. In contrast, the ways 
that the Thai authorities chosen to deal with these problems appeared to be the opposite, 
namely that of by recycling liquidity out from the banks towards the finance companies 
during the run up to the crisis. It turned out that the insolvent finance companies were 
eventually closed down while the solvent commercial banks became undercapitalised. The 
effects of such policy not only pushed commercial banks towards the collapse equilibrium 
but it also led to unnecessarily high costs of financial restructurings when the crisis came. 
Another policy lesson we draw in this chapter is that the Thai central bank underestimated 
the risk of asset price deflation due to the collapse of real estate sector. 
4 Based on our evidence, we do not find that loan portfolios in commercial banks were obviously unsound. 
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The problems in Thailand did not end with the collapse of finance and real estate 
companies. There is one important institution that also plays a crucial role in the dynamics 
of the crisis, namely the widespread use of collateral for loans. When finance companies 
continued on lending to real estate firms so as to increase the size of their assets, these real 
estate firms use borrowed funds to speculate on land and property which are generally used 
as collateral for loans in other lines of businesses. This in turn increased the capacity to 
borrow in other sectors. Since Thai firms always have tendency towards debt financing, it 
was not surprising that corporate leverage increased across the board. This is where the 
`third explanation' (i. e. the `balance sheet' effects) of the crisis is most relevant here. The 
use of tight monetary policy during the second half of 1997 to stabilise the currency turned 
out to be costly, as it opened another channel for a domestic liquidity crunch which led to 
widespread bankruptcies of corporate sector. 
Macroeconomic dimensions of bankruptcy law reform in aftermath of the crisis are the 
main theme in Chapter 5. Following the Asian crisis, Claessens et al. (1999) find that, on 
average, 63 percent of the Asian firms were illiquid (i. e. earning less than debt service) and 
31 percent technically insolvent (i. e. outstanding debt greater than assets). Indonesia 
suffered the most, where 77 and 65 percent of firms in the country were illiquid and 
insolvent, respectively. This was followed by Thailand with two-thirds of all firms illiquid 
and around a quarter were technically bankrupt. 
One key policy issue that arises is how to deal with such widespread insolvency of 
domestic firms, arising from the sharp fall in currency values and the collapse in asset 
prices. While reforming bankruptcy procedures by strengthening creditor's rights and 
introducing the US Chapter 11-typed reorganisation law is necessary so as to ensure that 
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debts have been worked out in an orderly and efficient fashion, Miller and Stiglitz (1999) 
and Stiglitz (2001) argue that the nature of the bankruptcy law itself is not designed to deal 
with such systemic debt problems. This is because normal bankruptcy procedures which 
deal with individual cases might fail to internalise the price effects of the asset fire-sales. 
Secondly, the number of cases will be beyond the capacity of the judicial system. They 
argue for a case of a "super Chapter 11" -- a new provision where firms can automatically 
write off debt increases, due to devaluation, in excess of a given limit. 
Two key lessons can be drawn in this chapter: (i) the extent to which an insolvency system 
to be effective depends crucially not by the letter of law but whether they can be 
implemented; (ii) when the efficiency of legal system is taken into account (particularly the 
built-in delay involved in the judicial process), a creditor-oriented bankruptcy law may 
effectively turn into debtor-friendly regime. In the case of systemic debt crisis, while such 
build-in delay may help prevent fire-sales of assets, it can also create efficiency losses as 
efficient firms are prevented from being restructured. This justifies the need for Chapter 
11-style reorganisation law. But the latter played a minor role in the resolution of the debt 
crisis in Thailand. An alternative mechanism that turned out to be effective in Thailand is 
the establishment of out-of-court restructuring framework (CDRAC). We find that there 
are two important features in this Thai-style framework that can greatly help increase 
efficiency; namely (i) first priority in restructuring is given to large and efficient 
companies that have the most impact to the economy; (ii) the focus is on resolving debt 
owned by financial institutions, so that normal lending can be resumed and economic 
recovery facilitated. 
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1.3 A brief review of theories of currency and financial crisis 
Following the 1997/8 financial crisis in East Asia, several interpretations regarding its 
nature and mechanisms have been proposed. In this section, we do not attempt to provide 
extensive literature on the subject (see, for example, Corsetti, 1998, Dooley and Walsh, 
2000). 
1.3.1 First and second generation models of currency crisis 
Theories on currency crises before the Asian crisis are known as first and second 
generation models. In the former (Krugman, 1979 and Flood and Garber, 1984), an 
exchange rate crisis reflects the conflict between the needs of public sector finance and the 
preservation of a fixed exchange rate, leading to continuous reserve. This is considered 
effective in explaining the crises in Latin American countries during the 1980s. According 
to these models, a government suffering from a large fiscal deficit will try to monetize the 
deficit by extending domestic credit, thus making it difficult to maintain a fixed foreign 
exchange rate system. This is because in order to maintain a fixed foreign exchange rate 
system, money supply (the sum of domestic credit and foreign reserves) needs to be 
maintained at a certain level. The extension of domestic credit leads to a fall in foreign 
reserves by the same amount. When foreign reserves fall below a certain level, investors 
come to anticipate a depreciation of the currency and start to sell it, and the economy can 
no longer maintain the fixed foreign exchange rate system. 
The second explanation in terms of self-fulfilling speculative attack, developed to account 
for the largely unanticipated collapse of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1992, 
by Maurice Obstfeld (1994,1996) in particular. In this case, a currency crisis involves an 
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unanticipated shift from one equilibrium (a peg) to another (a float). As applied to the 
ERM crisis, the government was faced with the choice between sticking to an exchange 
rate peg (with no output stabilisation) and a surprise devaluation which would create extra 
jobs: in conditions of high unemployment, it would not take much to lead people to expect 
the latter and it would be optimal for the government to behave accordingly, i. e., self- 
fulfilling. 
It should be noted that this multiple equilibrium story provides no economic explanation of 
the coordination mechanism of what causes the attacks. As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1997, 
p. 652) point out "With multiple equilibria, some seemingly unimportant event could 
trigger an abrupt change in expectations, shifting the equilibrium... Such an event would 
look much like [a] sudden speculative attack on [the] exchange rate". In order to 
understand the mechanism for coordinating such a shift, Morris and Shin (1998) apply the 
concept of equilibrium selection to the multiple equilibrium model of currency crisis and 
argue that with small amount of asymmetric information about economic fundamentals, the 
multiplicity of equilibria can be eliminated, i. e. unique equilibrium of crisis. However, 
Boonprakaikawe and Ghosal (2002) challenge this view by arguing that if all investors 
observe public signals (such as stock market indices or exchange rate options) and if such 
signal has sufficiently precise information about the true state of fundamentals, then it 
becomes common knowledge. In this case, multiple equilibria would restore. 
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1.3.2 Third generation models of financial crisis in Asia 
Following the Asian crisis, it is widely agreed that the first and second generation models 
appear to be inconsistent with the situations in Asia. First, the fiscal situation of each 
country was sound and the currency collapse was largely unanticipated. Second, it seems 
inadequate to describe events as optimal regime choices by the governments concerned. 
Particularly, the East Asian countries had no especially large temptation to devalue; 
unemployment rate was low and the GDP growth was strong in all of the countries. In 
addition, the option of devaluation would have a large potential (and subsequently actual) 
cost in term of weakening corporations and banks which had substantial short-term, 
foreign exchange nominated debt, Furman and Stiglitz (1998). Furthermore, the 
devaluations both in the first and second generations are expansionary, i. e. they should lead 
to improvement in economic activity, Marion (1999). This is clearly not the case in Asia. 
Finally, financial crisis in Asia did not specific to crisis in foreign exchange market but 
also in other financial markets. 
This has led researchers to either build new theoretical models or to expand the existing 
theories to interpret the causes of the outbreak in Asia. These theories emphasise three 
different sources of problems. For moral hazard view, it is government limited ability to 
honour implicit guarantees (i. e. prospective large fiscal deficits). For financial panic view, 
the source of vulnerability comes from the balance sheet of financial institutions (i. e. 
maturity and currency mismatches). And for financial accelerator view, the main concern 
is in the balance sheets of domestic firms (i. e. high leverage and foreign currency debt 
exposure). 
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(i) The moral hazard view 
The basic explanation of this view is that implicit government guarantees on poorly- 
regulated banking system are the main source of the crisis (Krugman, 1998). Specifically, 
it is argued that while East Asian countries had a sound fiscal policy prior to the crisis, the 
bailout commitment to the failing financial institutions would eventually translate into a 
large increase in government's contingent liabilities and the expectations that these deficits 
would be financed by seigniorage revenues or an inflation tax, can give rise to a currency 
crisis (Dooley, 2000; Burnside et al. 2001; Corsetti et al., 1998). Note that these contingent 
liabilities effectively represent a fiscal problem that would not be apparent until the crisis 
unfolds; this interpretation therefore has a parallel to the first generation currency crisis 
model that emphasises fiscal deficits and their monetisation as an underlying cause of 
crisis (Marion, 1999). 
(ii) The financial panic view 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) argue that it is hard to understand the magnitude of the economic 
collapse without reference to the severe turmoil in the financial sector: i. e., the 
deterioration of conventional fundamentals seems too small to explain the magnitude of the 
subsequent crisis. 
By way of theoretical background, they cite the work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
where the source of financial fragility is maturity mismatch and bank runs can be triggered 
by exogenous stochastic demands for liquidity by some depositors and not by fears of 
imprudent lending. Banks lend prudently and are essentially solvent, but their investments 
are illiquid: it is the conflict between the liquidity needs of some depositors and the 
illiquidity of the bank's assets that can precipitate a bank run. While a run on the deposits 
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of a single, solvent bank may be satisfied by disposing of its assets to other banks, this is 
not true if there is a generalised bank panic affecting the banking system as a whole. In that 
case, deposit withdrawals can lead to a `self-fulfilling' financial collapse, with the efforts 
of all banks to dispose of illiquid assets in a hurry leading to falling asset values and 
widespread insolvency. 
The financial panic view is further refined by Chang and Velasco (1998a) who develop an 
`open economy' version of Diamond and Dybvig. Chang and Velasco argue that currency 
crisis in Asia occurred because the objectives of stabilising banks and keeping the 
exchange rate peg become mutually incompatible. To help the bank, the central bank must 
pursue an expansionary monetary policy, either to keep interest rates from rising (and 
further wreck in the banks) or to provide lender-of-last-resort funds. But in either case 
private agents will use the additional domestic currency to buy reserves, eventually causing 
the collapse of the fixed exchange rate. A balance of payments crisis is best understood as 
a situation in which a central bank runs out of international liquidity. Chang and Velasco 
(2002, p. 425) define international illiquidity as a situation when "its potential short-term 
obligations in foreign currency exceed the amount of foreign currency to which it can have 
access on short notice" 
Marion (1999, footnote 18) makes an observation that: "It is interesting that open-economy 
bank run models developed to analyze the Asian crises are based on the Diamond-Dybvig 
approach since empirical evidence from earlier crises favors the `asymmetric information' 
view of bank runs over the Diamond-Dybvig `random withdrawal' story". In response to 
this point, it should be noted that, although it is widely believed that there is no moral 
hazard in the Diamond-Dybvig model, it has been suggested that it may account for the 
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nature of the contracts. In particular, Sayantan Ghosal argues that, with a wider set of 
contracts, if the payouts to depositors from asset liquidations could be made contingent on 
the number of other simultaneous liquidations, then bank runs might be avoided. This is 
because such contracts impose a penalty on joining the herd, rather than giving an 
incentive as is the case with the First-Come-First-Serve rule. Why are such contracts not 
used? The answer, he argues, is that the discretion they would give to bank managers is 
subject to moral hazard; the contracts make them responsible for liquidating assets and 
they cannot be trusted. So the existence of demand deposit is a device to check moral 
hazard on part of the bank. This means that imposing deposit insurance would do more 
harm than good because it might open the door for a bank manager to gamble for 
resurrection. 
(iii) The balance sheet view 
At the core of this view is the consideration that the Asian financial crisis does not end 
with a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime, because the devaluation itself appear to 
produce a dynamic feedback effect on the banking sector and the real economy. As argued 
by Aghion et al (2001), the crisis should be interpreted as a result of a shock that gets 
amplified by a `financial accelerator mechanism'. They show that a sudden currency 
depreciation increases firms' debt repayment in foreign currency; hence their profits 
decline, which in turn tightens the borrowing constraint. A fall in investment and output 
then reduces demand for domestic currency and leads to further depreciation. Note that 
there are two main types of balance sheet effects. The balance sheet effects presented in 
Aghion et al works through reduction in future aggregate supply, while in Krugman 
(1999), they reduce current aggregate demand. 
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Chapter 2 
Asset price bubbles and collapse 
2.1 Introduction 
In early 1997 Thailand had completed another year of rapid growth. There were some 
warning signs large current account imbalances and stock market past their peak but 
nothing to indicate impending disaster. By the year-end the country was in the throes of 
severe financial crisis, with share prices falling by a half in local currency value, and 
currencies halving against the dollar despite emergency funding from the IMF. 
Before the crisis, Thai baht were effectively pegged to the dollar and competitiveness was 
lost as the dollar strengthened. But surging capital inflows allowed an excessive credit 
build-up during the economic boom, financed in large part by financial institutions 
borrowing short term in foreign currency; this created over-valued assets, especially in the 
real estate or property sector. When the financial crisis was triggered by speculative attacks 
on the over-valued currencies, it rapidly led to a vicious downward spiral in other financial 
markets. 
There has been extensive research on the role of the financial system in the macroeconomy 
and its importance in propagating business cycles; see, for example Bernanke (1983) on 
the Great Depression, Bernanke and Gertler (1995), King (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997), and Allen and Gale (2000). These studies show how the banking sector can 
amplify the magnitude of the business cycle because bank credit behaves procyclically. A 
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booming economy raises expectations about the future, increases the willingness of firms 
to invest and induces them to borrow more, causing an expansion in bank credit: in a 
downturn, loans are recalled tightening credit and exacerbating the recession. In addition, 
the paper by Allen and Gale emphasises the agency problem that arises when investors are 
able to use borrowed funds so as to gain from good outcomes but avoid losses because of 
limited liability. 
In a globally integrated environment, with strong growth and large capital inflows (as in 
East Asia), these credit market effects can be more pronounced than in closed economies, 
as capital inflows give banks and near-banks a larger supply of funds to intermediate, 
allowing them to increase credit rapidly and substantially change the allocation of 
resources. I The lax regulation of financial institutions in East Asia meant that poor 
investment of borrowed funds was not uncommon, though it took different forms in 
different countries: in Thailand there was excessive property development, in Korea 
overinvestment in Chaebol, and in Indonesia the problem of connected lending. For recent 
evidence of an association between large capital inflows, lending booms and 
banking/currency crises, see World Bank Report (1997), Goldstein and Turner (1996), 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and Gavin and Hausmann (1996). 
This chapter draws on this literature and takes much the same perspective as Krugman 
(1998) who observes that, to understand the crisis in Asia, one must focus on the role of 
financial intermediaries and the price of land and other assets. Krugman focuses on the 
incentives for undercapitalised and deregulated financial intermediaries to overvalue risky 
assets and create an asset bubble; here we take up the story after the bubble breaks. We 
As Krugman (1998, pp. 78-79) points out, in a closed economy, it would be the rate of interest rather than 
the volume of investment that responds excess demand. 
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show how the scramble for liquidity in credit-constrained markets can rapidly turn 
financial boom into bust. Our aim in this paper is to employ a consistent approach to study 
both the dynamics of financial contraction and techniques of crisis management. The 
framework used is one where collateral plays a central role and adverse exogenous shocks 
can trigger a vicious spiral of falling asset values and loan recalls. 2 
In this framework, market imperfections are created by the lack of contractibility by 
agents, so only physical assets (i. e. land) can be used as collateral by highly-leveraged, 
credit-constrained borrowers and creditors limit gross borrowing to the present discounted 
value of land in order to protect themselves from the threat of repudiation. This implies 
that the ability of borrowers to acquire collateral determine their investment decisions and 
the interaction between asset prices and credit constraint can play an important role in 
generating the amplification of an adverse shock. Note that Kiyotaki and Moore mainly 
discuss positive productivity shock, so the possibility of collapse is ruled out. Here, our 
purpose is to look at financial contractions, i. e. what would happen if asset price bubble 
bursts which cuts the value of land being used as collateral. In addition, we emphasise the 
fragility of equilibrium created by corporate leverage and shows how rapidly boom can 
turn to bust as a sudden fall in collateral value can create the possibility that firms's net 
worth is entirely wiped out and the entire financial system collapses. 
This chapter is organised as follows. To motivate the formal analysis that follows, Section 
2.2 shows how loan recalls generate a `positive feedback' effect where falling asset prices 
triggers further sales, but ignores the dynamic effects these sales may have on asset prices. 
Section 2.3 outlines the analytical framework used here, namely the model of credit cycles 
2 For an alternative approach to financial vulnerability in emerging economies --with endogeneous cycles but 
no collateral requirements -- see Aghion et al. (1999). 
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developed by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) [henceforth KM] to study the first-round effects 
on net worth and the further `knock-on' effects that asset sales have on prices. In section 
2.4, we examine the effects on land prices of two shocks which have hit the East Asian 
economy, the bursting of an asset price bubble (with origins, it may be, in the moral hazard 
problem of under-regulated financial institutions as Krugman and others suggest); and an 
unanticipated devaluation (with unhedged foreign currency borrowing). Section 2.5 
discusses how wholesale financial collapse can be averted by co-ordinated loan roll-overs 
in a form of general financial freeze: and how the breathing space gained in this way can 
be used to arrange for loan write-downs or capital injections. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Leverage and margin calls 
Leverage has played a key role in creating vulnerability and propagating financial crisis. 
For example, the US stock market in 1929, where share prices rose over 200 percent 
between 1925 and 1928 and ultimately collapsed by 90 percent in value, was widely 
attributed to high leverage. As noted by Jacobs (1999): "While margin credit abetted the 
market's rise in 1929, the stock sales forced by margin calls exacerbated the ensuing crash. 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 recognized this, empowering the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System to regulate margin credit in the hope of preventing 
subsequent collapses. Just as margin liquidations contributed to the 1929 crash, the forced 
selling of stock by insurers served to undermine the market in 1987. " (p. 174). 
In this section, we discuss how margin calls generate a `positive feedback' effect where 
falling asset prices triggers further sales. For present purposes, however, we ignore the 
dynamic effects these sales may have on asset prices (as the extension of leverage raises 
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asset prices and vice versa). These are explicitly considered in the next section in the 
formal model of Kiyotaki and Moore. 
How margin calls trigger asset sales in the face of falling stock market prices is illustrated 
in Figure 2.1 below, where the horizontal axis is number of shares held by investors while 
the vertical axis represents values of their net worth and stock portfolio. For convenience, 
variables used here is consistent with the KM model in the next section, i. e. q is price of 
stock, k is number of shares held, m is margin requirements, and n is net worth. As lenders 
require credit-constrained investors to put a margin of m in order to lend up to 1-m of the 
share values, total portfolio value of investors at date 0, measured by the distance OV0, 
consists of two components: own net worth (ONO) and the amount borrowed (NOVO). These 
are separated by line OM (where its slope equals to mqo) at point A. Assuming that m is 
0.5, so a net worth of 50 can be levered with a 50 margin loan to buy a 100 stock portfolio. 
(Note that, during the 1929 stock market crash in the US, Jacobs (1999, p. 174) 
documented that "margins were unregulated at that time and exhibited considerable 
variation across brokerage firms. Minimum margins were customarily on the order of 10 to 
25 percent; the average effective margin rate was about 50 percent in October 1929. ") 
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Figure 2.1: Leverage and margin calls 
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Now suppose that a temporary adverse shock hits the stock market at date 1, which reduces 
share prices by 10 percent, i. e. from Vo to V1. This leads the net worth of investors to drop 
by 20 percent i. e. from 50 to 40. At point B, loans are under-collaterised, so `margin calls' 
by creditors force them either to provide additional funds (by 5) or, if not, to reduce their 
debts (to 40). Assuming that investors are credit-constrained and have used all net worth 
for loans, these margin calls force them to reduce their debts by a sale of 10 of stock (i. e 11 
percent of 90 portfolio), as shown by the movement from point B to C in the figure. 
What if m is smaller or leverage is higher? Algebraically, one would find that two 
components are at work: first, an initial fall in share prices gives rise to a drop in net worth 
which is scaled up by the leverage factor of 1/m; second, since the fall in net worth means 
that these margin loans are being under-collaterised, in restoring margin rule, investors are 
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forced to reduce debt from asset sales. Hence, one can write the overall proportional 
change of share prices to share sales as follows. 
(k1-ko)/ko 
_ 
(k, - ko)/ko * 
(n, -no)/no m) 
go *1 
(q1 - qo)/qo (n, -no)/no (q, - qo)/qo q, m 
As shown in the figure above, with 0.5 margin requirements, a 10 percent fall in prices 
causes the net worth to drop by 20 percent as 11 percent of shares held in margin are sold. 
But if a required margin is very low, for example m=0.1, this 10 percent fall in share 
prices will be enough to wipe out all net worth of the credit-constrained investors who are 
forced to leave the market. 
While the above discussion demonstrates the role of leverage in creating vulnerability to 
the financial system - as prices fall force margin investors buying on margin to sell -- it 
misses one important aspect, i. e. the dynamic interaction between forced sales and asset 
prices. In the formal model that follows, this feedback can potentially be powerful in that 
this forced selling may well further depress prices, leading to a downward spiral of asset 
prices and loan recalls; so the process of unwinding leveraged positions to meet margin 
calls can lead to financial collapse. 3 When highly-leveraged property companies in 
Thailand were hit by adverse shocks in the crisis of 1997, for example, the effects of the 
initial shocks (e. g. bursting of land price bubble and/or a sudden devaluation) were 
magnified both because their net worth was reduced by a greater proportion and because 
their efforts to repay loans by selling assets turned illiquidity into insolvency. 
3 When prices are rising, of course, and the ability to borrow is directly linked to price of assets that serve as 
collateral, a rise in asset prices will facilitate even more borrowing and this will drive the price up. 
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2.3 The basic KM model 
In this section, we use the model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), hereafter KM, to study the 
first-round effects on net worth and the further `knock-on' effects that asset sales have on 
prices. Before using it to show how the ending of an asset bubble and a sudden devaluation 
of the currency can easily lead to financial collapse, we provide a simple linear quadratic 
formulation of their model. 
Assumption is that there are two sectors, the credit-constrained sector whose land holdings 
are largely financed by short-term borrowing, i. e. bought on margin; and another sector 
which is not credit constrained whose ability to absorb asset sales determine their price of 
land. We refer to the first sector as `property companies': (KM refer to them as `farmers'). 
Second sector is a consolidation of the lending institutions and all other land-owners; for 
convenience, we refer to these lenders/owners as `finance houses' (corresponding to KM 
`gatherers' ). 
How is the quantity of land held by the property companies, denoted k,, determined? We 
begin with a- slightly simplified - budget constraint4: 
gt(kt - ki-1) + Rb1-1 = akt-1 + bt 
Land accumulation + Debt repaid = Income + Borrowing 
(1) 
4 Note that the left-hand side of this equation includes consumption purchases, while the right-hand side 
includes the non-tradable output from land. Since these turn out to be equal in equilibrium, they drop out 
from the equation. Further details on this issue are discussed in Chapter 4. 
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where bt is the amount of one-period borrowing, repaid as Rb, (R being one plus the one- 
period interest rate), qt is price of land, and a measures the productivity of land in this 
sector. 
The reason for credit constraints is that the owner/manager of each company in this sector 
uses an 'idiosyncratic 5 technology' and retains the right to withdraw labour. This means 
that owner/managers may credibly threaten creditors with repudiation, and puts a strict 
upper limit on the amount of external finance that can be raised, as "debt contracts secured 
on land are the only financial instruments investors can rely on" KM (1997, p. 218). The 
rate of expansion of these highly-leveraged, credit-constrained property companies is thus 
determined not by their inherent earning power but by their ability to acquire collateral. 
Assuming that there is no margin requirement and borrowing gross of interest is chosen to 
match the expected value of collateral implies 
b, = E1(q,, I)kl/R. (2) 
Since there is generally no aggregate uncertainty in this model and agents are assumed to 
have perfect foresight, Et(gt+l) = qr+l - except for the initial unanticipated aggregate shock. 
After substitution in (1), one obtains 
(qt - qr+ f/R)kt = aki_ j (3) 
5 Idiosyncratic in the sense that once production has started at date t, only s/he has the skill necessary to 
produce output at t+ 1, i. e., if s/he were to withdraw labour between t and t+ 1, there will 
be no output at t+ 1, 
only the land k,. Note that the manner in which Long-Term Capital Management was rescued 
in 1998 
supports the notion of an idiosyncratic technology - at least for hedge 
funds: the reason why the existing 
management was not replaced was that only Nobel Prize winners could understand the contracts! 
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where the LHS measures the net-of-borrowing cost of acquiring land kk and the RHS 
measures the net worth6 of the firms at beginning of the period. As KM (1997, p. 220) 
remark, the firms use all their "net worth to finance the difference between price of land, qt 
and the amount they can borrow against a unit of land, q, +i/R. This difference qt - qt+1/R 
can be thought of as the down payment required to purchase a unit of land". 
It is worth emphasising here that, in this specification, the down payment is effectively a 
`prepayment of interest'. This is because lenders apply a discount when evaluating the 
future collateral value for loans, so there is a wedge between the current value of land and 
the amount that can be borrowed. (Note that the rate of land price inflation is always 
smaller than the rate of interest in this model. ) Interestingly, the existence of the wedge 
implies that own funds are required, even though firms are fully leveraged. This means that 
the ability to borrow by the credit-constrained firms is limited by own net worth. Since 
these funds can be used as a buffer against an adverse shock. So one can also think of this 
up-front payment as a `quasi-margin'. (Note that actual margin requirements imposed by 
lenders mean that firms require to hold a margin of m and they lend only the fraction of 1- 
m of the collateral value; the size of m generally depends on the cost of liquidation, for 
example, expected legal and other transaction costs. ) But the size of the quasi margin in 
this case depends on rate of interest. For example, in equilibrium where land price is 100, 
if interest rate is set to 50 percent, the leverage ratio (defined as the value of debt claim 
over the value of firm's net worth) will be q*k*/ak* = R/(R-1), i. e. three times or the quasi 
margin required is one-third of loans. 
6By definition, the net worth of property companies at the beginning of date t is the value of tradable output 
and land held from the previous period, net of debt repayment, i. e. (a + qdk1., - Rb1_, = ak,.,. 
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The arbitrage condition for the other users of land, the `finance houses', implies 
f(kr) + qr+i - qt = (R - 1)q1 (4) 
where f(k1) is the marginal productivity of land in the unconstrained sector. Or, as KM put 
it, 
(qr - qc+I/R) =f(kc)/R = u(kc) (5) 
where u(k1) is the discounted marginal productivity of land in the unconstrained sector 
(which, because of arbitrage, we refer to as the `user cost' of land in what follows). 
Equating the down payment required to purchase a unit of land to the user cost, i. e. 
substituting (5) into (3), gives 
(kt) k, =ßk2t= akt-1" R 
(6) 
where, for simplicity of exposition, we assume that the user cost is proportional to kt, 
(Specifically ßk, measures the rate of decline in the marginal productivity of land used by 
the finance houses, and the discount factor 1/R reflects the one-period lag in production. ) 
Combining (5) and (6) yields a non-linear difference equation: 
Ra 
k= kr-ý '. (7) 
There are evidently two equilibria, one at zero and the other at k* = Ra/ß; the latter is 
stable while the former is not. 
7 Note that -- on the assumption that total amount of 
land is fixed in supply -- the user cost (i. e. the 
discounted marginal product) is, for convenience, expressed in (5) as an increasing function of land held by 
property sector -- instead of a decreasing 
function of land used by finance houses themselves. 
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Figure 2.2. Dynamics of the KM model with no surprise 
User cost ofla'nd holdings 
a 
k, 
: onstrained firm 
Land holdings 
The path of convergence to k* from an initial value of kt< k* is also shown in the lower 
panel where the vertical axis measures its productivity in the small business and the user 
cost of land (its discounted productivity in the other sector). As (6) requires ak, _, 
(i. e. net 
worth) be set equal to u(kt)kt (today's holdings times the user cost), the points labelled A 
and B must lie on the same rectangular hyperbola, labelled HH in the figure. This 
illustrates how to find kt given kt_1. (On the same principle, land holding in period t+1 can 
be found by shifting the hyperbola to the right as shown. ) Note that the net worth of 
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k j+, 
k. k, k, +1 
property companies (akc_1) increases as k approaches k*. This is because, with credit 
rationing, the productivity of land in this sector is higher than the user cost. 
In these circumstances, the value of land is given by the present discounted value of user 
costs i. e. 
00 
Qr =Iu l+s 
> 
S S=0 R 
(8) 
where these are measured along the path towards equilibrium. In the analysis below, we 
approximate this by the linear function 
qt- q* = e(kt- k*) (9) 
where q*=R al(R-1) and B, which measures the sensitivity of land prices to land sales, = 
ß/(R-0/2), and the autoregressive coefficient of land accumulation, 0= (Ra/)6) 112; so 9= 
ß/(R-1 /2) where 0 =1. 
Before adding extra features to their model, KM use it to study the effects of a temporary 
productivity shock which unexpectedly raises the parameter a by da for one period only; 
and they show that because the small business sector is credit-constrained, this has effects 
on the value and allocation of land which persist beyond one period. They emphasise that 
this unexpected rise in productivity not only eases the borrowing constraint on small 
businesses directly by raising a in (6), it also helps indirectly by raising the price of their 
land, which (because debt is not indexed) raises their net worth. 
In the face of a one-time positive productivity shock, which occurs when the system is in 
equilibrium, (6) needs to be recast as: 
32 
u(kr)k, =(a+da+q, -q)k* (10) 
where da is the `direct' effect of the productivity gain and qr - q* is the `indirect' effect due 
to the rise in land prices. 8 
Much more important for our purposes, which is to look at contractions, is what would 
happen if the productivity shock were negative. It might appear from Kiyotaki and 
Moore's assumptions that equation (10) would not apply in that case, as any unanticipated 
fall in land prices would lead borrowers to negotiate debt write-downs. If all unanticipated 
capital losses have to be borne by the lender, this would buffer the system against negative 
shocks, but it would undermine the use of land as collateral. But this is not true if, as they 
indicate in KM's Footnote 13 (p. 224), the unexpected shock takes place after the labour 
supply decision has been taken, see Figure 4 below. For, in this case, borrower can no 
longer costlessly repudiate the debt contract: to walk away would be to lose all of his/her 
net worth. 
Figure 2.3: The timing of events 
Period t 
Unexpected shock 
Debt 
contract 
signed 
Labour supply Land acquisition 
decision or sales 
Period t+1 
Output New debt contract 
Produced (including substantial rollover) 
8 Note that, in the KM model, without the inclusion of non-tradable output, with positive productivity shock, 
farmers would not have an incentive to hold more land in the market equilibrium and so the borrowing 
constraint would become non-binding. This is because it is not profitable for them to do so as the marginal 
return from investing one more unit of land is less than cost of buying land i. e. a1(R- l)<Ra1(R-1)=q *. 
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2.4 Bursting bubbles and escalating debts 
Land prices in Thailand fell more than a quarter in 1997 and the baht lost half of its value 
against the dollar. How do credit constraints operate if a property price bubble bursts (or 
there is a sudden increase in debts due to unhedged foreign currency borrowing), so 
liabilities are no longer fully collaterised? Lenders try to protect themselves from 
repudiation of debts backed by inalienable capital by lending only on the security of 
marketable collateral. But where is their protection when collateral values fall with the 
bursting of a property bubble? In reality, lenders will be protected by the cushion of 
borrowers equity (and their willingness to inject new capital): and this can be seen in the 
almost complete collapse in the share value of property companies in Thailand for 
example. But if this is insufficient, then lenders will have to face the consequences. 
On the strict timing assumption of the KM model (see Figure 2.3 above), there can be no 
write-down of uncollateralised lending: it will instead be recalled. The formal reason for 
this is that by deciding to supply labour before the shock comes, borrowers have forfeited 
their bargaining strength. Another reason is that for lenders 'adversity is strength': 
borrowers in Thailand were unable to negotiate a prompt write-down because their losses 
exceeded the capacity of the lenders to pay. Finance houses could only have paid if they 
themselves were bailed out, but that would have posed a severe problem of moral hazard - 
as the IMF was quick to point out. (The IMF blamed implicitly-insured financial 
institutions for the asset price bubble and would not have approved of government 
subsidies for this purpose. ) 
With finance houses unable to absorb the capital losses, their efforts to recall loans (a 
squeeze) runs a considerable risk of simply driving borrowers into bankruptcy as sales of 
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land push down land prices: and the alternative of lenders rolling-up loans may be 
undermined by free-riding, i. e., those who roll-up will be undermined by those who go for 
the cash. So later we look at how a complete freeze on lending can solve this collective 
action problem and stabilise property prices. 
2.4.1 A squeeze - loan recalls: general equilibrium 
Kiyotaki and Moore focus on solution paths which converge to equilibrium. As this is a 
saddlepoint equilibrium, however, there are also paths that diverge, as shown in Figure 2.4. 
In the absence of future changes, these paths are essentially asset bubbles. Gambling 
financial resources on a speculative bubble is not so implausible when investors can use 
other people's money for the purpose. In that case, a speculative bubble may be another 
manifestation of moral hazard. 
Allen and Gale (2000) derive a simple theory of bubbles based on agency relationships. 
Investors use borrowed money to invest in assets. Risky assets are relatively attractive 
because investors can default in low payout states so their price is bid up; and Krugman 
(1998) describes how such an asset price bubble will end if financial guarantees are 
withdrawn following an unfavourable outcome. As incentives in lending institutions are 
not modelled in this paper, we simply assume that they are willing to gamble financial 
resources on speculative bubbles9 which take asset prices above equilibrium. 
Consider specifically the unstable path leading directly upwards from equilibrium at E in 
Figure 2.4 and assume that lenders effectively ignore the probability of the bubble 
bursting. (On such a dynamic path, asset prices which begin above equilibrium will keep 
9 These speculative bubbles will have different time-series properties from the `Pangloss' value discussed by 
Krugman (1998). How the latter may be incorporated within the framework used here is discussed in Milnes 
(1998). 
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growing at a speed given by q1+i = Rqt - ßk* .) Say the bubble were to burst when land 
values reach qb . If lenders were willing to absorb all the losses as asset prices drop to q*, 
then there would be a prompt return to equilibrium at E. If not, loans will be recalled 
because of inadequate collateral, leading to `fire-sales' of land and depressed land prices; 
the fall in land prices will `overshoot' equilibrium. 
Figure 2.4: Adverse shock and land price `overshooting' 
Lan 
9 
User cost and net worth 
0 
Land holdings 
The first-period equilibrium after the bubble bursts is determined as described above after 
the unanticipated productivity shock, see Equation (10) replacing Aa by q* - qb . That 
is, 
i 
i 
IU 
Land holdings 
I Bubble bursting (q ;-q b)k t 
IN 
Overshooting (q, -q 
*)k 
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N k, k' 
ß(k)2 
[a+(q, -q*)-(gb-9)]k* (11) R 
The solution to equation (11) is shown in the lower panel of Figure 2.4. The LHS of this 
equation, the quadratic function OU, shows the user cost of land (with equilibrium at point 
E where the OU crosses the line ak); and the RHS, labelled NN, gives the net worth of all 
property companies after the bubble has burst. It is shown as a linear function of k with 
slope 6k*, as qt - q* has been replaced by the approximation 9(kl - k*). First-period 
equilibrium is where the two curves intersect. 
The net worth of property companies falls for two reasons: first the impact of land prices 
dropping to long-run equilibrium at q* (shown by the distance EN in the figure); and, in 
addition, the `overshooting' due to forced sales by property companies. (It is because the 
latter depends on the volume of disposals, that the net worth function NN slopes downward 
to the left in the figure. ) We illustrate the case where OU and NN intersect at a unique 
equilibrium point, C, where the net worth of all property companies is just sufficient to 
provide the down payment of land holdings, kc. The distance EN, which measures (qb - 
q *)k*, indicates the size of the largest adverse shock consistent with survival of credit- 
constrained borrowers. Note that this unique equilibrium is a special case, there may be 
multiple equilibria or none. A smaller shock, which leaves the net worth schedule above 
NN, yields two equilibria (above and below kr); while a larger shock, with a net worth 
schedule below NN, rules out any intersection - so all the credit-constrained firms go out 
of business. 
It is importance to note that, while such a fall in land prices creates negative externalities 
across the credit-constrained sector, there appears to be conflicting factors following 
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adverse macro shocks. First, as discussed above, is direct negative effect due to capital 
losses from initial adverse shock and the subsequent knock-on effects. Second is indirect 
positive effect i. e. an increase in profit on land not sold. The first can lead to complete 
collapse; but, if avoided, the second permits complete recovery. As shown in the figure 
above, the net worth of these property companies will be rebuilt by following the dynamic 
path sketched in the figure from C to E. 
The reason behind this positive effect is that a fall in land prices enables the credit- 
constrained sector to exploit their profit opportunity from using `cheap land' relative to the 
equilibrium level at E while the other sector can not. To see how, consider the no-arbitrage 
condition given in equation (4) which determines the opportunity cost from using land in 
period t, i. e. 
f (k`) 
+ 
q`+' q` 
=r, where f(kd is the marginal productivity of land in the 
q, q1 
unconstrained sector. Using their remaining land, the credit-constrained firms realise a 
total return of akt (at point D in the figure). By comparing this with the other unconstrained 
sector (which is subject to the arbitrage condition), one can see that there is profit 
opportunity for credit-constrained firms which arises from the difference in productivity 
level between two sectors. (i. e. the distance between point C and D). So, along the dynamic 
path from point C to E where the total return from using land is always greater than the 
user cost of land, these property companies are able to use these extra profit to rebuild their 
net worth until the equilibrium reaches at point E where there is no more extra profit and 
so land holding by credit-constrained sector equals to Ra/ß. 
What would happen if a margin call triggers land sales but leaves land prices staying at 
equilibrium q*? Since land sales do not generate further fall in prices, the first-period 
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equilibrium of the property companies' net worth reduce to [a - (qb -q )]k#. So land sales 
(k1 - k) required is the same as the size of the bubble (q* - qb). In this case, line NN 
becomes horizontal. To find out if there is a prospect for recovery, one needs to compare 
with the user cost of land. Since land prices stay at q*, this implies that the user cost of land 
is (R-1)q*/R which equals to a. So, in effect, the quadratic line OU has now become the 
same as line OE and so one can see that there is no profit opportunity to be made by 
property companies because their return is equal to the opportunity of using land. 
Therefore, the size of credit-constrained property companies will be reduced 
permanently lo 
Note that, in an open economy setting, where unhedged short-term borrowing in foreign 
currency is a significant source of finance for land holdings, the financial sector is highly 
exposed to exchange rate movements. Let f be the fraction of total borrowing in foreign 
currency loans and ö, the unexpected devaluation; as this raises local currency value of 
total borrowing by ß %, it will have the same effect on the property market as aß% 
collapse in land prices. 
2.5 Financial stabilisation 
2.5.1 A freeze - loan roll-ups 
By driving down property prices and causing bankruptcy, lenders trying to recall loans 
impose externalities on others willing to roll-over or write-off debt. A freeze is one way of 
solving this collective action problem. How is it put in place? Once again, we take 
Thailand as example. There the operations of the finance houses who provide credit to 
10 Following random walk if the shock is repeated. 
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property companies were temporarily suspended, in some cases from a date preceding the 
devaluation of the baht. During the freeze, no loans are recalled and any arrears of interest 
are rolled up, so there need be no `fire-sale' disposals of land and prices can fall to 
equilibrium without overshooting. Current lenders have to provide `temporary financing' 
over and above what the rules of collateral would allow, so they are collectively forced to 
act as lenders of last resort. 
Note that if forced land sales are to be avoided, i. e. k1 = k*, lending must be determined not 
by the value of collateral but by the requirement that 
bt = Rbb - ak* = (qb- a)k* (12) 
i. e., new lending must exceed the principal of outstanding loans as interest payments are 
partly rolled up. [This follows from the budget constraint for the period after the bubble 
has burst which can be written q, (k, - k*) + Rbb = ak* + bt where bb = qbk*/R, i. e. the 
inherited level of borrowing reflects over-valued land prices. ] 
2.5.2 Financial restructuring - loan write-downs 
A financial freeze may prevent a collapse in land prices, but property companies cannot 
continue rolling up interest in this fashion forever. (Asymptotically, their debt would 
expand at the rate of interest, which violates the intertemporal budget constraint, see 
Appendix II) Debt write-downs and/or capital injections are required. But in Thailand, the 
write-downs needed exceeded the capital of the finance houses, so the authorities had to 
step in with public money. For obvious reasons of moral hazard, IMF conditionality ruled 
out using public funds to keep finance houses going under existing management. (The 
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main piece of evidence is the IMF-enforced closure of 56 out of the 91 finance houses, 
whose assets have been taken over by the government for later disposal. ) 
The resolution of property crisis in Thailand was freeze in 1997, followed by the closure of 
most finance houses: the next step will be a debt write-down for the property companies, 
together with capital injections mostly from foreign firms. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
Let the initial adverse shock reduces net worth almost to zero before any knock-on effects 
are taken into consideration, see the net worth schedule NN. By providing roll-ups of EN, a 
freeze shifts the net worth schedule to OE and maintains a temporary equilibrium at E 
without any land sales; but net worth would inevitably fall to zero if fire-sales take place 
when the freeze ends. Debt write-downs of value MN will stabilise situation: the net worth 
of the property companies after reconstruction is shown by MM with temporary 
equilibrium at point C (i. e. landholdings of ke) and subsequent recovery to equilibrium at E 
as indicated in the figure. 
Figure 2.5: Averting collapse: Roll-ups, write-downs and recovery 
0 
. owns 
Land holdings 
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User cost and net worth 
Our exposition has focused on debt write-downs, Ab < 0; but in Thailand, for example, the 
market also expects cash injections from foreign companies tempted by low land prices 
and the cheap baht to take equity stakes in the property sector, as indicated by the term dc 
above. In the KM model where all land is used to collateralise loans, equity participation is 
actually ruled out because there is no credible residual value for shareholders (see KM, 
1997, p. 218, footnote 8). With margin requirements and debt write-downs, however, there 
could well be some residual value to re-assure equity investors (though equity financing is 
not something we formally analyse in this chapter). 
Algebraically, the minimum amount of financial reconstruction required to avoid 
wholesale bankruptcy can be determined from the condition that 
ß(kC)2 
=[a+q(kc)-qb-db+dc]k* (13) R 
where kk is the `unique' first-period equilibrium shown in Fig. 2.5, -Ab is a debt write- 
down and dc is a capital injection. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
A number of economists have blamed the depth and persistence of the Great Depression in 
the USA on collapsing credit markets. Could similar mechanisms have played a role in 
ending the East Asian economic miracle - and in creating fragility in global financial 
markets? 
It is widely agreed that the availability of abundant funds with little monitoring has led to 
over-inflated property prices. And it appears that asset sales by credit-constrained firm in 
response to adverse shocks could greatly amplify their effects. So, without intervention, the 
sudden ending of an asset bubble (or an exchange rate peg) might lead to financial 
collapse. 
To shed light on the financial crisis affecting East Asia, we have applied Kiyotaki and 
Moore's model of credit cycles to land-holding property companies and analysed how 
stabilisation policy might prevent financial collapse. Among the drastic policy measures 
used to protect the financial system examined was a financial freeze, which delays loan 
recalls, and financial reconstruction to reduce debt and increase capital. While these may 
be effective crisis measures, the vulnerability of the financial systems in East Asia suggests 
the need for prevention, primarily by improved regulation of banks and near-banks so as to 
nip asset bubbles in the bud. To discourage exposure to unhedged foreign currency 
borrowing, Chile and Columbia tax short-term external borrowing more than long term, the 
justification being that they reduce a negative externality, namely systemic collapse. 
Further research on how highly-leveraged, financial institutions function might help 
explain the vulnerability of the global financial system to adverse shocks - and suggest 
ways to increase stability. 
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Appendix I: Temporary finance 
Consider the idea that creditors might roll over part of the loan, which firms promise to 
repay from the tradable goods available in the next period. This is an attractive prospect. 
For the creditors, it avoids a potentially costly liquidation and offers the prospect of 
repayment in full. For the debtors, the surrender of future tradable goods will slow the rate 
of recovery, but it will ensure survival. 
To see how extra lending offers a path to recovery, suppose first that there is no co- 
ordination/free-rider problems among lenders, they roll over debts by amount F when the 
shock occurs (in period t) and the borrowers promise to give some of their tradable output 
by the amount of RF in the next period (period t+l). If the amount provided is the 
minimum required to avert collapse, then this extra money would be just sufficient to shift 
the financing constraint up to provide a unique first-period equilibrium at C. Algebraically, 
the amount of temporary financing required can be determined from the condition that 
u(kk)k, _ [(1 - 0)a + qc - qb]k* +F (Al) 
where kk is the unique equilibrium shown in the figure below. 
The amount of temporary finance provided may well exceed this minimum, shifting the 
financing constraint above the line MM in the figure and reducing the impact of the shock 
on land prices. With this given amount, there is convergence back to equilibrium at E. Note 
that, as the property companies have to give up some of their tradable output for repayment 
of RF in period t+l, they can only expand their business from the condition that u(kt+i)kt+I 
= ak, - 
RF. 
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Figure 2.6: Temporary finance 
User cost and net worth 
0 Land holdings 
So there is a clear economic case for emergency credit. As long as the borrowers are 
solvent, the prospect for voluntary rollovers looks promising. But what if the debtor cannot 
pre-commit? It is assumed in the KM model that seizure is the only credible option for the 
creditor. And the borrower can threaten to repudiate the existing loan by taking down 
payment and labour, and signing a new debt contract with another lender without adverse 
effects from earlier repudiation. In addition, it is also assumed in KM that traded goods 
cannot be seized when default occurs. This is because debtor simply runs away with 
whatever output they have. Under the provision of the US Chapter 7 provision, however, 
creditors may be allowed to grab traded goods if collateral value is less than debt 
obligations. So there could be some prospect of rollover allowed in the KM model if one 
assumes Chapter 7 provision. 
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Appendix II: Infinite-period rollovers 
From the budget constraint: 
gt(kr - kt-1) + Rbt-i = ak1-I + bt" (A2) 
Re-arranging terms, we have 
Rb, 1= ak,. 1 + gc(kt - k, 1) - b1. (A3) 
Forward this equation by one period and divide both sides by R, this yields 
[ak1+º - q, +2 
(kr+2 - k1+1)) + 1+ (A4) RR 
Substituting (A3) into (A2) and by iteration, we get 
00 00 
Rbb _ R-S (akt+s) - R-Sqt+s+l (kt+s+, - k, +s) - 
lim Rsb1+s+, 
S-)00 
S=o s=o 
Transversality condition implies lim Rsb, +s+, =0. 
So, 
S-+00 
00 Go 
Rb, =Z R-S (ak, +3) - 
1: R Sq, 1(k, 51 - 
kt+s). (A5) 
S=o s=o 
Now consider the case when debts are rolled over without ever being repaid, the budget 
constraint becomes: 
qý+S+, (k1+s+, - ký+s) + Rb1+s = ak, +s + 
b, 
+s+, - 
RSF (A6) 
Performing the same step as above and assuming transversality condition holds, we obtain 
00 00 
Rb, _ R-S (ak, +s) - 
R-Sqt+s+, (k, 
+s+l - 
k, 
+s) - 
lim RSF 
. 
(A7) 
s-+00 s=o s=o 
lim RSF > 0, as the amount of rollover grows at the rate of interest, this violates the 
S--+o0 
intertemporal budget constraint. 
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Chapter 3 
Leverage and Financial Fragility: A Quantitative 
Exploration 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a lively debate on whether monetary policy should be used 
in responding to asset price bubbles and this has sparked a hot debate about its desirability 
and effectiveness. But relatively little research has focused on the role of prudential 
regulatory policies as a means of controlling bubbles and mitigating the impact of a 
bubble's bursting. While the consequences of asset price collapse have varied widely 
across countries, it is evident that crashes in real estate markets tend to have had more 
impact on the real economic activity than those in equity markets. This is because real 
estate is widely used as collateral for loans in many countries, and as real estate prices 
increase, banks are willing to lend more and this in turn leads to further rise in prices. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, sudden fall in collateral value can create the possibility 
that firms' net worth is entirely wiped out and the whole financial system collapses. 
The purpose of this chapter is to take further step toward developing a framework that is 
suitable for quantitative analysis in order to analyse the role of corporate leverage in 
contributing to financial instability more explicitly; and to consider the implications for 
regulatory policy to reduce the likelihood and effects of excessive or destabilising asset 
price movements. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 explores the robustness of the 
homogeneous KM model used in the previous chapter. We begin with solving for the 
4 exact solution' of the non-linear KM model; and use it to distinguish the linearised 
approach used in KM from our basic linear-quadratic specification (i. e. where the land 
price equation is approximated with a linear function but the user costs of land remain 
quadratic in the landholdings of the credit-constrained firms). We show that allowing for 
some non-linearity is essential for analysing the possibility of financial collapse. As the 
basic model is very vulnerable to adverse shocks, due to the extra sensitivity of land prices 
to land sales, we modify the framework by reducing the elasticity of land prices. 
In Section 3.3, we modify the model further by allowing for a margin requirement (where 
lenders only lend up to some fraction of present discounted value of collateral) so that the 
effects of corporate leverage on financial stability can be analysed more explicitly. One 
interesting aspect of the model is that while higher margin leads to contraction of credit- 
constrained firms in the short run, the long-run equilibrium holdings increase appear to be 
higher (i. e. they hold more land and land prices are higher). This is because firms are 
effectively forced to use more of their internal funds and rely less on external finance, so 
the agency costs are reduced. We then look at dynamic properties of the model and find 
that the impulse responses of a temporarily negative productivity shock on credit- 
constrained sector are much smaller with margin requirements but the effects of shocks 
become more persistent. 
Section 3.4 contains simulation experiments of responses to two kinds of adverse shocks. 
First we study how vulnerable leveraged companies are to asset price shocks. Following 
48 
the analytical technique of computing maximum shocks used in the previous chapter, the 
simulations in this section make clear that reducing leverage increases the stability of the 
financial system. The second type of shock is the impact of an unexpected temporary rise 
in interest rates. A case in point is the financial crisis in Thailand when the authorities used 
high interest rate policy to check capital outflows. We find that there are two effects at 
work. First the increase in interest expenses of existing short-term debt obligations leads 
the credit-constrained firms to sell land to satisfy the margin rule; second this effort causes 
asset prices to drop unexpectedly. This process is similar to asset price shocks, but the 
knock-on effects in this case turns out to be stronger as the capacity to roll over debts 
declines with higher interest rates. 
Section 3.5 analyses `regulatory forbearance', specifically how a temporary relaxation of 
margin requirements can help avoid the credit crunch and reduce the impact of the knock- 
on effects. We then discuss potential policy instrument of using margin requirement as a 
build-in stabiliser. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Exact and linearised solutions of the KM model 
In this section, we solve for the exact solution of the non-linear KM framework so as to 
illustrate some important features of the model (and to provide a benchmark for 
distinguishing our linear-quadratic version analysed previously from the KM linear-linear 
version). Another purpose is to see how well the linear-quadratic specification performs 
numerically comparing with the exact solution and to test the robustness of the basic KM 
model. 
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3.2.1 Exact solution 
For convenience of exposition, let us briefly recall the three main elements of the 
homogenous KM model. First is the budget constraint of the credit-constrained property 
companies at the beginning of period t: 
g1(k1-k, -, 
)+Rbt., +x1 = (a+Y)k1_, +b1, 
where kr is the amount of land held at the end of period t; qt is its price; bt is the amount of 
borrowing; R is gross rate of interest on debt (one plus one period of interest, r); and xt is 
consumption. Output from land obtained by the credit-constrained sector consists of 
tradable output, akk_,, that can be sold and non-tradable output, ykt_t, which can only be 
used for self-consumption. ' It is assumed in KM that y is large enough to ensure that 
credit-constrained firms will not consume more than their non-tradable output (and will use 
all available resources to land accumulation), i. e. xt = ykr_,. Therefore the budget constraint 
reduces to 
qý(k1-k! _, 
)+Rb, 
_, = ak, _, +b,. 
(1) 
As will be discussed later when we introduce a margin requirement into the model, the role 
of the non-tradable output is not only crucial in determining the condition under which 
borrowing constraint is binding but also the maximum size of a margin requirement that 
can be allowed without violating the logic of the model. For the moment, assuming that 
borrowing gross of interest is chosen to match the expected value of collateral implies: 
b=E, 
(qt+, )k, 
`R 
(2) 
Since there is generally no aggregate uncertainty in this model and agents are assumed to 
have perfect foresight, E, (qt+1) = qr+i - except for the initial unanticipated aggregate shock. 
1 Due to the linearity in preference of credit-constrained firms, non-tradable output is introduced to prevent 
borrowers from postponing consumption continuously. 
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The last equation is a pricing equation that comes from other users of land, the finance 
houses, assumed not to be credit constrained of the form, 
u (k, ) =ßk, RR 
(3) 
where ßk1 measures the marginal productivity of land used by the finance houses, written 
(for convenience) as homogeneous in land holdings in the constrained sector. The value of 
land is given by the present discounted value of user costs i. e. 
00 
q1 =, I 
s=o 
(4) 
In the face of an initial unanticipated temporary productivity shock which occurs when the 
system is in equilibrium, the first period equilibrium is 
u(k, )k, _ (a - Da + q, - q`)k'. (5) 
Or, 
Rkr2= (1- 0)a + R-Su(k¬+s) k' - q*k* " (6) 
s=o 
So far the modelling is similar to that presented in the previous chapter. In what follows, 
we will show that the non-linear solution in (6) can be re-written in a much simpler way. 
By replacing q*=R a/(R-1) and multiplying both sides of (6) by 1lk* (where k* = Ra/fl) and 
(1/a), one obtains 
fk` ki k 
co R s R-kt+s-R_1 
S=o 
After substituting backward kt+s = (k) l/2(kl+s_I)1 /2, we can successively eliminate k, +1, kt+2, 
and so on. Hence the exact solution of the homogenous KM model can now be written as 
follows: 2 
2 We are grateful to Craig Burnside (1998) for pointing this out in his discussion of Edison, Luangaram and 
Miller (1998). 
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k2 <"' k vzj R 
=1-A+<"' 1R - (7) 
S=o kR -1 
While this equation is not in closed form, it can easily be analysed graphically and 
numerically. By plotting both sides of (7) separately in Figure 3.1, one can clearly see the 
distinction between the exact non-linear solutions of the basic KM model following 
negative shock, and the solutions from our linear-quadratic and KM's fully linearised 
versions. 
Figure 3.1: Exact, linear-quadratic and linearised solutions of the KM model 
LHS 
RHS (0=0) 
B /C 
RHS (small A) 
/ 
/ 
RHS (large 
1 k/k* 
As illustrated in the figure, the non-linear KM model can have multiple equilibria for small 
negative shock (points A and D). The logic behind this multiplicity is that "if the farmers' 
future landholdings are expected to be small, then currently the land price will be low, the 
farmers will have little net worth, and they will be unable to borrow as much to buy land -- 
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which in turn justified the expectation that their future landholdings will be small. ", KM 
(footnote 16). While KM recognise this possibility, both sides of (7) are linearised in their 
analysis (which gives closed-form solutions) and hence yields unique equilibrium at point 
C. 3 
In our linear-quadratic specification of their basic model, the short-run equilibrium after 
shock will be at point B. 4 Here, the LHS of (7), which represents the user costs of land, 
remains quadratic but on the RHS, we approximate land price equation (4) by a linear 
function which comes from solving the dynamic equations of the system: 5 
qr -Rý= 9(k, - k*), (8) 
where B, measuring the sensitivity of land prices to land sales (around equilibrium), = ß/(R 
- 0/2), and the autoregressive coefficient of land accumulation, 0= (Ra/ß)1/2; so 0= , ß/(R - 
1 /2) where ý=1. 
Such a specification allows us to study another key feature of the KM model -- which is 
our main focus but has not been emphasised in KM's analysis -- the potential risk of 
3 Note that while the shocks considered in KM are small positive productivity shocks, the analytical solutions 
will be similar but in opposite sign. 
4 It should be noted that, in our linear quadratic specification, there exists another equilibrium at low level of 
landholdings (as discussed in the previous chapter), which are not shown in the figure. 
R 
The linearised difference equation of the basic KM model can be written as follows: k, +, =2Qk, and 2 
q, +l = -, 
3k, + Rq, where k, = k, - k* and q, = q, - q* . 
Solving linearised difference equations above, we 
obtain stable and unstable roots i. e. 0 (<1) and R (>1), respectively. And eigenvectors are (1, ß /(R - 0) ) and 
(0,1). The dynamics of land holding and land price are: k, = c, (0)` and q, = c, R- 
(O)` + c2 (R)` , where 
Ra /Q 
Hence, by setting cZ=0, the stable manifold is given by and = '8 k, and setting c =0 gives i2 R0 
the unstable manifold, i. e. q, +, 
/ q, =R. 
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financial collapse when A becomes larger. In fact, as illustrated numerically below, the 
shocks do not have to be very big for this to happen. 
In the following section, we parameterise the model (by varying R) to illustrate two main 
points. Firstly, the linear approximation of land prices turns out to fit the non-linearity 
well. As a result, the solutions from linear-quadratic specification are close to the ones 
from non-linear version with negative shocks to land prices. Secondly, the basic 
homogenous KM model appears too fragile to yield any realistic results. 
3.2.2 Numerical comparison between the exact and linearised solutions 
Figure 3.2 and 3.3 below report the simulation results of the basic KM model when R=1.1 
and 1.5, respectively. We find that linear approximation of land prices fits the non-linear 
curve quite well even if the distance of the initial state (q* = 100 and k* = 1) is reasonably 
far from steady state equilibrium. 
Figure 3.2: Linear approximation of land price when R=1. O1 
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C 
9 
9 
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Figure 3.3: Linear approximation of land prices when R=1.5 
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Table 3.1 below provides both the exact and the linear-quadratic solutions following asset 
price shocks, with three levels of interest rates. If fully-leveraged firms have to absorb 
losses, the model turns out to be very fragile. Even when we set interest rates as high as 50 
percent, the maximum initial shock to asset prices that the system can stand is only around 
2 percent (see Column 3 in the table). One of the main reasons for this is that the knock-on 
effects turn out to be very powerful. By selling about a quarter of their land holdings, they 
suffer a knock-on effect of 11-13 percent fall in land prices which is around 6 times 
relative to the initial fall. The exact sizes of the maximum shocks given by the non-linear 
model appear to be smaller than those given by our linear quadratic approximations; but 
given that the solutions from linear quadratic specification are reasonably close, the 
simulation exercises in Section 3.4 below will concentrate on this specification. 
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Table 3.1: Comparisons between exact and linear-quadratic solutions 
Exact solutions Linear-quadratic 
solutions 
Interest rates (R) 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 
Landholdings 
-Before crash (k) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
-After crash (kt) 0.94 0.85 0.79 0.92 0.81 0.75 
Land prices (% fall) 
-Initial shock (q -qb ) -0.1 -0.7 -1.8 -0.1 -0.8 -2.1 
-Knock-on effects (qt-q) -1.1 -5.9 -10.8 -1.4 -7.0 -12.5 
-Total crash (q1-q) -1.2 -6.6 -12.6 -1.5 -7.8 -14.6 
3.2.3 Non-homogenous user cost of land 
For analytical convenience, the user cost specified earlier (and in the previous chapter) was 
assumed to be homogenous in kr, so, r7, the elasticity of land holdings by the constrained 
sector with respect to land prices is equal to 1. To reduce the fragility of the model, assume 
that the user cost of land -- and so land prices -- are less sensitive to land sales. By 
introducing some arbitrary constant term (/3o), the modified non-homogenous user cost 
takes the form: 
kk +, ß0 . 
(9) 
The elasticity of the user cost of land with respect to landholdings by credit-constrained 
sector is defined as 
d dk )k-I 
's ' which 
is <1 for ßo > 0. And land prices 
r ukr) q 
/ý 
/' 1 kr + RQ0 
will be given by 
/3 ßo R 
q, =R R-Skr+S + R-1 S=o 
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The effect of lower user cost elasticity will slow the speed of recovery as shown in the 
Figure 3.4 below (assuming R=1.5): as the elasticity declines, the user cost curve moves 
towards the net worth line. Since the speed of adjustment is determined by the difference 
between net worth and user cost, in the limit when the elasticity of user costs goes to zero, 
line OU is the same as line OE and so there will be no knock-on effect. We will discuss the 
effects of reducing user cost elasticity on the sensitivity of land prices to land sales in 
Section 3.3 below. 
Figure 3.4: Impacts of user cost elasticity on speed of adjustment 
User costs and net worth 
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3.3. The introduction of a margin requirement 
As illustrated in the previous section if fully-leveraged, credit-constrained firms have to 
absorb losses, the model is very fragile. Not only because 
land prices are sensitive to land 
sales but they also have very little net worth, only ak* 
in equilibrium i. e. one period flow of 
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income. So, if land prices drop unexpectedly by a small fraction, they are wiped out. While 
KM go on to introduce other mechanisms which have the effect of damping the response to 
exogenous shocks, we stick with their simple model but increase its robustness by reducing 
the leverage taken on by the property companies. 
Specifically, we assume that lenders impose a margin requirement on borrowers requiring 
owners/managers to hold a margin of m (i. e. by forcing firms to maintain a certain level of 
liquidity) and they lend only the fraction 1-m of the value of land. One motivation for this 
is suggested by KM (1997, p. 221), namely the cost of liquidation: if legal and other costs 
were expected to be the fraction m of land values, then bankers looking for complete 
collateralisation would need to constrain their lending appropriately. While this does 
probably account for some fraction of observed margin requirements, it is prudential factor 
which seems to be more relevant here, i. e. to prevent borrowers going bankrupt too often. 
Another reason for increasing participation of owners/managers might be to combat a form 
of moral hazard not included in the KM model, namely the incentive that low capitalisation 
give them to invest in high-variance projects, i. e. the well-known incentive to `gamble for 
resurrection'. [See, for example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994, Chapter 8); Hellman, 
Murdock and Stiglitz (2000). ] 
With a margin requirement denoted m, the borrowing constraint becomes 
bt = 
(1- m)qt + ikt (lo) 
R 
This constraint limits the extent to which firms can leverage their debt by forcing them to 
maintain some certain level of liquidity. Substituting into the budget constraint, (1), and re- 
arranging yields 
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u, k, = ak, -, + mq 
kt-, - 
mq_+ºkt 
R 
or, 
(1- m)qt+ý k =(a+ mqt)k (11) qý -R-, 
As can be seen from the LHS of (11), a margin requirement implies that the down payment 
must exceed the user cost of land. How this affects the adjustment can be seen in Figure 5, 
constructed along the same line as Figure 2 in the previous chapter. 
Figure 3.5: Dynamics adjustment where m>0 
Productivity and user cost 
(kr) 
a 
Land holdings 
k, I kor kr 
With no margin requirement and starting at point L, where k= kt_1, land purchases would 
take land holdings to k, where the net worth, shown as HH, matches the user cost schedule, 
u(kr), at point N. With a margin requirement of 50%, for example, the down payment is 
shown by the curve DP, equal to half of the linear function u(kt) plus half q, (k1 - k, _, 
), the 
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money needed for new land holdings (an approximately quadratic function of k1). As is 
evident from the figure, the requirement to find half of the money for new land purchases 
out of current profit slows the recovery, to kt' less than kt. Solving the linearised difference 
equations for land holdings and the price of land, assuming 0= (Ra/ß)' 2=1, one obtains 
the following expression for the slope of stable path as follows 
9'= (12) 
1+ 
Rm 
R_ (R-1)(1-m) 
2+ 
Rm 
(R-1)(1-m) 
Increasing the margin requirement makes land prices more sensitive to land holdings - i. e. 
9' is increasing in m. This is because a higher margin requirement slows the speed of 
adjustment of land holdings. As the margin requirement increases from 0 up to 40%, the 
parameter 0', which measures the sensitivity of land prices to land sales, and 0, the 
autoregressive coefficient in the process of capital accumulation, also increase as shown in 
the table assuming 10 percent rate of interest. If 0' rises, this means that land prices are 
more sensitive to land sales and we observe that 6' lies just above the margin requirement. 
(If m equals 30%, for example, land prices fall below equilibrium by 32.2 times the 
percentage disposal of land by property companies. ) The reason that the higher m increases 
OP is that the margin requirement makes it more difficult for a company to expand (as they 
rely more internal funds and less on bank finance, see Proposition 3 below); this slows the 
speed of adjustment and moves land prices closer to current user costs. (How markedly 
adjustment slows down is indicated by 0, the coefficient on lagged land holdings, which 
increases sharply from 0.5 in column one to 0.85 in column three. ) 
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Table 3.2: Margin requirements, land price coefficients, and autoregressive coefficients 
Margin requirements (%) 
0 20 30 40 
Elasticity =1 
Of 16.7 32.2 40.2 48.3 
0 0.50 0.79 0.85 0.89 
3.3.1 Steady state 
In equilibrium where k1= k, _, = 
k* and qt = qt_i = q*, the land-holding by credit-constrained 
firms, k*, is 
'80 
RaM) 
, 
land price, q, is (R -1)(1- m) 
; and (1 - m)u = a. It may seem 
surprising that a high margin requirement raises the equilibrium level in the long run: i. e. 
when debt capacity of credit-constrained firms is limited to some fraction, 1-m, of present 
discounted value of land collateral, the long-run equilibrium land prices and land-holdings 
increase by a factor of 1/(1 - m). It might appear that, as m goes towards 1 (i. e. own-equity 
financing), k* --*oo. This will not occur because there is a limit of m that can be allowed 
without violating the logic of the model (see proof below). 
In this respect, the assumption made in KM regarding the existence of non-tradable goods 
(yk, ) in the production function of the credit-constrained sector plays a crucial role here. 
Since only tradable output can be used for down payment for land purchase, while the non- 
traded goods is not -- except for own consumption, the equilibrium in this credit- 
constrained economy is sub-optimal. Specifically, the equilibrium is not determined by a+ 
y= G'(k - k) but at the point where the marginal product of tradable goods equals to the 
present discounted value of marginal product in the unconstrained sector (i. e. the user cost 
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of land), G'(k - k*)/R, where k is the total supply of land in the economy. The fact that total 
marginal productivity in credit-constrained sector is greater than that of the unconstrained 
sector in such an equilibrium implies that these firms will always have incentive to expand 
their investment to the first best equilibrium if they have enough resource to do so. 
With a higher margin requirement, firms are effectively forced to use more of their internal 
funds for investment and rely less on external borrowings. So they will need to sell land in 
order to satisfy the margin rule and this effort leads to a fall in land prices and a contraction 
of their land-holdings in the short run. But the process of rebuilding net worth allows them 
to make extra profits -- the difference between returns from using land and the user cost of 
land, as discussed in the previous chapter. Figure 3.6 below shows that the short-run 
contraction followed by higher long run equilibrium (at k* = 1.33 and q* = 111.1) when m 
increases from 0 to 0.1. (Parameters used: R= 1.2; a= 16.7;, 8'= 6.7; 83o = 11.1; and I/ q= 
1/3). Initially, the economy is in steady state with value of q* and k* of 100 and 1 
respectively. But when m increases from 0 to 0.10, they are forced to reduce their land- 
holdings to satisfy the margin rule and this causes land prices to fall to 98.4, which calls 
for more land sales; so that first period equilibrium of such land sales reduces by 30 
percent (i. e. k! = 0.7). After that, they are able to rebuild their net worth by accumulating 
more equity from using cheap land, this in turn results in the gradually increase in the net 
worth and equilibrium land-holdings increases by 30 percent above the initial equlibrium, 
as shown in Figure 3.7. 
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Figure 3.6. Short-run contraction and long-run expansion when m increases 
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Figure 3.7: The process of rebuilding net worth after m increases 
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How large can the margin requirements be consistent with the assumption that firms are 
credit-constrained in equilibrium? To answer this, we use the same assumption as in KM: 
i. e. a credit-constrained firm will use all of their tradable goods for investment and 
consume only non-tradable goods if and only if 
a+y lý 
=Rý 
a8 
(13) 
where 6 and 6' are discount factors in the credit-constrained and unconstrained agents 
respectively. We compare two consumption paths from two strategies. That is borrowing 
constraint will always bind if the consumption path of using a marginal unit of tradable 
goods to buy land yields more utility than consuming it immediately in period t, i. e. 
,v+,, ( a7 )+82( aa7 (14) 
LDP DP DP+, DP DP+, DP+2 
where DP1= q, - 
(1- m)g`+' By replacing DPI = DP, + j_... = DP* = 
(R +m -1)a in (14) and R (R -1)(1- m) 
using condition (13), we find the condition for the upper bound of m that can be 
summarised as follows. 
Proposition 1: The borrowing constraint will be binding if and only if 
R+m-1 Ra 
(R-1)(1-m) a+y 
Proof See above. 
(is) 
In other words, margin requirements which do not satisfy this inequality would imply 
equilibrium landholdings by credit-constrained firm lying beyond the first-best 
equilibrium. Assuming that y is greater than ra allows for some margin requirement, but 
not too much. (Note that if y= ra, no margin requirement will be possible. This means that 
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y needs to be quite large) So if non-traded goods were given, Proposition 1 can be re- 
written as 
y> 
[R(R-1)(1-m)-1]a 
R-1+m 
In KM's simulation exercises, y is assumed to be equal to a. Given 50 percent rate of 
interest, for example, this implies that the maximum m can only be 0.1. As this is too small 
for our purposes, for the simulations presented in Section 4, we will assume higher y. 
3.3.2 Aggregate productivity shock 
How does the inclusion of a margin requirement affect the model's response to a negative 
shock? In this section, we follow KM's linearised approach which allows us to find closed- 
form solutions and to analyse some important properties of our modified version more 
explicitly. As emphasised earlier, however, the possibility of financial collapse is thus 
ruled out (but this issue is analysed in Section 3.4 which applies the linear-quadratic 
method). 
Suppose the economy is in equilibrium until period t-1 and an adverse temporary shock 
occurs in period t which lowers productivity by Aa. By replacing the modified borrowing 
constraint (10) into (5), the first-period equilibrium after the shock is determined by 
[ut + mR'1+, ]k, _ [(1 + 0)a + q, - (1- m)q* ]k; R 
To find a closed-form solution for the new equilibrium path, we linearise both sides of this 
equation around the neighbourhood of the steady state (let xt denotes the proportional 
change from it steady state value, i. e (x1 - x*)/x*). Using u* = a/(1 - m) = (R - 1)q*/R and 
ur = k, / r7 , one obtains 
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1+1+ 
Rm kt =0+R qt . (16) 77 (R-1)(1-m) R-1 
The RHS shows the reduced net worth at the time of the shock, which consists of the direct 
effect of negative productivity shock (0) and the knock-on effects from land sales, which is 
scaled up by the proportion of R/(R - 1). But land sales are reduced with m>0 as shown in 
the LHS of (16). 
From period t+s onwards (s > 1), demand for land is (1 - m)u1+skt+s = (a + mq1+s)k1+s - 
mq1+skl+s. Linearising both sides gives the dynamics of land accumulation after the shock 
period, i. e. 
The next proposition characterises the dynamic adjustments of land-holdings after shock. 
Proposition 2: With m>0, the speed adjustment of land-holding by credit constrained 
-1 
firm, defined as 0=1+ 
Rm 
1+1+ 
Rm 
will be slower than with (R-1)(1-m) q (R-1)(1-m) 
m=0. 
[1+1+ Rm 
kt+s =1 kt+s_,. (17) R -1)(1- m) (R -1)(1- m) 77 (R-1)(1-m)]^ 
1+ 
Rm 
Proof: 
ao 
_ am 
öI (R -1)(1- m) 
am 1+1+ 
77 (R -1)(1- m) 
Rm 
Since R>1 and i>0, then 
ao 
>0. 
am 
+l+ 
77 
Rm 
(R -1)(1-m) 
The inclusion of margin requirement makes it more difficult for credit-constrained firms to 
expand since they have to rely more on internal funds and less on external borrowing. As 
R 
(R -1)(m -1)2 i 
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noted before, as r7--+co, the two coefficients in the LHS and RHS of (17) are the same, 
implying complete persistence. 
To find the sensitivity of land sales to land prices, linearising the land price equation (4) 
gives 
1 R-1 °° S- 
11 R-1 1 
-1 
qt_IR- kt+s= -k, = 8'k, (18) rl R S=o qR 1-1 Rm 1 Rm 
R (R-1)(1-m) ' (R-1)(1-m) 
where B' represent sensitivity of land price to land sales. This equation is essentially the 
same as Equation (12) above (except that here qr and k' are measured in percentage term 
while in (12), q, and k, are measured in absolute value). The sensitivity of land prices to 
land sales consists of two components. The first term on the RHS of the equation reflects 
change in the user costs at date t while the second term captures the effects of persistence 
in land-holdings of the firms. It is important to note that the second term plays a dominant 
role in determining the sensitivity of land sales to land prices. We can summarise the 
implications of (18) into the following propositions as follows. 
Proposition 3: As m increases, the sensitivity of land prices to land sales (9'), increases. 
Proof: 
a 
am 
I R-1 1 
R1 Rm 
1 
R (R-1)(1-m) 
Since R>1, then 
a>0. 
am 
1 Rm 
-+ 
77 (R-1)(1-m) 
R 
[R(m-1-77)+r(m-1)]2 
The effects of a shock on land-holdings becomes more persistent as m rises and because 
user costs will also be lower in the future, which are taken into account into current land 
67 
prices and so this leads to higher sensitivity of land prices to land sales. To find out the 
impact on land-holdings and land prices as a function of the size of shock, substituting (18) 
into (16), one obtains 
,"1 
Rm 
1-I- kt 
1+ 
11 
rý (R-1)(1-m) 
1 
A 
qr = 
1+ 
Rm 
77 
(R-1)(1-m) 
R 
Rm ' (R-1)(l+(R-1)(1-m) )ý 
(19) 
(20) 
Figures below reports the impulse responses of equation (19) and (20) to a 10 percent fall 
in productivity of the credit-constrained borrowers (assuming 10 percent interest rate). We 
find that the impact effects on k, and q, is much smaller with the margin requirement of 20 
percent, compared to the baseline case -- shown as bold lines -- where m=0 and user cost 
elasticity (1 /i) = 1. And the effects of the shock become more persistent when the user cost 
elasticity reduces to 1/3. [It should be noted that our purpose here is to study the impulse 
responses when key parameters vary. In fact the base case will collapse for m=0 if we 
allow for non-linearity. ] 
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Figure 3.8: Dynamics of land-holdings 
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Figure 3.9: Dynamics of land prices 
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3.4. Leverage and financial fragility: Some numerical exercises 
In this section, we use the modified model (i. e. with margin requirements and non- 
homogenous user cost of land) to examine numerically the impacts of two adverse shocks. 
First, we look at how vulnerable leveraged companies are to asset price shocks. Our aim 
here is to show the robustness of the extended model with non-homogenous user costs of 
land and margin requirements. 
The second type of shock is a temporary increase in interest rates on debt obligation (i. e. 
the case of `floating rates' on short-term debt). The motivation comes from the recent 
debate in aftermath of the Asian crisis on the policy of using high interest rate to stabilise 
the currency values and cope with capital outflows. 
3.4.1 Asset price shocks 
Table 3.3 below illustrates land prices and land holdings by credit-constrained borrowers 
before and after the bursting of the largest land price bubble consistent with a return to 
equilibrium. (The technique of computing the maximum shock is similar to what we 
discussed analytically in the previous chapter. ) Note that our goal here is not to match data, 
but is rather to provide some important properties of the model and show numerically how 
robustness of the basic linear quadratic specification increases significantly by a 
combination of reducing the sensitivity of land prices to land sales and imposing a margin 
requirement on loans. Note also that since we set interest rates at 10 percent per annum and 
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assume that 10y = a, 6 these imply that the upper bound for margin requirements cannot be 
greater than 0.45.7 
Table 3.3: Measuring the impact of asset price shocks: Some examples 
Key Parameters 
-Interest rates (R) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
-Margin requirement (m) 0 0 0.20 0.40 0.44 
-User cost elasticity (1/ ri) 1 0.2 0.67 0.67 0.56 
Landholdings 
-Before crash (k) 1 1 1 1 1 
-After crash (k1) 0.92 0.06 0.47 0.31 0.15 
Land prices (% fall) 
-Initial shock (q -q) -0.1 -1.6 -3.6 -15.0 -24.2 
-Knock-on effects (qt-q) -1.4 -7.0 -14.2 -26.4 -30.6 
-Total crash (qt-q) -1.5 -8.6 -17.8 -41.4 -54.8 
For fully-leveraged property companies, the first column demonstrates the extreme 
fragility of the basic KM model with 100 percent leverage: the `maximum bubble' is 
effectively zero, as already mentioned in Section 1. Even we reduce the elasticity of the 
user cost to 0.2, as shown in the second column, the maximum shock is still quite low, i. e. 
only 1.6 percent, but notice that land sales are substantial as shown in the second column. 
(In their simulations, however, KM assume user costs and land prices are much less 
sensitive to land sales than assumed here: the elasticity they use is only 0.1. In this case, 
the negative shock of 3.85 percent will lead the firms to sell all their landholdings. ) 
6 As noted by KM, so long as (15) holds, the parameter y has no effects on dynamics of land prices and 
landholdings. 
Other parameters used to generate the results in Table 3 are as follows. For the first column, a=9.1, ß'=10. 
For the second column, a=9.1, ß'=2, ßo=7.3. For the third column, a=7.3, ß'=6.7, Po=3. For the fourth 
column, a=5.5, ß'=6.7, ßo=3. For the last column, a=5, ß'=5.6, ßo=4. Note that these parameters 
in each 
column give equilibrium values q 
=100 and k'=1. 
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As high leverage plays an important role in creating vulnerability of the system, the third 
column shows how reduced leverage increases robustness. By somewhat reducing the 
elasticity of user cost, to 0.67, and setting leverage of 20 percent, the maximum bubble is 
3.6 percent. The total fall in land prices will of course be a good deal larger than that 
because of the impact of land sales needed to satisfy the margin requirement after bubble 
bursts. This leads to a `knock-on' effect of about 14 percent in this case; so the maximum 
crash in land values (bubble plus knock-on) which can be sustained without wholesale 
liquidation is a little under a fifth. With a margin requirement at 40 percent, however, the 
system can withstand the bursting of a bubble of 15 percent, which causes land prices to 
fall by another 26 percent. The last column shows how the model can be calibrated to 
accommodate an even bigger bubble without collapsing: when the user cost elasticity falls 
to 0.56 and margin requirement is set at its near upper bound level of 44 percent, the 
biggest bubble increases to 24 percent, giving rise to the total `sustainable' crash in land 
prices of 55 percent. 
Assuming they survive, it might be useful to see how the credit-constrained firms react to a 
crash in land values. Consider the sources and uses of funds (which are measured on a 
scale where the equilibrium value of their land holdings, q*k*, is 100) for partly leveraged 
firms in the case of column 4. The debt to be repaid, 60 percent of pre-crash land holdings 
plus interest, amounts to 69. How is this achieved? The answer is primarily from land sales 
(50.7); secondly from new borrowing (12.8); and hardly at all from current income (a mere 
5.5). As lenders cut their financing by 80 percent (so to ensure that it is no more than 60 
percent of expected future land holdings at post-crash prices), they become caught in a 
spiral of tightening credit constraints and falling land values. Indeed, as the table shows, 
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the credit-constrained companies have to dispose of almost 70 percent their land holdings 
at knock-down prices. 
How do they rebuild their net worth despite selling land at fire-sale prices and later buying 
it back at higher prices? As discussed previously in Chapter 2, there are two effects at work 
following adverse macro shocks. First is direct negative effect due to capital losses from 
initial adverse shock and the subsequent knock-on effects. Second is the indirect positive 
effect - the increase in profit on remaining land. The first can lead to complete collapse; 
but, if avoided, the second permits complete recovery. The reason for this positive effect is 
that a fall in land prices enables the credit-constrained sector to exploit profit opportunity 
which arises from the difference between the total returns from using land by this sector 
and the user cost of land determined by the unconstrained sector. Taking the case of 
column 4 where land prices falls by 40 percent, the figure below illustrates the extra profits 
made by these credit-constrained firms and the recovery path financed by these profits. 
Along this path, the net worth quickly rebuilds during the first 20 periods but converts 
slowly to its long term equilibrium as these extra profits from using land becomes smaller. 
This numerical simulation here confirms our analytical explanation in the previous chapter. 
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Figure 3.10: The process of rebuilding net worth after negative shock 
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3.4.2 Interest rate shocks 
In aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the appropriate monetary policy to be used in 
such crisis has been hotly debated. 8 Some argue that the authorities should raise interest 
rates to maintain currency value and check capital outflows. Others argue that interest rate 
cut may be required to bring the economy out of the recession. In this section, however, we 
do not attempt to settle this debate9, but instead to use the model to illustrate how raising 
interest rate unexpectedly could open another important channel for domestic credit 
crunch, as emphasised by Stiglitz (1998) and Krugman (1999), for example. Specifically, 
our main objective here is to understand the impact of the asset price channel in 
8 See, for example, Fischer (2001). 
9 See Aghion et al. (2001) for their analysis of monetary policy in credit-constrained economy. They 
specifically argue that if credit supply does not strongly sensitive to changes in the nominal 
interest rate, it is 
always desirable to increase the nominal interest rate if the aim is to avoid a currency crisis. 
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circumstances where assets are used as collateral for loans. 10 Another important example is 
the case of Japan where tight monetary policy in early 1990s was thought to be responsible 
for the asset price collapse which leads to a prolonged recession. I 
While there is no explicit role for monetary policy in this model, the exogenous changes in 
real interest rates can be imposed. ' 2 The model used here captures some key characteristics 
of the Thai credit market. As documented in Chapter 1, more than 60 percent of firms used 
collateral for bank loans which 62 percent of collateral in the were in form of land. During 
the crisis, the Thai authorities increased short-term interest rates sharply from an average 
of 11-12 percent during the first half of 1997 to the range of 25-30 percent per annum in 
the last quarter of 1997. 
To see how the model would respond to a temporary increase in real interest rates on 
outstanding debt obligation, we suppose that interest rate unexpectedly rises to R' = [I + (1 
+ 0)r] when the economy is in equilibrium. Since firms' tradable output is just enough to 
cover interest payment on loans (i. e. rb* = ak*), a sudden increase in interest expenses 
from raising interest rates means that firms need to sell land in order to repay their debt. To 
understand the effects of monetary transmission mechanism at the period of shock, we 
solve for the market clearing condition of these credit-constrained firms which is given by: 
C1- m)q, 1 
1k R(1 - m)q* k* X21) qt R' jt = 
[a 
+ qý -R 
10 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for their emphasis on the credit channel of monetary policy transmission. 
Kwon (1998), for example, finds the evidence that monetary tightening associated with a rise in short-term 
interest rates produces a significant and persistence fall in land prices in Japan. 
12 "One possible monetary transmission mechanism would be through the redistribution of wealth between 
debtors and creditors", as noted in KM's footnote 18 (p. 228). 
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The impacts of the interest rate shock on the RHS of (21) are similar to those of an asset 
price shock, i. e. there are two negative effects on net worth of the firms. The direct effect 
as mentioned before is due to higher interest payments on existing debt contracts and the 
indirect effect is due to an unexpected fall in land prices because firms are forced to unload 
their land holdings in the wake of the shock. There is, however, an additional reinforcing 
effect which is shown on the LHS of the equation. Higher interest rates reduce debt 
capacity of the firms as the borrowing constraint becomes more binding. With higher down 
payment, to be met from their lower net worth (caused mainly by the unexpected fall in 
land prices), there is a real danger of financial collapse if firms' net worth is too low to 
satisfy the condition above. 
These effects in a numerical example are illustrated in Figure 3.11, which we assume 10 
percent real interest rate and 30 percent margin requirements. 13 The horizontal axis is land 
holdings by credit constrained firms and the vertical axis represents the required down 
payment and firms' net worth. The equilibrium is shown at point E in the figure and we 
seek to find the maximum interest rate shock. An unexpected rise in interest rate causes net 
worth to fall from the equilibrium point E to B and this triggers margin calls. As firms sell 
land, user costs must also fall for the market to clear. However, such a fall in user cost is 
matched with an increase in the required down payment: this causes the DP curve to 
swivel upwards to DP'. First period equilibrium is shown at the point where the straight 
line NN is tangent to the curve DP' at point C. At this point, we find that the maximum 
interest rate shock is 11.7 percent (i. e. an increase from 10 percent to 21.7 percent), leading 
the credit constrained borrowers to sell around 60 percent of their land (kk = 0.39) and land 
13 Other parameters used are l 1q = 2/3, a= 6.36, ß' = 6.67 and Qa= 3.03, giving q* and k* = 100 and 1. 
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prices drop by around 23 percent (qt = 76.7). Any bigger shock will cause them to go 
bankrupt. 
Figure 3.11: Impacts of an interest rate shock 
The financial system becomes even more vulnerable to interest rate shocks as leverage of 
the credit-constrained sector increases from 70 to 80 percent (i. e. m reduces from 0.3 to 
0.2). A rise in interest rates of only 5 percent (i. e. from 10 percent to 15 percent) can cause 
a wholesale bankruptcy of the credit-constrained sector. We conclude that the higher is the 
degree of financial leverage, the higher is the impacts of monetary policy shocks on asset 
prices. 
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As the simulation makes clear, the effects of a temporary shock in interest rate to credit- 
constrained firms can be very powerful. Indeed, these effects appear to be stronger than 
those of asset price shocks, given the same initial fall in net worth. Thus, in Figure 3.11 
above, if it was asset price shocks (instead of interest rate shocks) that lead the net worth to 
fall from E to B, the first-period equilibrium would be at point A, where the down payment, 
DP equals to the line ON. At point A, the knock-on effects and land sales are clearly much 
lower than C. (In fact, there is another equilibrium in the asset price shock here i. e. point 
A' which is lower than C. ) In the case of interest rate shocks, the swivelling of DP to DP' 
due to higher down-payment clearly plays a crucial role in exacerbating the credit crunch. 
The reason for the shift in the required down payment is that higher rate of interest when 
used to discount the future value of land tightens the credit constraint further, so the ability 
of borrowers to roll over their debt is reduced. This brings to mind a comment made by 
Joseph Stiglitz (2002, p. 110) that: "To discuss monetary policy and finance without 
bankruptcy is like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. At the heart of the analysis of 
macroeconomy should have been an analysis of what an increase in interest rates would do 
to the chances of default and to the amount that creditors can recover in the event of 
default. Many of the firms in East Asia were highly indebted, and had huge debt equity 
ratios. As very high interest rate levels, a highly leveraged company goes bankrupt quickly. 
Even if it does not go bankrupt, its equity (net worth) is quickly depleted as it is forced to 
pay huge amounts to creditors. " [Italics in original] 
So far the analysis highlights the potential risk of pronounced leverage among credit- 
constrained borrowers in creating financial instability - which suggests a rationale for 
regulatory policies to discourage such excessive leverage in the first place. But what could 
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be done to reduce the powerful impacts of such a costly and destabilising decline in asset 
prices when it occurs? This is the subject of the next section. 
3.5 Temporary relaxation of a margin requirement 
Here, we focus on the following question: With rigid margin requirements leading to asset 
fire-sales and subsequent financial collapse, is there not a case for temporarily relaxing the 
margin rules during the crisis? 
To understand how such a policy can help mitigate/avoid severe liquidity crunch, we 
consider two cases. First is the case when the magnitude of asset bubble crash is bigger 
than maximum shock that the system can stand. In the second case, we examine how 
knock-on effects could be reduced even when a shock is smaller than the maximum shock. 
Starting with the first case and using an example from column 4 in Table 3.3 above (i. e. m 
= 0.4, R=1.1,1/q = 2/3) where the maximum bubble is 15 percent, we suppose that size of 
the bubble is 20 percent. While the value of outstanding debt (= (1 - m)gbk* = 72) is smaller 
than the value of collateral (q*k* = 100) just after the bubble bursting, the need to satisfy 
margin requirements leads to wholesale liquidation. Suppose that the authorities can 
influence bank lending practices by re-setting m at the time of bursting bubble, i. e. they can 
enforce financial institutions to reduce their margin requirements on loans. By setting m 
enough to prevent bankruptcy of the credit-constrained sector, the first period equilibrium 
is determined by 
R', 
m)R', +I k, = 
ra + q, - (1- m)qbk' , 
(22) 
RL 
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where LHS of the equation represents required down payment and RHS is the net worth of 
credit-constrained firms. This can be shown more clearly in the figure below. With a 20 
percent shock to asset prices, the net worth line (NW) falls below the required down 
payment curve (DP), reflecting the inability of the credit-constrained borrowers to meet 
their margin calls. By reducing m, there are two effects at work. First is that the required 
down payment (qt - (1 - m)qt+l/R) becomes smaller, i. e. the curve DP swivels downward to 
DP'. At the same time, the line NW changes to NW', reflecting the reduced sensitivity of 
land price to land sales when m declines (for the reason as stated in Proposition 3 above). 
Using the same method as before, we can solve for the minimum cut in m needed for 
stabilisation. As shown in the figure, we find that by relaxing m from 0.40 to 0.354, there is 
a unique equilibrium at the point where DP' touches NW': this involves land sales of 
around two-thirds (k, = 0.33) and the knock-on effects of 24 percent (q, = 76.2, i. e. total fall 
in land prices is 44 percent). [Note that with m smaller than 0.35, we find that there can be 
a region of values of margin that results in multiple equilibria. For example, if m=0.34, 
there are two levels of k1, i. e. = 0.1 and 0.58. ] Unsurprisingly, in the period after m returns 
to its normal level, there will be another round of land sales which involves a further drop 
in land prices. As m changes back from 0.35 to 0.4, credit-constrained firms need to unload 
their land-holdings to 0.32 and land prices fall to 74.1. If there is no further adverse shock, 
however, they will gradually return back to the long-run equilibrium. 
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Figure 3.12: How relaxing m can help avert collapse. 
Note that the cut in m required to prevent financial collapse is much smaller for low- 
leverage, credit-constrained economy, given the same initial adverse shock. As shown in 
Table 4 below 14, we look at two scenarios: high leverage economy (1 -m=0.6) and low 
leverage economy (1 -m=0.8). Suppose that these two economies suffer from the same 20 
percent bursting of asset bubble but the maximum shocks for the high leverage case is only 
3.6. For high leverage economy, m needs to be cut by 0.16: this involves a quarter of land 
sales during the relaxation period and land holdings are reduced to 0.39 after m returns to 
0.2. 
14 Other key parameters used for generating this figures are R =1.1,1/ rq = 2/3. 
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Table 3.4: High leverage vs low leverage economies 
High leverage 
(1 -m)=0.8 
Low leverage 
(1 -m)=0.6 
m 0.20 0.40 
Maximum shock 3.6 15.0 
m' for survival 0.04 0.35 
During period of shock with relaxing m 
k, 0.75 0.33 
q, 95.9 76.2 
After relaxation period 
kt+1 0.39 0.32 
qr+1 83.8 74.1 
Turning to consider what happens if the shock is smaller than the maximum. While there 
is, by definition, no collapse in this case, it is worthwhile to see how knock-on effects can 
be reduced when margin rules are relaxed. Using the same example as above but keeping 
m constant (the case with m=0.4), with asset price shock of 10 percent, land-holdings of 
the firms will be reduced 0.71 and they will suffer the knock-on effects of 11.2 percent. 
When m is relaxed from 0.40 to 0.35, however, k, = 0.95 and the knock on effects reduce to 
1.7 percent (qf = 98.3)! (In the next period, after m returns to 0.4, there will be another 
round of which causing kt = 0.85 and q, will fall to 94.6). Furthermore, by reducing m to 
0.34, knock-on effects could be completely eliminated during the period of adverse shock. 
Even when m returns to 0.4 immediately in the next period after shock, we find k, = 0.88 
and price effect is only 4.7 percent. 
3.5.1 Discussion 
From our numerical experiments above, it is clear that relaxing margin requirements is 
effective in avoiding wholesale financial collapse and/or mitigating the 
impacts of a sharp 
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decline in asset prices. In this section, we discuss some issues and provide some evidence 
of using the margin requirement as a counter-cyclical policy instrument. 
(i) Moral hazard problems 
An important question one might ask is that: would such a relaxation of the margin rule 
lead to moral hazard problem? In the context of the model used here, the answer is no. So 
long as the collateral value is worth more than the debt outstanding, there will be no 
incentive for a credit-constrained borrower to threaten its creditors by leaving the land 
behind and repudiating the debt contract. In the case of asset price shocks, if the size of the 
bubble is not too large i. e. qb <q *1(I - m), there is a strong case for relaxing the margin 
rule in the midst of the crisis. While m could technically reduce to 0, this may, however, 
lead to another form of moral hazard (the so-called `gamble for resurrection')? While this 
issue has generally been analysed in the case of financial institutions, (see Dewatripont and 
Tirole 1994); and Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000), for example), this form of moral 
hazard is not included in the case of credit-constrained corporate sector in the KM model. 
As relaxing m can effectively reduce the destabilising effects of a fall in asset prices, 
another question that one might ask is that: why not allow margin requirements to be 
contingent on prices themselves so that a price drop would automatically trigger relaxing 
margin requirements? The problem with implementing such a mechanism is that if agents 
come to believe that the authorities will provide a safety net when the market experiences 
an adverse shock, by setting a limit on a floor price, for example, they will have less 
incentive to limit their own risk. Hence this would essentially create the moral hazard 
problem which would result in an insurance bubble as analysed by Miller, Weller and 
Zhang (2002) in the case of the US stock market. 
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(ii) Rules vs Discretion 
One way to avoid the asymmetry of policy may be by raising margin requirement when 
price increases (so as to prevent bubble from going too big) and relaxing when price falls 
(to dampen the magnitude of knock-on effects)? In practice, it should be noted that 
authorities has intervened in the markets by relaxing borrowing constraint from time to 
time in both equity and property markets. As for property markets, Borio et al. (2001) 
documented that in 1991, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) required that 
banks imposed a maximum loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of 70 % of their real estate lending. 
In December 1996, in the face of the booming property market, the recommended 
maximum LTV was reduced to 60 percent. During the decline in property values in 1998, 
although these ratios remained in place, the HKMA introduced a mortgage guarantee 
scheme which effectively allowed homebuyers to secure mortgage loans of up to 85 % of 
the value of the property. This limit was further increased to 90 % in July 2000. 
In the case of the US stock market, support for such a policy -- at least on a discretionary 
basis -- is proposed by Robert Shiller who notes that: "The Fed used to change its margin 
requirements actively as a tool against speculative movements in the stock market, raising 
the requirement when the market got too hot and lowering it when things cooled. Between 
1934 and 1974, the Fed changed this margin requirement 22 times... But for 26 years the 
Fed has kept the margin requirement constant, at 50%. " However, he goes on to argue that: 
"While the Fed should be very wary on principle of intervening in markets, increasing the 
margin requirement today would stand as a warning to investors not to leverage themselves 
up excessively and would work in the direction of cooling the market. Increasing margin 
requirements a little, to 60% say, and grand-fathering existing margin credit so as not to 
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induce an immediate crisis, would send a healthy caution signal. " (Wall Street Journal, 
10/04/2000). 
Charles Goodhart (2003, p. 477) remarks that "Whereas there is always dispute and 
uncertainty about the existence and size of misalignments, at least the rate of change, 
relative to recent trends, in asset prices is easily and unambiguously estimated, though the 
period of time over which one might try to relate regulatory, prudential requirements to the 
rate of change of asset prices would have to be analyzed and estimated more carefully. " 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have extended the homogeneous KM model by reducing the sensitivity 
of land prices to land sales and by incorporating a margin requirement in order to examine 
the effects of corporate leverage on financial system more explicitly, and discuss policy 
implications to reduce the risk of such instability. 
Two numerical exercises are considered; temporary shocks to asset prices and to real 
interest rates. In the former, our simulations show that reducing leverage increases the 
stability of the financial system. This suggests a rationale for regulatory policy to 
discourage excessive leverage in the first place. 
As to the second type of shock, i. e. the impact of an unexpected temporary rise in real 
interest rates, we show that the higher is the degree of financial leverage, the higher is the 
impacts of monetary policy shocks on asset prices. In addition, we find that knock-on 
effects in the case of interest rate shocks turn out to be much stronger than those of asset 
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price shocks (given that shocks to asset prices and interest rates lead to the same initial 
drop in net worth). Raising interest rate not only leads to a sudden increase in interest 
expenses of existing short-term debt obligations (which leads land sales to satisfy the 
margin requirements), but higher rate of interest when used to discount the future value of 
land tightens the credit constraint further. In Aghion et al. (2000), the proportion of 
foreign-currency debt (and the sensitivity of credit supply to changes in interest rates) 
plays a key role in determining whether raising interest rate might help stabilising 
exchange rates in the midst of the crisis. While our modified model falls short on this 
`open economy' dimension, the analysis suggests that the degree of corporate leverage 
would also be of similar importance and needs to be taken into accounts. If most firms are 
highly leveraged, the use of high interest rates to stabilise exchange rates can lead to 
widespread bankruptcy. 
In addition, we use our modified framework to shed light on the current debate on the role 
of prudential regulatory policies as a means of mitigating the impact of an asset price 
shocks. Our simulation exercises show that the `regulatory forbearance' policy by way of 
relaxing `margin requirement' can be effective in avoiding and/or mitigating the knock-on 
effects. 
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Chapter 4 
Understanding the Thai Financial Crisis 
4.1 Introduction 
Until 1996, Thailand had enjoyed an outstanding economic growth for half a century: GDP 
averaged around 7 percent per annum since 1950 (see Table 4.1 below). ' Income per capita 
had increased to US$2,740 in 1997 from US$720 in 1980. At the same time, social 
indicators had improved considerably as measured by a major improvement in education 
and health standards, a lengthening of life expectancy and a decline in the proportion of the 
population living in absolute poverty. This remarkable performance was well above that 
experienced in other developing countries, as documented in the World Bank report (1993) 
on The East Asian Miracle. 2 
Table 4.1: Main Economic Performance since 1950 
1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 1997-99 
Real GDP (°/o) 5.4 8.0 7.1 7.3 8.5 -2.4 
Saving/GDP 11.5 20.6 21.8 25.1 34.1 31.0 
Investment/GDP 13.6 20.8 23.8 28.6 40.7 24.3 
Inflation 5.1 2.2 8.0 5.8 5.1 4.7 
Source: Jansen (2001). 
The financial crisis that hit Thailand and other East Asian countries in 1997 led to a sharp 
contraction of the economy: real output in 1998 declined sharply ranging from 6.7 percent 
for Korea and 10.4 percent for Thailand to 13.1 percent for Indonesia. Subsequently, there 
1 Jensen (2001) notes, however, that there had been very little growth in the century prior to 1950: i. e. per 
capita income between 1870-1950 grew 0.2 percent per annum! 
2 See also Warr and Nidhiprabha (1996). 
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has been an unprecedented examination of policies ranging from corporate governance and 
risk management in both corporations and financial institutions to economic management 
at macro level. Interestingly, perceptions of the region's economic performance had been 
dramatically shifted and particularly many factors that were thought to be the key 
economic success had been identified as the cause of the crisis. For instance, Bosworth and 
Collins (2000, p. 1) observe that: "Discussion of an economic miracle was replaced by 
claims of severe structural imbalances and policy distortions. Even the high rates of capital 
formation that were originally stressed as a sign of Asia's strength were seen by a new set 
of commentators as excessive and often in the wrong sectors of the economy. And what 
once seen as an important contributor to growth, the intermediation of saving through the 
banking system became an illustration of 'crony capitalism' and a predictor of crisis. Prior 
to the crisis, governments were often seen as having made a positive contribution to 
growth by coordinating private saving and investment. After the crisis, they were blamed 
for creating situations of severe moral hazard through implicit guarantees on investment 
and the encouragement of excessive foreign borrowing. " 
While there is a set of similar factors that contribute to the Asian crisis in general, 
problems in each country also have its own institutional characteristics which may explain 
the difference in the nature and severity of the crisis. For example, Corsetti (1998, p. 4) 
wrote that: "A common view attributes the crisis to premature financial liberalization 
Such a view identifies a unifying pattern in the crisis region. Thus, it tends to blur 
structural and policy differences across countries, and implicitly considers the crisis since 
1997 as a single episode. Hopefully, future research will shed light on country-specific 
features that will help fill the many gaps in the currently available explanations of the 
Asian events. " Furthermore, as noted by Furrnan and Stiglitz (1998, p. 12): "any 
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explanation of the East Asian crisis must deal jointly with the crisis today and the region's 
remarkable growth and stability in the past. Given their past record, it does not make sense 
to characterize the East Asian economies as inherently vulnerable to crisis, despite their 
recent experiences. One must therefore identify change, either in the East Asian economies 
or in the world around them. " [italics in original. ] 
The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to look at the case of Thailand by discussing some 
key structural changes in the period before the crisis and then examining what had actually 
happened during the crisis. 3 But what should serve as the beginning of the Thai crisis? It 
may be worth emphasising that Thailand first experienced a significant boom in the 
property markets and the subsequent collapse came with problems in the financial sector 
(particularly the finance companies), before forcing into currency devaluation. Such a link 
between real estate markets and banking sector in Thailand is not new but it had happened 
in many other countries, particularly in Japan and Nordic countries (see, for example, 
Allen and Gale, 2000; Herring and Wachter, 1999; and Drees and Pazarbasioglu, 1998). 
Regarding the connection between banking and currency crises (so-called 'twin crises'), 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) find that financial sector problems often precede the 
balance of payment crisis. While this sequence of events may not necessarily imply 
causality, the interaction of such 'triple' crises in Thailand would undoubtedly have a 
profound impact on the real economy. 
In his work, Rajan (2001) examines the relevance of currency crisis theories to the collapse 
of Thai baht and argues specifically that the currency crisis in Thailand should be seen at 
two distinct phases; i. e. it was "originally pushed into devaluation by secularly 
' Interestingly, during the period of the run-up, Thailand claimed four finance ministers, three central bank 
governors, and two prime ministers, Nabi and Shivakumar (2001). 
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deteriorating fundamentals, but it was then pull into outright economic collapse by an 
international bank panic", (p. 69). 4 Our focus in this chapter, however, puts less emphasis 
on speculative attacks on currency. Specifically, we argue that the nature of Thai financial 
crisis lies in the profound boom and bust in the real estate markets which played a central 
role in creating tensions on the Thai financial system and causing the severe contraction of 
the economic activity. 5 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 looks at the boom period (from 
1987 to 1996) when Thailand experienced two important structural and cyclical changes; 
first, it was the period of comprehensive financial liberalisation that led to rapid and large 
capital inflows and second, it experienced a significant boom in the stock market and real 
estate markets. In Section 4.3, we examine the crisis period (1996 to mid-1997) when 
financial sector experienced severe illiquidity/insolvency problems as a result of a sharp 
deterioration of assets; and the main driving force of economic growth, i. e. exports failed, 0 
followed by series of speculative attacks on currency. Section 4.4 concerns the meltdown 
period after the devaluation of the currency, when the Thai economy was sent into the 
vicious downward spirals. Section 4.5 concludes with some perspectives on the Thai crisis. 
4 Rajan uses the first-generation model of speculative attacks (i. e Kr-ugman-Flood-Garber model) as a 
theoretical support to the former, while the latter is essentially due to Chang and Velasco (1998). 
5A similar view can be found in Renaud et al. (2000) and Quigley (2001), for example. 
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4.2 The boom (1987 - 1996) 
The economic boom went back to the late 1980s when Thailand enjoyed double-digit 
growth rate for three years running between 1988 and 1990 and maintained high levels of 
growth between 8-9 percent in the first half of the 1990s. 6 The growth slowed to 5.9 
percent in 1996 -- due mainly to the sharp tum-around of export growth from 24.6 percent 
in 1995 to -1.8 percent in 1996. As shown in Table 4.2 below, with such a high economic 
growth, standard indicators suggested macroeconomic stability: inflation remained 
moderate, averaging around 4 percent in 1986-90 and 5 percent in 1991-96. Fiscal policy 
was consistently conservative as reflected in the budget surplus every year since 1988, with 
an average of around 3 percent of GDP. One area of concern is that the current account 
deficit -- owing to shortfalls of domestic savings relative to private investments (see Table 
4.1 above) -- had run up persistently. In 1990, it peaked at 8.3 percent, then fell to below 6 
percent in 1994 and rose again to around 8 percent in 1995-6. Note that the current account 
deficits had increasingly been financed by large private capital flows. 
Table 4.2: Selected macroeconomic indicators 
(Annual percentage change unless otherwise noted) 
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
Real GDP 5.5 9.5 13.3 12.2 11.2 8.6 8.1 8.4 9.0 9.3 5.9 
Inflation 1.9 2.5 3.8 5.4 5.9 5.7 4.1 3.3 5.0 5.8 5.9 
Gov't budget balance' -3.5 -1.4 1.9 3.2 4.7 4.9 3.0 2.2 1.8 2.7 2.3 
Exports 23.9 31.8 37.1 25.2 15.1 23.6 13.8 13.7 22.1 24.6 -1.8 
Imports 1.1 41.5 48.9 27.3 29.8 15.6 6.1 12.5 18.4 31.8 27.3 
Current account balance' -0.7 -0.6 -2.4 -3.3 -8.3 -7.5 -5.5 -4.9 -5.4 -7.9 -8.1 
Net private capital flows' -0.9 1.8 6.2 8.2 12.9 10.5 7.2 8.2 8.3 12.4 10 
International reserveS2 3.8 
,I 
5.2 7.1 10.5 14.3 18.4 21.2 25.4 30.3 37.0 38.7 
' In percent of GDP; ` US$ billion. 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
6 Human capital was not the main source behind this strong economic performance; but it was the 
accumulation of physical capital which contributed 61-66 percent to total observed growth of GDP in 1980- 
1995. For detailed discussion on the sources of economic growth in Thailand until 1996, see Tinakorn and 
Sussangkang (1998) and Jansen (2001). 
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Behind this boom was a rapid increase in assets of the financial sector. While nominal 
GDP grew four-fold between the end of 1985 and the end of 1995, total assets in 
commercial banks expanded five and a half times in nominal terms. In particular, assets in 
finance companies expanded by almost 12 times over the same period, Siamwalla (2001). 
At the end of 1996, total assets of financial system in Thailand reached 8.9 trillion baht 
(i. e. around 190 percent of GDP), of which the commercial banks accounted for 64 percent 
(121 percent of GDP) and finance companies for 20 percent (39 percent of GDP). [Note 
that the Thai financial system consists of many different types of financial institutions, but 
the most dominated ones are commercial bank and finance companies. Commercial banks 
were the main players in the system absorbing 81 percent of deposits and accounting for 73 
percent of total financial system assets, while finance companies accounted for 9.5 percent 
and 12.7 percent respectively. 7] 
Two main factors were behind this rapid growth in financial assets; i. e. financial 
liberalisation that led to substantial capital inflows and the un-precedent boom in real 
estate sector. In what follows, we focus in details on both of these factors respectively. 
4.2.1 Financial liberalisation and capital inflows 
In the past decade, emerging markets around the world had received substantial capital 
flows from industrial countries. The surge in capital inflows was due mainly to a declining 
trend of interest rates in developed countries that led investors to search elsewhere for high 
yield opportunities in emerging markets, and financial liberalisation on the recipient side, 
Ito (1999). The figures for net private capital inflows to East Asia in Figure 4.1 shows 
inflows averaging between I and 3 percent of GDP in the 1980s, rising to levels ranging 
For a detailed structure of the Thai financial system, see Bank of Thailand, 1998. 
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from 5 percent of GDP for Korea to almost 10 percent for Malaysia, Thailand and the 
Philippines by 1996. This surge was both large and persistent. During the six-year period 
from 1989 to 1995, for example, private capital inflows to Thailand reached around II 
percent of GDP. 
FigUre 4.1. - Net private capital inflows 
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Source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, December 1997. 
(a) Overview of financial liberalisation in Thailand 
In response to the recognition that the Thai financial system needs to be made more 
efficient so that it can continue to support the growth of the real economy, the Thai 
authorities began the process of financial sector and capital accounts liberalisation started 
in late 1980s and continued to early 1990s -- with three basic objectives (namely, to raise 
financial market efficiency; to mobilise domestic savings; and to internationallse the 
domestic financial system). 
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Financial liberalisation during this period has been the most comprehensive in Thailand's 
economic history, Nijathaworn (1995). Because it involved all dimensions of the financial 
system's operations: price (by lifting interest rate ceilings); entry (by granting licenses to 
foreign banks); scope of operation (by expanding businesses of commercial banks and 
finance companies); and infrastructure building of the payments and super-vision system, 
Bank of Thailand (1998c). Among the key measures during this period were (i) interest 
rate liberalisation, (ii) foreign exchange control deregulation and (iii) the establishment of 
the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF). 
Interest rate liberalisation was gradually implemented, starting with the floating of the 
interest rates on time deposits with maturity of more than one year in June 1989. 
Subsequent measures followed in March 1990 and January 1992 when ceilings on all time 
deposits and savings deposits were abolished. Finally, after the ceiling on loan rates was 
removed in June 1992, commercial banks and finance companies have been able to set 
their own deposit and lending rates subject to market liquidity. 
Prior to the liberalisation of foreign exchange transactions that began in 1990, control on 
foreign exchange ouýflows were relatively tight 8 while there was no restriction on capital 
inflows9, Nijathaworn (1995). So the liberalisation focused mainly on relaxing the 
restrictions on the outflows so as to increase flexibility in cross-border movements of 
funds. Starting with the acceptance of the obligations under IMF Article VIII in May 1990 
(resulted in the lifting of foreign exchange controls on current account transactions), three 
8 For example, residents were not allowed to buy foreign currency over a certain limit and capital transfers 
other than debt repayment required approval from the authorities. 
9 Except that (i) commercial banks and finance companies were subject to limits on their net foreign 
exchange exposure; (ii) domestic residents were not allowed to hold foreign-exchange dominated deposits 
except exporters. 
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rounds of capital accounts liberalisation had been implemented. [The first round (May 
1990) involved allowing commercial banks to authorise foreign exchange transactions in 
trade-related activities without prior approval from the Bank of Thailand. For the second 
round (April 1991), most foreign exchange control related to capital account were lifted. In 
the third round (February 1994), residents were allowed to use foreign exchange proceeds 
abroad to service their external payments, see Nijathaworn and Dejthamron (1994) for 
more details. ] 
The introduction of the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF) in 199310 played 
the most important role especially in attracting flows of funds from overseas to finance 
domestic investment. Importantly, it allows the new foreign banks to engage, not only in 
offshore banking activities, but also in onshore lending as well as a number of other 
international and investment banking businesses; so this puts a greater pressure into the 
domestic banking system. 46 BIBF licenses have been granted, including 15 Thai banks, 
II foreign banks with branches in Thailand and 20 foreign bank's representative offices 
(without domestic branches). It should be emphasised that such BIBF license was 
restricted only to commercial banks, not the finance companies. The main operations of the 
BIBF institutions on the liability side are deposits or borrowing in foreign exchange from 
abroad (mainly through inter-bank transactions and inter-office borrowings), and their 
main activities are lending in foreign currency to Thai residents (so-called 'out-in') and 
other neighbourhood countries ('out-out'). Furthermore, the BIBF institutions have 
enjoyed several tax privileges, including a reduced corporate income tax (10 percent 
instead of a 30 percent normal rate) and exemption from specific business tax, interest 
10 In May 1994, the government expanded to scope of this facility by allowing BIBF banks to open branches 
in upcountry provinces (namely, Provincial International Banking Facility, PIBF). 
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income withholding tax and stamp duties. Importantly, cross border borrowing within the 
same institution were exempt from withholding taxes. 
(b) Consequences and policy response 
(i) Capital inflows 
Such an increase in openness of the capital account, together with financial sector 
deregulation, had led to higher degree of capital mobility as reflected in a rapid increase of 
net inflows from 3 percent of GDP during 1983-1988 to II percent of GDP during 1989- 
95. In particular, from 1993 to 1995, the size of the inflows doubled and the composition 
shifted towards commercial bank sector after the introduction of the BIBF in 1993. As 
shown in Table 4.3 below, the net inflows in banking sector - where BIBF played the 
dominant role - increased substantially from US$3.6 billion in 1993 to almost US$14 
billion in 1994 and continued to become the largest source of capital inflows in 1995.11 
Note that the negative flows to commercial banks and non-banks in 1993-4 indicated a 
rebooking through BIBF, Bank of Thailand (1998). 
11 The increase in short-term capital through the non-resident baht accounts in 1993 was prompted partly by 
the liberalisation which allows exporters to accept payments from non-resident baht accounts and partly by 
the increased use of non-resident baht accounts as transitory deposits for other types of investments 
especially for portfolio investment, Nijathaworn and Dejthamron (1994). 
96 
Table 4-3: Composition of net private capital inflows to Thailand 
(Million of US dollar) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Banks 1934 3604 13894 11239 5003 -5717 
- Commercial banks 1934 -4051 3807 3097 419 -5212 
- BIBF 0 7655 10087 8142 4584 -505 
Non-banks 7582 6712 -1869 9610 13198 -1906 
- Direct investment 2015 1438 904 1169 1455 3180 
- Otherloans 2846 -2432 -5845 1518 5451 -3688 
- Portfolio investment 561 4852 1110 3420 3488 4550 
- Non-resident baht 
accounts 
1707 2685 2066 3407 2924 -5812 
- Trade credits 305 539 457 154 -145 -382 
Others 148 -370 -561 -58 25 246 
Total private capital 9516 10316 12025 20849 18201 -7623 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
However in 1996, as indicated the table above, loans to non-banks increased substantially 
(from US$1.5 billion in 1995 to US$ 5.5 billion in 1996) while the flows of foreign 
borrowings through commercial banks and the BIBF fell sharply. This is because the 
authorities imposed a number of restrictive measures to discourage short-term debt and 
BIBF inflows (more details on policy responses below). Bank of Thailand (1996) reported 
that the increase in non-bank debt in 1996 mainly came from long-term debt (both loans 
and convertible bonds) which was channelled to main industry sector particularly 
petroleum, chemicals, electrical appliances and construction materials. And the major 
sources of funds in this non-bank sector were Singapore (more than 50 percent of total 
non-bank borrowings), followed by Hong Kong, the US and the UK, respectively. It 
should be noted that foreign borrowing by finance companies are recorded under 'other 
loans' item of the non-bank sector but it was relatively small, compared with direct 
borrowing by domestic non-financial firms. 
97 
Table 4.4: Thailand'S private external debt 
($US million) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Commercial Banks 6263 5279 9865 14436 10682 9141 
- Short term 5532 4016 6414 9993 8368 5218 
% of total 88 76 65 69 78 57 
BIBF - 7740 18111 27503 31187 30080 
- Short term - 6355 15142 23704 20490 19185 
% of total - 82 84 86 66 64 
Non-banks 24290 24917 21176 42491 50072 45973 
- Short term 12832 12263 7443 18616 18831 13871 
% of total 53 49 35 44 38 30 
Total private external 
debt 
30553 37936 49152 84430 91941 85194 
- Short term 18364 22634 28999 52313 47689 38274 
% of total external debt 60 60 59 62 52 45 
of foreign reserves 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.4 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
The figures on outstanding stock of private external debt are shown in Table 4.4 above. 
Between 1993 and 1996, short-term foreign -currency debt had increased most rapidly in 
the BIBF institutions, followed by commercial banks and non-banks respectively. As 
mentioned above, lending via BIBF had received many tax benefits: this explains such a 
sharp increase via this channel. In addition, both commercial banks and BIBF institutions 
appeared to favour short-term debt more than non-bank sector, reflected in higher share of 
short-term debt to total external debt in 1996. Interestingly, while the overall share of 
short-term debt in foreign currency in Thailand was relatively stable (between 50-60 
percent), the ratio of short-term debt to foreign reserves - measuring the vulnerability of 
financial system to a sudden shift in foreign creditor's expectations - had increased to 1.0 
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in 1994 and 1.2 in 1996; i. e. if all foreign creditors decide not to roll over, foreign reserves 
will not be enough to repay the debt. 
In response to such an increasing size of these foreign flows and the short maturity of 
external private debts, in 1995, the Thai authorities had imposed a number of measures 
aiming to (i) control overheating pressures; (ii) create incentives for market to minimise 
excessive risk taking; (iii) strengthen the regulatory framework of financial institutions. 
These included raising the policy interest rates in March 1995; requiring finance 
companies and the BIBF banks to submit their credit plans; and reducing loan-deposit 
ratios in cases the ratio was above average, IMF (2000). However, as noted by Alba et al. 
(1999), since Thailand relied mainly on monetary tightening and the sterilisation of capital 
flows to deal with the overheating pressures, raising interest rates in fixed exchange rate 
environment encouraged for further inflows. 
So the second set of policies was aimed to target directly at financial institutions by 
increasing their costs of foreign borrowing. For example, commercial bank, BIBF, finance 
companies were required to maintain a cash reserve equivalent to 7 percent (from 2 percent 
previously) of their new short-term foreign liabilities and non-resident deposits with 
maturity of less than one year. In addition, the central bank also set a limit on the net 
foreign exchange position of the financial institutions (i. e. net asset not exceeding 20 
percent and net liabilities not exceeding 15 percent of their capital funds). The effect of this 
policy, however, was to convert exchange risks into credit risks because these financial 
institutions could tend to domestic firms in dollars, Siamwalla et al. (1999). 
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These measures to discourage the inflow of short-term capital proved to be effective in 
slowing down the net inflows in 1996 and in reducing overall ratio of net capital inflows of 
the banking sector to those of the non-banking sector to 28: 72 in 1996 (from 54: 46 in 
1995). However, large domestic firms are left freely to borrow directly from overseas and 
indirectly from commercial banks, with little incentive to hedge. ' 2 
(ii) Financial sector 
One of the most important consequences of financial sector deregulation was greater 
competition among financial institutions. Although this was one of the Thai authorities' 
intentions, the fact that appropriate prudential regulation was not in place and biased 
towards commercial banks, led finance companies to pursue aggressive lending policies 
and engage in price-based competition to mobilise funds (as a result of lifting ceiling on 
deposit and lending rates, mentioned above). Particularly, the regulatory and supervisory 
framework was such that finance companies could not effectively compete with most 
commercial bank businesses; ' 3 so they were left largely with more risky activities (e. g. real 
estate loans, margin loans for equity investment and hire purchase loans), while being 
subject to less stringent prudential requirements than banks (i. e. lower the BIS adequacy 
ratio), Kawai and Takayasu, (1999). In order to compete with commercial bank, they had 
to offer higher returns so as to attract funds from public. Note that finance companies could 
not take deposits but instead fund their operations by issuing promissory notes to general 
public, and borrowing from domestic and foreign banks were also significant sources of 
funds. 
12 From March 1993 to August 1996, it was reported that the stock of foreign-currency denominated loans in 
the corporate sector grew from US$1.4 billion to US$ 30 billion, at annual growth rates of around 50%. 
13 Compared to commercial banks, finance companies were restricted from the businesses of (i) mobilising 
time deposits, (ii) offering overdrafts or credit cards, (iii) offering credit facilities related to trade finance, (iv) 
providing foreign exchange services and (v) establishing a domestic branch outside Bangkok. Kawai and 
Takayasu, (1999). 
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Furthermore, these finance companies had further incentive to lend because of the central 
bank policy to issue new banking licenses where the size of loans and assets was the main 
criteria: i. e. the bigger they are, the higher the chance they would get license to do banking 
business, Alba et al. (1999). These factors had contributed to a lending boom. During 
1988-1995, total credit outstanding grew 22 percent on average in real terms. But finance 
companies lent at an even faster pace of around 30 percent, compared to 20 percent for 
commercial banks. As a result, commercial banks' lending share declined to 67 percent in 
1996 from 75 percent in 1989 but that of finance companies rose to 21 percent from 15 
percent in the same period. On the deposit side, deposit share of commercial banks fell 
from 73 percent in 1989 to 67 percent in 1996, while that of finance companies surged 
from 10 percent to 17 percent over the same period, Vajragupta and Vichyanond (1998). In 
effect, these less-regulated finance companies appeared to grow at the expense of highly 
regulated commercial banks. 
In response to their declining share of domestic deposits, commercial banks had 
increasingly resorted to foreign borrowing especially through BIBF where they received 
benefits from tax incentives. As illustrated in the figure below, the share of foreign 
liabilities to total borrowing in commercial banks had risen substantially from 6 percent at 
the beginning of 1993 to 22 percent at the end of 1996. On the other hand, while foreign 
borrowing by finance companies had also increased rapidly by two-fold during the same 
period , it appeared that 
less than 10 percent of their sources of funds came from overseas. 
The figures for loan portfolios of finance companies and commercial banks are shown in 
Table 4.7 in Section 4.1.2 below, where we will discuss the potential pitfalls in collateral- 
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based lending as commonly used by both banks and finance companies. It should be 
emphasised that while finance companies appeared to expose themselves from their 
imprudent domestic lending especially towards more cyclical and non-tradable sector, 
commercial banks were exposed in borrowing short term from their large sources of 
foreign funds. As reflected in their loan portfolio shown in Table 4.7 below, finance 
companies largely lent to real estate sector and personal consumption, but the majority of 
loans from commercial banks went to the productive sector such as manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail sectors. 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
(iii) CoEporate sector 
The structure of corporate financing in Thailand was generally geared towards borrowing 
or leveraging. This is because most Thai companies are family-run so they do not want to 
dilute their ownership by issuing equity. In addition, they are given tax allowances from 
debt servicing but not from dividend payments for equity financing, Vichyanond (2000). 
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FigUre 4.2: Foreign borrowing of commercial banks andfinance companies C), 
The introduction of the BIBF in 1993 gave domestic firms an opportunity to borrow 
directly from overseas, as shown in Figure 4.3 at the end of 1996, about one quarter of 
corporate borrowing denominated in foreign currency. Given the belief that fixed exchange 
rate regimes were unlikely to change also provided a strong incentive to borrow without 
hedging. However, loans from domestic financial institutions remained the main sources of 
funds, i. e. around 60 percent of total financing, while equity and bond financings played 
relatively small role. 
Figure 4.3. - Sources of corporate funding in Thailand (1996) 
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Table 4.5 below shows the financial positions of Thai manufacturing firms at the end of 
1996.14 Debt to equity ratio was, on average, around 2.5 at the end of 1996 15 ; and 
unsurprisingly the ratio was higher for the large firms than for smaller firms (because bi ig 
14 Based on 942 companies. 
5 Based on dataset from Fiscal Policy Office and Office of Industrial Economics of Thailand (1999), which 
covered small and medium-sized enterprises in five major manufacturing sectors, it is indicated that the debt 
to equity ratio in 1996 was 3.21 times. 
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firms have greater access to external funds). Moreover, all these firms relied heavily on 
short-terrn debt financing which was around 80 percent of total liabilities. Such a high 
reliance of short-term debt may imply that creditors generally prefer to roll over short term 
loans, Kawai et al. (2000). As the table shows, while around 60 percent of finns used 
collateral for loans, only 22 percent of small-sized firrns used audited statements, 
compared to 62 percent of large firms. 
Table 4.5: Financial indicators of manufacturing firrns in Thailand (1996) 
Small-sized Medium-sized Large 
Average debt-to-equity ratio 2.0 2.5 2.7 
Short-term debt/total financing (%) 84.0 81.0 80.0 
Share with audited statements (%) 22.0 36.0 62.0 
Share offering collateral (%) 52.0 65.0 59.0 
Source: Dollar and Hallward-Driemeier (2000). 
The build up of leverage is attributable to financing of acquisition of fixed assets which 
grew rapidly at 29 percent in Thailand during 1993-1996 (33 percent in Indonesia, 17 
percent in Korea and 20 percent in Malaysia), Pornerloano (1998). According to Claessens 
et al. (2000), however, return of assets (in real local currency) had declined from around 
the peak of 11.7 percent in 1990 to 7.4 percent in 1996 (see Figure 4.4). 
As a result of a decline in profitability (measured by returns on assets) and a rapidly rising 
debt, the ability of the finns' cash flow to adequately pay interests on outstanding debts 
declined substantially; the ratio of operating cash flow (before interest, taxes and 
depreciation) to interest payments on loans fell from 4.6 times in 1992 to only 1.92 times 
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in 1996, Pomerloano (1998). This puts the corporate sector in a vulnerable position to 
adverse shocks even before the crisis. 
Figures 4.4. - Return on assets and debt to equity ratio of listed companies C). 
Percent 
12 
Return on assets 
in real local currency (LHS) 
10 
9 
Debt to equity ratio (RHS) 
8 
7 
6 
88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 
Times 
2.6 
2.4 
2.2 
2 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
Source: Claessens et al. (2000) 
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4.2.2. Asset price boom and bust 
Thailand witnessed a rapid surge in property and equity prices since 1987. As shown in 
Figure 5 below, the magnitude of an increase in prices of land in Bangkok Metropolitan 
Region (BMR) 16 was phenomenal, even when compared with those in Japan. During the 
five year period, from 1985 to 1990, land prices in Tokyo Metropolitan Region rose by 2.6 
times before the bubble burst in 1991, while the value of land in BMR recorded a 
significant increase of around 20 times. The momentum was continued (with a slower 
growth rate) to the peak in 1996: on average, land prices in BMR grew at the annualised 
nominal rate of 37 percent from 1985 until the peak in 1996 and fell by about 40 percent in 
2000. In terms of total stock of the real estate sector, Renaud et al. (2000) estimated that it 
reached around 2,200 billion baht at the end of 1997. To put this into perspective, it is 
equivalent to almost half of national GDP and more than twice of the total capitalisation of 
the Thai stock market. 
Similarly the value of share prices in the property sector exhibited a sharp increase of 
around 12 times within one and a half years running from January 1988 to mid 1990 and 
22 times from its peak in 1994, this was well above other-sectors in the stock market (see 
Figure 6 below). Closely link to the property sector was the share values of the finance 
companies, which played the major source of funding for real estate developers. 
16 It should be noted that most of the assets in real estate sector are concentrated in the BMR, with the 
exception for housing and hotel, Renaud et al. (2000). 
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Figure 4.5: Landprice index 
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Despite the substantial increase in land prices, Renaud et al. (2000) argue that the Thai real 
estate boom had been justified by economic fundamentals until 1992-1993. Based on data 
from the Urban Land Institute, Herring and Wachter (1999) report that, during the period 
from 1988 to 1990, new supply of office space averaged 720,000 square metres per annum 
but the absorption averaging of 880,000 square metres per annum implies near zero 
vacancy rates. This led to a sharp increase in prime office market rents from $US 93 per 
square metre in late 1987 to $US 269 in 1991 (equivalent to commercial rents in New York 
at that time). By end of 1994, however, overproduction in the real estate sector became 
more apparent, as reflected in rising vacancy rates in all segments of the industry. 
Consequently, profits growth of listed property companies turned negative in 1995 and 
1996 before the sector experience a wholesale collapse in 1997 (Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6: Profit growth of listed companies in the stock market (016) 
1994 1995 1996 1997 
All listed companies 42.3 5.7 -9.8 -555.7 
* 
Real estate sector 32.9 -26.0 -28.5 -1506.5 
Finance companies 26.2 -25.8 -14.9 -520.3* 
* Include only active finance companies. 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
In fuelling the rapid growth in values of the property sector, domestic financial institutions 
played a crucial role. As shown in the figure below, the growth in credit from banks and 
finance companies to property sector shows a strong correlation with changes in land 
prices. As the boom continued, there was a growing dependence of the financial sector on 
property lending: the growth of lending by finance companies to property sector averaged 
40 percent per annum, compared with total lending growth of 33 percent per annum during 
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1988 to 1996. So there was a marked shift in the composition of Thai finance companies' 
loan portfolio; the percentage share of property loans (including construction) increased 
from 18 percent to about 28 percent while manufacturing loans declined from 22 percent to 
15 percent during 1988-96, see Table 4.7. At this point, it should be emphasised that, in the 
case of commercial banks, there appeared to be no significant changes in the composition 
of their loan portfolio over the same period; almost half of their loans concentrated on 
manufacturing and trade-related sectors. 
Figure 4.7. - Changes in landprices andproperty lending 
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Table 4.7: Loan portfolio composition of commercial banks andfinance companies 
(Percent of total lending) 
Sector 1988 1996 
Commercial 
banks 
Finance 
companies 
Commercial 
banks 
Finance 
companies 
Agriculture 7.1 1.3 3.9 0.9 
Manufacturing 25.8 21.8 26.8 15.3 
Construction 4.3 3.5 4.6 3.7 
Real estate 6.3 14.8 9.1 24.3 
Imports 5.3 2.8 3.2 1.7 
Exports 8.3 1.3 4.2 0.8 
Wholesale/retail 18.9 12.7 17.8 7.8 
Public utilities 7.3 7.3 10.6 7.6 
Banking and finance 6.3 9.1 7.5 11.0 
Personal consumption 10.3 25.5 12.3 27.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
One of the reasons is that commercial banks are subject to more rigid supervision by the 
central bank and especially the policy which required to channel their funds towards high 
priority and productive sectors such as manufacturing. So this explains why exposure to 
property companies (real estate and construction) played a small part in their loan 
portfolios -- around 13 percent. Note also that it has been argued that commercial banks 
could also lend into the real estate indirectly through finance companies affiliated to them. 
From Table 4.7 above, banks' exposure to banking and finance sector did not appear to be 
significant (i. e. 7.5 percent in 1996). The more important case is that banks can indirectly 
be exposed to real estate sector from the practice of using real estate as collateral which is 
widespread in other lines of bank lending, especially in form of land (Figure 4.8). 
Particularly, real estate collateral was perceived to be the safest. For example, Herring and 
Wachter (1999, p. 60) observe that: "Thailand had never experienced a commercial real 
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estate cycle and so understandably found it difficult to estimate the probability of a 
collapse in real estate prices. " 
Figure 4.8. - Structure of commercial bank collateral 
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To what extent did commercial banks expose to fluctuation in land price? Based on a 
survey by Fiscal Policy Office and Office of Industrial Economics (1998) from 642 firms 
in five ma . or manufacturing sectors, it was reported that 64 percent of fin-ns used collateral i 
to receive loans (see Table 4.8 below) and among these firms, 65 percent of loan value was 
covered by land. As shown Table 4.7 above, commercial banks lent to manufacturing 
sector by 26.8 percent of total lending. Using two pieces of evidence, a crude calculation 
implies that 11.1 of the 26.8 percent in total loan portfolio was based on land collateral. 
(Assume that all lending to real estate and construction sectors were based on collateral in 
form of land) So adding this with their exposure to real estate and construction sectors, we 
estimate that around 25 percent of commercial bank loans were exposed to land price 
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fluctuation. As for finance companies5 we find that almost 35 percent of loan portfolio in 
1996 used land as collateral. 
Table 4.8: Lendingpractice in Thailand 
Percent of firms 
Collateral 64% 
Cash flow 43% 
Other guarantees 33% 
Note: These figures do not add up to 100 because some firms used more than one approach to get loans. 
Source: Fiscal Policy Office and Office of Industrial Economics (1999) 
Furthermore, not only are land and buildings used as collateral for loans, but they are used 
as a substitute to proper credit evaluation. Specifically, loans are generally based on 
assumptions about the future value of land collateral, rather than on the estimated cash 
flow from investment projects. This means that firms were able to borrow for risky or low- 
return projects on the basis of rising value of collateral. Bank of Thailand (1998, p. 14) 
reports that: "A significant portion of lending by financial institutions in Thailand is 
c ol lateral -based. With the property and stock price boom in full swing, financial 
institutions did not spend resources on valuing the underlying collateral because of the 
widespread belief that the gains would be substantial should a need to foreclosure arise. 
Banks were also under pressure from shareholders to take on risky investments in return 
for potential profits and attractive dividend payments. This, in turn, made them less 
vigilant in monitoring and taking appropriate actions against borrowers once they showed 
signs of financial deterioration. The growing risks inherent in the system were, 
unfortunately, over-shadowed by the real estate and/or stock market boom and the banking 
system was ripe for asset deflation. " 
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It is worth emphasising here that the collapse of asset prices had also played a crucial role 
in explaining Japanese financial distress. Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (2000) note that the 
relationship between stock market and banking system was especially strong. This is due to 
a special characteristic in Japanese financial system that allowed banks to count equities of 
their corporate customers as part of near-capital or tier 11 capital in the Basle capital 
adequacy requirements. This means that banks were able to increase lending at the same 
time as equity prices increased. On the other hand, the collapse in the stock market after 
1990 led to a severe shortage of capital. 
In the Thai case, banks and finance companies did not only expose to real estate sector but 
they are indirectly exposed to changes in land prices from their collateralised lending 
practice. (It is in this sense that Thailand is similar to Japan. But in Japan, banks are 
exposed to change in the stock market as they are allowed to use equities as their capital 
base. ) Secondly, as land prices increase, lending can expand and so this led to an increase 
in leverage at firm level. 
By way of summarising the consequence of financial liberalisation, we use diagram below 
to show how liberalisation can lead to rapid build-up of vulnerability. On the right hand 
side of the flow chart, financial liberalisation resulted in a surge in private capital inflows 
and rapid credit expansion, which in turn led to a boom in investment and asset prices. 
Since loans are made on the basis of collateral, an increase in asset prices means that more 
loans are available. These reinforcing effects increase exposure of financial institutions 
toward more cyclical sectors, which make them vulnerable to asset price shocks. On the 
left hand side of the chart, the flow of short-term foreign borrowing resulted in high 
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leverage at the economy wide level by increasing exposure to currency mismatch that 
make the economy vulnerable to sudden reversal of foreign capital. 
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4.3 Run-up to the crisis (1996 - mid 1997) 
4.3.1 Real estate and finance company crises 
In 1996, Thai economy experienced a sharp decline in export to 1.8 percent from the 24.6 
percent growth in previous year. Note that this sudden stop was also observed in most 
countries in the region, indicating that there may be a set of common external factors. One 
of these factors was the overvaluation of the currency that pegged their value to the US 
dollar: as the dollar appreciated against the yen (by 50 percent from mid-1995 to 1997), 
this led to an increasing loss of trade competitiveness. 
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While such a drop in exports may trigger some concerns to foreign investors over the size 
of current account deficits and the exchange value of the baht, the real estate sector was the 
first to collapse, followed closely by insolvency of the finance companies. As mentioned 
earlier, share prices of property companies fell sharply in 1994 and subsequently, property 
companies began to record losses in 1995 (26 percent losses from the profit growth of 33 
percent in 1994). This pattern was similar to finance companies. However, this was not the 
case for commercial banks: their share prices only began to fall in mid- 1996. 
The collapse in real estate sector was due mainly to the oversupply situation, as well as the 
results of the tightening of monetary policy in 1994-5 (to curb with capital inflows). In 
addition, in 1995 real estate firms were further depressed by the regulation of the Bank of 
Thailand to limit the use of collateral in extending new loans, which required that if a 
debtor was unable to make interest payments, creditors cannot advance additional amounts 
to the borrower on the basis of the same collateral, Herring and Wachter (1999). Since 
property companies were highly leveraged, both high interest rates and the tightening 
margin requirements meant that they were required sell assets which were already in 
oversupply situation. Consequently, these companies ran into serious illiquidity. 
By 1996, it appeared that rising number of non-performing real estate loans, together with 
falling land prices were rapidly undermining not only some finance companies but the 
stability of the whole financial system. This had led the Bank of Thailand to change its 
policy by relaxing financial constraint in the real estate sector and to launch a number of 
measures to alleviate property loan problems and stimulate market demand, see Table 4.9 
below. These included encouraging financial institution to extend loan and interest 
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payments period for financially-troubled property developers. It also established the 
Resolution Property Trust Fund (RPTF), with contributions from the financial institutions 
(totalling 50 billion baht) to be used to purchase debts and assets from financially-distress 
property companies. However this project never materialised and was subsequently 
replaced by the establishments of the Property Loan Management Organisation (PLMO) in 
April 1997, Siamwalla (2001). The objective of PLMO is to increase liquidity of financial 
institutions by buying their property loans that could not find enough working capital and 
help them to complete the project. 
Table 4.9. - Measures to revive the real estate sector 
Measures to alleviate financial constraints Measures to revive market demand 
1. The setting up of the Resolution Propejjy Trust 1. Capital gains tax exemption for residential 
Fund: The fund would purchase assets and properties transferred in 1997 and sold by 2007. 
mortgage loans at a discount from real estate 2. Home mortgage loans for civil servants and 
companies. The assets of the fund would be state enterprise employees. 
managed by professional managers. 3. Matching the existing excess supply of property 
2. The setting up of PropeEty Trust Funds: each with the planned property acquisition or lease by 
fund for retail investors amounts to 500 million government agencies and state enterprises. 
baht. Funds for institutional investors are larger. 4. The operation of the Secondary Mortgage 
3. Expediting the enactment of the Securitisation Department (SMD) by Government Housing 
Law. Bank. 
4. The setting up of the Prope!:! y Loan 5. Relaxing the rule of the maximum for foreign 
Management Organisation (PLMO): the ownership of condominiums. 
organisation would purchase property loans from 
financial institutions. Operating fund of PLMO 
came from three sources: initial capital of I 
billion baht allocated from the government 
budget; contribution from the member financial 
institutions of I million baht each; and the 
issuance of PLMO bond worth I billion baht. 
Source: Annual Economic Report, Bank of Thailand, 1997. 
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However, many finance companies were in serious trouble before PLMO appeared to be 
fully operational, Ito (1998). While a first sign of the tensions in financial sector began 
with the collapse of one commercial bank (Bangkok Bank of Commerce) in May 1996, 
which arose from massive fraud, the critical area of concern in thefinancial system during 
thefirst haýf of 1997 was not commercial banks themselves butfinance companies. Since 
the beginning of 1997, some finance companies experienced runs on their liabilities. But 
note that it was driven by fears of insolvency in specific finance companies (which had 
exposure on real estate lending), not by illiquidity of the whole financial sector. 17 As 
shown in Figure 4.10 below, fund outflows from Thai finance companies began in early 
January 1997 and sharply accelerated in May. On the other hand, aggregate deposits at 
commercial banks had risen throughout the year. Specifically, finance companies 
experienced an outflow of around 500 billion baht since May 1997 while commercial 
banks received deposits of around 400 billion baht during the same time. 
Such a fear of depositors appeared to be justified, since 16 and 42 finance companies had 
their operations suspended subsequently on June, 27 1997 and August, 5 1997 (with only 
33 finance companies remaining). However, the runs did not cause the illiquid finance 
companies to become insolvent. In fact the problems of insolvency had already been 
incurred (after having their operations suspended, 56 of the 58 finance companies was 
found to be insolvent later in the year) before the panics took place. So it was the existing 
17 The ratio of money supply (M2) to foreign reserves has been used by Chang and Velasco (2002) to 
indicate the possibility that domestic residents might liquidate their claims and convert the proceeds into 
foreign currency. Given this condition, a bank run by local depositors would result in either the collapse of 
the financial system or the abandonment of the fixed exchange rate. Chang and Velasco (2002, Table 8) show 
that this ratio at the end of 1996 was high in Indonesia (6.50) and Korea (6.5 1) but relatively moderate in 
Thailand (3.90) in fact it was falling. They note that: "The behaviour of Thai ratio most likely indicate that 
the relevant measure of the liabilities of Thailand's financial system to domestic residents should include the 
promissory notes of the finance companies, which are not include in M2 but become increasingly important" 
(p. 433). However, we find that the inclusion of finance companies' promissory notes increases the ratio to 
4.96 which is relatively small, compared to Indonesia and Korea. 
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insolvency problem of these finance companies that caused the run. One important 
difference between the 16 and 42 finance companies, and 33 surviving finance companies 
was the quality of their loan portfolios: more than 40% of the loans from the 16 finance 
companies were directed to the real estate sector, as opposed to 25% for the 42 companies 
and less 33 companies, Ito (1998). 
Figure 4.10: 'Flight to quality' by domestic depositors 
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In addition, the Thai authorities appeared to throw good money after bad by recycling 
liquidity to these insolvent finance companies. That is, commercial banks and finance 
companies were requested to lend to the Liquidity Pool (by way of bonds issued by the 
Financial Institutions Development Fund, FIDF 18) in proportion to an increase in their 
18 Established in 1985, the Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF), is part of the government's 
mechanism for implementing financial-support measures and rehabilitating financial institutions in order to 
maintain stability in the system. The primary role is W to provide liquidity support for distressed financial 
institutions; (ii) to purchase increased share capital where there is insufficient capital funds as a result of 
accumulated losses cased by mismanagement or sustained high volume of bad debts. (Generally, FIDF will 
order the troubled financial institution to reduce its capital before buying its new shares); (iii) to act on behalf 
of the govemment as guarantor for depositors and creditors. 
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deposits. These lender financial institutions received interest at the rate of 7-day repurchase 
(which at the time around 20 percent) plus a margin of 1.5 percent per annum and financial 
institutions borrowing from the Liquidity Pool were charged at the same rate. While the 
stronger financial institutions were gaining their excess liquidity at the expense of the 
weaker ones, the policy of liquidity recycle has proved to be costly because it was not 
enough to check the depositors' panic on these insolvent institutions. [On December 8, 
1997) the government allowed only 2 of the 58 suspended finance companies to resume 
business. The remaining 56 companies -- with total assets of about 860 baht, i. e. II percent 
of the financial sector's total assets -- were closed and liquidated under the supervision of 
the Financial Restructuring Authority (FRA). ] 
In addition, despite the arrangement of a compensation scheme for creditors of the 58 
suspended finance companies'9 (by exchange of promissory notes and certificates of 
deposit issued by these 58 finance companies for those issued by state-owned financial 
institutions), it appeared that withdrawal of funds in remaining financial institutions 
continued. This led the government to announce a blanket guarantee (in local currency 
terms) for both depositors and creditors of the remaining financial institutions. Such 
guarantee was implemented through the state-owned Financial Institutions Development 
Fund (FIDF) and it covered full principal and full (or partial) interest payments, Bank of 
Thailand (2000). 
'9 Depositors of the 56 closed companies can exchange their promissory notes for those issued by state- 
owned financial institutions. But creditors of the first 16 companies have no choice but to wait for the 
liquidation outcome. As for the creditors of the 40 finance companies, they have the option of exchanging 
their notes for the negotiable certificate of deposit of the state-owned bank or await the outcome of the 
liquidation process. 
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According to estimates undertaken by an IMF advisory mission in mid-July 1997, 
Lindgren et al. (1999), it is indicated that "many, if not most, of Thailand's 91 finance 
companies were insolvent, while banks as a group were solvent, but undercapitalized. In 
the absence of detailed supervisory information on the individual institutions, there was an 
expectation that the five largest banks (representing about two-thirds of the banking 
system) were among the strongest in the system, so that several of the small- and medium- 
sized banks most likely were insolvent. " 
4.3.2. Currency devaluation 
The first round of speculative attacks on Thai baht began in December 1996, but massive 
attacks started in May 1997.20 While there was some warning from the IMF - in 
confidential with Thai authorities - that baht was overvalued and needed adjusting, the 
Thai authorities continued to defend its defacto dollar peg (see Nukul Commission, 1998). 
In preventing a sharp rise in domestic interest rates, Bank of Thailand chose to defend its 
currency by using foreign exchange swaps. 
In addition, selective capital controls were also imposed in order to reduce foreign 
speculators' access to domestic currency market: for example, foreign exchange 
transactions with non-residents were limited to those with genuine underlying commercial 
and investment activities. These measures effectively led to two-tier foreign exchange 
market, i. e. the onshore market where there was normal supply of baht and the offshore 
where baht was scare. Immediately after the imposition of control, Thai baht overnight 
interest rates in the offshore market rose to over 1000 percent, Bank of Thailand (1998). 
'0 In January 1997, Thailand's foreign exchange position was relatively healthy, ranking 8th in the world at 
around $40 billion dollar, Kaosa-ard (1998). 
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As reported in IMF (1997) reported that the increase in offshore financing costs resulted in 
losses of between US$I and 1.5 billion to speculators at the end of June 1997. 
Although these measures appeared to be successful in punishing non-resident speculators, 
the extensive use of forward foreign exchange market caused the central bank to 
accumulate large short foreign exchange positions and this constrained its ability to prevent 
the pressure that came from domestic residents. Bank of Thailand (1998, p. 27) reports that 
in the wake of Foreign Minister's resignation, domestic capital flight began by the rush of 
local corporations to buy US dollars to hedge against their foreign currency dominated 
debt; this resulted in a heavy loss of international reserves. Consequently, net foreign 
reserve (gross reserves less the forward obligations) -- which stood at around US$ 40 
billion in September 1996 -- declined from over US$30 billion in May 1997 to its lowest 
level at US$ 1.1 billion in July 1997. The baht was subsequently floated on July 2,1997 
and immediately depreciated against US dollar by 17 percent. 
It may be worth emphasising that movements in the baht were relatively calm after 
floating. In case of Mexican peso, however, the devaluation of 15 percent on December 20, 
1994 was followed by massive capital outflows which caused the crash in currency of 50 
percent in one week. This was not the case in Thailand: after one month, the baht was still 
within 20 percent range, Ito (1998). However, as capital outflows accelerated sharply in the 
fourth quarter of 1997, the US dollar reached a peak at 56.06 baht on 26th January 1998 
(Figure 4.11). 
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Figure 4.1 ]. - Exchange rate (Bahtl$US) and interbank rates 
(Monthly average) 
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After the beginning of the currency crisis, in August 1997 the Thai government asked for 
financial support from the IMF and obtained a US$17.2 billion rescue package. However, 
such rescue came with a series of rigid conditional ities, including budgetary cash surplus, 
tight monetary policy, and comprehensive financial reforms and the subsequent 
macroeconomic regime in Thailand had been dominated by IMF policy (covering 8 Letters 
of Intent from August 1997 until September 1999). Such regime developed with the IMF 
went through three relatively distinct phases from August 1997. The first phase was mainly 
the standard IMF tight monetary policy (and fiscal policy) to stabilise the baht devaluation. 
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The second phase aims at restructuring financial sector; and the third phase concerns 
various structural reform, including legal reforms and privatisation. 21 
In order to stabilise the baht from further devaluation, the government tightened its 
monetary policy. However, the baht fell continuously until it reached the bottom at around 
56 in mid January 1998. They also had led to a severe contraction of the real economy. 
(Note that by August 1998, strict monetary and fiscal policies were seen to be the main 
cause of the alarming contraction of the real sector and the continuing growth of non- 
performing loans. In response to this, the Thai government and the IMF agreed, as part of 
the fifth letter of intent, on a major relaxation of the macroeconomic policy regime. ) 
4.4.1 Foreign investor panics on commercial banks 
Unlike finance companies which had suffered losses since 1995 and subsequently brought 
down by wholesale collapse of real estate sector in 1996, the operations of commercial 
banks as a whole remained unaffected until the floatation of the baht in July 1997. Indeed, 
as shown in the table below, Thai banks recorded net profits both in 1996 and the first half 
of 1997 but had been severely hit in the second half of the year. [This was in contrast to 
foreign bank branches which perforined better than Thai banks because they did not suffer 
from shortage of foreign funds. ] 
21 For details, see Ministry of Finance (1999). 
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Table 4.10: Net profit and loss of commercial banks and BIBF operation (billion baht) 
1996 1997 1998 
IH 2H Total IH 2H Total 
Thaibanks 
(including BIBF) 
50.3 29.9 -108.4 -78.5 -163.9 -206.9 -370.8 
Thaibanks 
(excluding BBC) 
- 31.2 -94.0 -62.8 -153.5 -195.4 -348.8 
Foreign bank branches 
(including BIBF)' 
7.9 5.7 1.8 7.5 -1.3 -6.0 -7.3 
Other BIBF unitS2 1.4 0.5 -1.4 -0.9 -1.4 -2.5 -3.9 
Total 59.6 36.2 -108.0 -71.9 -166.6 -215.3 -382.0 
Note: ' In 1997, net profit included branches of 6 new foreign banks which started their operations in that 
year and the BIBF operation of 6 existing financial institutions. 2 In 1997, net profit excluded 6 BIBF 
operations which became full branches in that year but included 6 BIBF operations which were newly 
appointed and started their operations in the same year. 
Source: Bank of Thailand, Annual Economic Report, 1998. 
The most important reason for this was due to the loss of confidence of foreign creditors, 
by refusing to roll over foreign currency denominated debt. This forced banks to recall 
their loans from local corporations of their BIBF operations. Table 4.11 below clearly 
illustrates that the ouy7ows in the second haýf of 1997 were due mainly to repayments of 
short-term loans; and this came mostly from commercial bank sector (including BIBF) 
with the turnaround of almost $US 10 billion, while non-bank experienced loan recalls to 
the lesser extent. Such reversals intensified throughout 1998. The flow of non-resident baht 
accounts which were essentially foreign currency deposits at banks also turns negative. 
Foreign direct investment appeared to be the most stable form of capital flows, which 
recorded surplus in 1997 and even increased more than double in 1998. In addition, 
portfolio investment had even increased during the second half of 1997 because Thai 
stocks became cheaper in dollar terms to foreign investors after the baht depreciation. It 
appears that both foreign lenders and foreign depositors had lost confidence primarily 
towards commercial bank sector. 
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Table 4.11: Net private capital ouýflows ($US Million) 
1997 1998 
HI H2 Total HI H2 Total 
Direct investment 829 2536 3366 4962 2144 6836 
Loans 1859 -9156 -7297 -7467 -8053 -15421 
- Banks 2820 -6332 -3512 -4569 -6644 -11214 
- Commercial banks 1380 -3653 -2273 -243 -1389 -1632 
- BIBF 1440 -2680 -1239 -4326 -5255 -9581 
- Non-bank -961 -2824 -3785 -2798 -1409 -4207 
Portfolio 1424 2965 4389 180 -175 4 
Non-resident baht 
account 
-3485 -2328 -5813 -1092 -1699 -2791 
Others 301 -3048 -2746 -2507 -1750 -4256 
Total 929 -9031 -8102 -6095 -9533 -15628 
Bank 2405 -8689 -6284 -5050 -8558 -13608 
Non-bank -1476 -342 -1818 -1045 -975 -2020 
Source: Bank of Thailand 
Note that Thai financial institutions were subject to Bank of Thailand's regulation that net 
foreign exposure cannot be greater than 20 percent of their capital funds; so commercial 
banks did not suffer directly from the risk of currency depreciation. However, it was 
transferred to their corporate customers, which in turn increased the banks' credit risk. As 
shown in the figure below, borrowing and lending in foreign denominated currency had 
risen dramatically since 1993 and the decline since 1997 had reflected the refusal to roll 
over debt by foreign creditors. Therefore, in addition to the collapse in the real estate 
sector, which had already brought down more than haýf of finance companies, Thai 
commercial banks had indirectly suffered from serious consequences of currency 
devaluation in terms of rising non-performing assets. 
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Figure 4.12: Lendings and borrowings of Thai commercial banks inforeign currency 
(including BIBFs) 
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Together with the deterioration in the quality of their assets, the capital position of 
commercial banks was suffered by tightening prudential regulations. Since the devaluation 
in July, the Bank of Thailand had no longer accommodated the banks' loan problems by 
practicing 'regulatory forbearance', Siamwalla (2000). In contrast, the regulation standard 
had been even more stringent. For example, the definition of non-performing loans was 
changed to cover past due loans with 3 months, instead of the previous 6 and 12 months. 
More loan loss provisions were also required: for doubtful debts from 50 percent to 100 
percent and for substandard loans from 0 percent to 15 percent. Such new standards 
effectively forced banks to increase their capital which was scare in the midst of the crisis. 
So they could hardly extend credits because their huge existing non-perfon-ning loans had 
to be backed up by capital funds. This pushed non-performing loans even higher. As seen 
in the figure below, non-performing loans in the financial system rose considerably from 8 
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percent of credit outstanding in mid-1997, to 20 percent in December 1997 and to 45 
percent in December 1998 (or 59 percent of GDP) until the peak in the second quarter of 
1999. As for the composition of these non-performing loans, it turned out that real estate 
sector suffered the hardest from the crisis. At the end of 1998, almost 70 percent of total 
real estate lending in the financial system were non-performed. 
Figure 4.13: Non-performing loans infinancial system 
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Figure 4.14. - Non-performing loans by sectors (end 1998) C) 
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Unsurprisingly, there was substantial consolidation and ownership change in financial 
sector between June 1997 and December 1999. As illustrated in Table 4.12 below, finance 
companies suffered the hardest hit: 56 out of 91 were liquidated and the others had been 
intervened by the government. Thus far, the number of finance companies has substantially 
reduced to 23 companies, with the share of assets reduced from 24 percent to only 4 
percent. As for the 15 commercial banks, one bank was closed down, 6 banks were 
intervened (through nationalised, merged and privatised). The remaining ones are 
recapitalise which resulted in a significant dilution of ownership stakes; the three largest 
banks (with over 40 percent of total assets) have substantial foreign ownership, ranging 
between 30-39 percent. 
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Table 4.12: Consolidation of the Thaifinancial sector (June 1997 and December 2000)' 
Finance companies Commercial banks 
Number Share of assets Number Share of assets 
June 97 91 24 15 76 
Total assets of $163 billion State share negligible State share 10% of total assets 
Foreign-owned: 0% of total assets 
Closures 56 14 1 2 
Government interventions 13 4 6 14 
December 2 0002 23 4 13 96 
Total asset of $133 billion State share negligible State share 28% of total assets 
Foreign-owned: 6%3 
' Excludes foreign bank branches and specialised financial institutions. Dollar figures are at a constant 
exchange rate of 44 baht/dollar. 
2 Figures exclude $23 billion of finance company assets taken over by FRA. 
3 Further, the three largest private banks, with over 40 percent of total assets, have high foreign ownership 
(30-39 percent). 
Source: IMF (2001). 
4.4.2 The meltdown 
As a result of bubble bursting in land prices in 1996 (see Figure 4.5 above), capital stocks 
in constructions and land -- which also reached its peak in the first quarter of 1996 -- fell 
sharply by around 30 percent in the first quarter of 1997, even before the currency crisis 
took place in the mid of 1997, see Figure 4.15 below. But the effects of high interest rates 
in the second ha4f of 1997, together with currency depreciation, worsened corporate 
balance sheets even further; and this led corporate firms to reduce their capital stocks so 
as to repay rising debts. The extent of recession (and recovery) has been amplified by 
adjustments in capital stocks until 1999. The total cumulative fall in investment from 1996 
to 1999 was around 60 percent. However, adjustment on constructions and land continued 
until reaching the bottom in the end of 2000; capital stocks on constructions and land of 
corporations reduced to around 30 percent from what they hold at the peak. Note that 
recovery in total output took place in the second half of 1998 and, at the end of 200 11 
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remain the same as the pre-crisis level. The main factors were due largely to i increase in 
private consumption and exports. 
Figure 4.15. - Boom, Bust and Recovery 
(IQ 93 = 100, seasonally adjusted) 
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Source: National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand. 
Figure 4.16 below demonstrates an important role of corporate leverage in explaining the 
depth of the crisis, by plotting average debt to equity ratio of listed companies in 1996 
together with real GDP growth deviation from trend in 1998 in Asian countries. 
Specifically, output contraction became more severe for countries which had high initial 
levels of leverage. 
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Figure 4.16: Corporate leverage and the 'balance sheet'effect 
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4.5 Concluding remarks: Some perspectives on the Thai crisis 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Asian financial crisis has often seen and analysed as 
a single episode from a set of common factors. Even though the analysis in this chapter is 
neither theoretical nor empirical, by examining at evidence in some details for the Thai 
case, it is not difficult to see that there were some specific institutional characteristics 
(together with government policies) which had played a key role in contributing to the 
1997/8 Thai crisis; and they may also shed some light on the three main competing 
explanations of the crisis in Asia. That is, (i) moral hazards in financial markets where 
ing financial panic; (iii) balance implicit government bailout guarantees; (ii) self-fulfilli III 
sheet effects of credit-constrained firms. [Note that the third one does not need to be in 
conflict with the first two because it aims to explain severity of the crisis and puts 
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emphasis on corporate sector. ] In what follows, we look at the relevance of these theories 
on the Thai case. 
Regarding the debate on the first two hypotheses, we find that both had their part in the 
Thai crisis but through different types of financial institutions. Problems in finance 
companies are caused by moral hazard; and the case for financial panics (especially from 
foreign investors) applies most to commercial banks. We argue that the reason for this is 
due to un-balanced and inadequate supervision and regulation between these two 
institutions. 
Specifically, in contrast to commercial bank, finance companies. in Thailand were subject 
to less stringent regulation and had limited scope of offering banking services. But when 
the authorities allowed these finance companies to apply for banking license on the basis of 
asset5s size (i. e. the bigger they are, the higher chance they will be commercial bank), one 
way to achieve this under the competitive environment was by shifting their lending 
towards cyclical sector such as real estate sector (as asset prices increase, they can lend 
more on the basis of collateral, which in turn leads to higher asset prices). So their lending 
grows as asset prices increased; hence these finance companies become increasingly and 
directly exposed to real estate sector and asset price shocks. 
Because of interest rate liberal i sation, these finance companies offered higher interest rates 
as their investments were riskier than those of commercial banks. In effect, they gained 
more share in domestic source of funds at expense of the commercial banks. But the 
establishment of BIBF allows banks to attract cheaper funds from overseas (with tax 
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incentives), these pushed banks to toward short-term foreign borrowings, which in turn 
made them more vulnerable to a sudden reversal of capital flows and exchange rate risk. 
The implication of our account of the Thai case is that there was unique equilibrium of the 
crisis in real estate sector and finance companies but not for the commercial banks where 
22 
collapse needs not have happened . Consequently, policy to deal with problems in finance 
companies and in commercial banks should have been different, i. e. insolvent finance 
companies needed to be closed down while banks needed liquidity. In contrast, the ways 
that the Thai authorities chosen to deal with these problems appeared to be the opposite, 
namely that of by recycling liquidity out from the banks towards the finance companies 
during the run up to the crisis. It turned out that the insolvent finance companies were 
eventually closed down while the solvent commercial banks became undercapitalised. The 
effects of such policy not only pushed commercial banks towards the collapse equilibrium 
but it also led to unnecessarily high costs of financial restructurings when the crisis came. 
Another policy lesson we draw in this chapter is that the Thai central bank underestimated 
the risk of asset price deflation due to the collapse of real estate sector. 
The problems in Thailand did not end with the collapse of finance and real estate 
companies. There is one important institution that also plays a crucial role in the dynamics 
of the crisis, namely the widespread use of collateral for loans. When finance companies 
continued on lending to real estate firrns so as to increase the size of their assets, these real 
estate firms use borrowed funds to speculate on land and property which are generally used 
as collateral for loans in other lines of businesses. This in turn increased the capacity to 
borrow in other sectors. Since Thai firms always have tendency towards debt financing, it 
22 Based on our evidence, we do not find that loan portfolios in commercial banks were obviously unsound. 
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was not surprising that corporate leverage increased across the board. This is where the 
'third explanation' (i. e. the 'balance sheet' effects) of the crisis is most relevant here. The 
use of tight monetary policy during the second half of 1997 to stabilise the currency turned 
out to be costly, as it opened another channel for a domestic liquidity crunch which led to 
widespread bankruptcies of corporate sector. 
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Chapter 5 
Managing corporate debt crisis: Lessons from Thailand 
5.1 Introduction 
The institutions of bankruptcy have been a subject of the discussion at both national and 
international levels. Following the 1997/8 Asian financial crisis, one important issue is 
how to deal with simultaneous insolvency of domestic fir-ms, owing to sharp currency 
depreciation and collapse in asset prices, (see, for example, Stiglitz 2001). In another part 
of the world, the recent crisis in Latin America has demonstrated the need for efficient 
mechanisms to handle sovereign bankruptcy. To ensure that debt restructuring is done in 
an orderly fashion, the framework of the corporate reorganisation law used in the US has 
received much attention in both cases. Indeed, the US Chapter II -typed law has been 
imposed (as part of the IMF structural reform programme) in Asian countries and has been 
used as a basis for Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanisms (SDRM), proposed by 
Krueger (2001). 1 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the issue relating to systemic bankruptcy in 
corporate sector, based on the Thai experience. The focus is on some macroeconomic 
implications of domestic bankruptcy reform and the policy actions taken to deal with large- 
scale corporate debt overhang. While domestic bankruptcy law refonn would clearly help 
balance creditor's rights and debtor's rights, it was not an adequate response to the crisis. 
As argued by Miller and Stiglitz (1999), in the context of economy-wide shocks, even 
' For development and debate on such mechanism in resolving the sovereign debt, see Miller (2002). 
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well-managed firms can easily go bankirupt; so the mechanisms designed to handle 
domestic fin-ns in normal times and during crises should be different. 
In investigating the extent of corporate balance sheet problems in five Asian countries 
following currency and interest rate shocks, Claessens et al. (1999) find that 63 percent of 
the Asian finns were illiquid (i. e. earning less than debt service) and 31 percent technically 
insolvent (i. e. outstanding debt greater than asset). As shown in the table below, Indonesia 
suffered the most, where 77 and 65 percent of firms in the country were illiquid and 
insolvent, respectively. This was followed by Thailand with two-thirds of all firms illiquid 
and around a quarter were technically bankrupt. These figures suggest that liquidity 
problems in Thailand were much more pervasive than insolvency. 
Figure 5. P Corporate distress in East Asia (as of 11199) 
Illiquid 
firms (%) 
Insolvent 
firms (%) 
Non-performing 
loans (% of GDP) 
Indonesia 77 45 29.9 
Korea 50 41 24.8 
Malaysia 63 5 14.4 
Philippines 57 16 7.1 
Thailand 65 23 27.9 
Average 63 31 20.8 
If the private sector could voluntarily work out debts by themselves, then there would be 
no need to concern about size of the problems stated above. However, as argued by Hart 
(2000) for example, such renegotiation may be difficult, which suggests that we cannot 
rely purely on private solutions. Effective and orderly procedures in bankruptcy law are 
needed. 
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While there are many types of bankruptcy procedures, they fall into two main categories 
i. e. liquidation and reorganisation (Hart, 1995). [In the US, these two processes are known 
as Chapter 7 and Chapter 11, respectively. ] Which bankruptcy policies to use depend on 
whether illiquid fin-n are economically viable or non-viable. If a firm is economically 
viable -- i. e. its value as going concern (continuation value) is greater than the value of the 
assets sold on a piecemeal basis (its liquidation value) -- the best outcome for it is to 
continue operation, since its capital has no higher value use. If, on the other hand, if a finn 
is non-viable, the best outcome is for its assets to be liquidated, hence releasing its assets to 
higher value users. Although these two procedures may be viewed as relatively distinct 
from each other, there are linkages between them. When a creditor initiates a liquidation 
proceedings against a debtor, debtors have an option to seek for bankruptcy protection by 
commencing a rehabilitation proceeding. Conversely, this proceeding can be converted 
into liquidation proceeding if it appears that a successful rehabilitation is not possible. That 
is, liquidation will run its course if rehabilitation efforts have failed, IMF (1999). 
In the case of Thailand, prior to 1998, Thai bankruptcy law oriented towards liquidation 
procedure and there was no legal protection to new financing for financ ially- distressed 
firms. Following the financial crisis which began in July 1997, Thailand reformed the law 
by introducing a Chapter 11 -typed rehabilitation procedure to prevent business from being 
driven into unnecessary bankruptcy because of temporary liquidity problems. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 discusses some potential 
incentive problems that may arise if borrowers and creditors are left alone to work out their 
claims. To investigate this issue, we specifically look through the lens of the framework 
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analysed in Chapter 2 where we show that debt roll-overs and write-downs can be used to 
avoid credit crunch. In this section, however, we find that such methods may not function 
without extra legal powers; and this seems to be a good case for the authorities to provide 
4off the shelf bankruptcy procedures. 
Before turning to the details of the formal insolvency processes and recent reforms, Section 
5.3 takes a brief look at history of property rights in Thailand, along with political factors 
and cultural attitudes - which appear to play an important role in limiting the capacity to 
implement the law. We then show that, when the efficiency of legal system is taken into 
account (particularly the built-in delay involved in the judicial process), a creditor-oriented 
bankruptcy law may effectively turn into debtor-friendly regime. Given the extent of 
macroeconomic shocks that hit Thailand in 1997/8, delay may not be the worst outcome. 
This is because the delay helps preventing wholesale liquidation of domestic firms. 
However, it can create efficiency losses as efficient firms are also prevented from being 
restructured. Specifically, we argue that - in the situation where there exists only 
liquidation process (as was the case in Thailand) - strengthening the enforcement of 
property rights in midst of the crisis without ensuring that the new reorganisation law has 
been put in place, would potentially be dangerous. This is because it would potentially lead 
to downward spiral of loan recall, as analysed previously. 
Since court-supervised restructuring law was not established in sufficient time to deal with 
the crisis, the needs for a quick resolution led Thai authorities to construct a modified 
version of the out-of-court workouts (based on the 'London Approach'). Of one particular 
feature in the Thai out-of-court approach - which appears to be innovative in resolving 
systemic debt overhang in the financial system - is the degree in which the Thai authorities 
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help co-ordinating workout between financial institution creditors and big and viable 
businesses that have the most impact on the economy. We argue that this feature did help 
increase efficient outcomes of systemic debt resolution in midst of the crisis. This is the 
subject of Section 5.4 and we conclude in Section 5.5. 
5.2 Will voluntary renegotiation avert the credit crunch? 
In their paper, Kletzer and Wright (2000) observe that sovereign states participate in 
mutually beneficial lending without collateral; and they develop a model to show that 
voluntary renegotiation may be possible. In their account, all loans are publicly recorded in 
'tombstone' messages displayed for all to see, so any debt repudiation is visible and can be 
'punished'. Could the same logic not be applied domestically, so that when collateral 
values have fallen, the credit crunch is nevertheless averted by voluntary private 
renegotiation? 
Consider the idea that creditor might roll over part of the loan, which the firm promises to 
repay from the traded goods available in the next period. This is an attractive prospect (as 
analysed in Chapter 2). For the creditor, it avoids a potentially costly liquidation and offers 
the prospect of repayment in full. For the debtor, the surrender of future traded goods will 
slow their rate of expansion, but it will ensure survival. 
Will this extra lending -- ex hypothesi not collateralised -- be repaid? If the proceedings 
were under the supervision of the courts, as under Chapter II of the US Bankruptcy Code 
for example, then legal powers could be used to ensure repayment. But what if the only 
legal provisions are for the seizure of collateral? On the assumptions of the model of 
Kiyotaki and Moore, for example, repayment is surely in doubt. For if the self interest of 
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borrower and lender were sufficient to support lending without collateral in a crisis, why 
not at other times? Why the need for complete collateralisation under normal 
circumstances? 
The rationale for demanding collateral for loans in the KM model is spelled out in Hart and 
Moore (1994) who draw the distinction between human and physical assets (i. e property 
rights over physical assets can be traded but human capital is not). In Hart and Moore's 
model, firms cannot pre-commit their labour but they can promise to hand over control of 
the physical assets in the case that they fail to meet debt repayments. Collateral has a 
desired incentive as the threat of seizure induces firms to repay their debt. To check on 
why collateral is required, consider the bargaining conditions that prevail between lender 
and borrower, after the original loan was made but before the labour had been committed. 
2 The lender , it is assumed, 
has the powers of seizing land in pursuit of his claim. So seizure 
is a credible outside option for the creditor. What about the borrower? What is the outside 
option in that case? It is assumed by Kiyotaki and Moore that the borrower can threaten to 
repudiate the loan by taking down-payment and labour and leaving; and that this threat is 
sufficiently credible that the lender only expects to receive his/her outside option value, i. e. 
the lender dare only lend up to value of the collateral, minus the legal costs of seizure. 
It is implicit in this account that the borrower expects to be able to recommence 
negotiations with another lender, without adverse effects from earlier repudiation, i. e. 
borrowers are anonymous. This is a significant departure from the 'common knowledge' 
2 It should be noted that under Hart and Moore's assumption, traded goods cannot be seized even when 
default occurs. This is because debtor simply runs away with whatever output they have and starts new 
business elsewhere. Under the provision of the US Chapter 7 provision, however, creditors may be allowed 
to grab traded goods if collateral value is less than debt obligations. So there could be some prospect of 
rollover allowed in the KM model if one assumes Chapter 7 provision. 
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assumption needed by Kletzer and Wright to sustain non-collaterallsed lending. Theirs may 
be appropriate assumption for sovereign states, as there are less than 200 countries in the 
world; and it may well be relevant for countries like the US where running a credit check is 
a standardised procedure. But it is not generally appropriate for the reason discussed by 
Hart and Moore, lenders will expect any voluntary rollovers to be repudiated: so -- like un- 
collateralised loans before the crisis -- they will not take place. 
If pressing for repayment leads to the liquidation of the firm, will there not be an incentive 
for creditors to write down debt so as to allow for the survival of firms hit with a temporary 
macroeconomic shock? After all, mass liquidation will lead to a large fall in asset prices, 
i. e. to low liquidation values. But the problem here is that no individual lender internalises 
the pecuniary externality attached to his or her liquidation. If other make concessions and 
stabilise land prices, the incentive for the last to take land prices as given and to seize 
whatever is available at those prices, rather than making concessions. In short, there is a 
ftee-rider problem. 
The above analysis implies an important role for Chapter II -style bankruptcy institutions. 
As wel I- functioning bankruptcy law plays an important role for an efficiency market 
economy, the goal of the institutions of bankruptcy is to balance these bargaining powers 
to ensure that, on the one hand, the rights of creditors are well protected, and, on the other 
hand, economically viable firms are not liquidated prematurely (Stiglitz, 2001). In what 
follows, we look at the case of Thailand. 
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5.3 Formal legal mechanisms in Thailand 
In this section, we discuss formal bankruptcy procedures in Thailand; but before getting 
into details, it is important to see issues in historical perspectives. 
5.3.1 Legal origins and history of property rights in Thailand 
Generally, commercial laws used around the world can be grouped into two broad 
traditions: common law, which is English in origin, and civil law, which originates from 
Roman law. Within the civil tradition, there are three major families that modem 
commercial laws derive from: French, German, and Scandinavian. La Porta et al. (1998) 
study the impact of historical origin of the legal codes on the protection of investor's rights 
and contract enforcement efficiency. They find that common-law countries give creditors 
stronger legal protections against managers. And the quality of law enforcement is the 
highest in Scandinavian and German-civil-law countries, next highest is common-law 
countries and the lowest is French-civil-law countries. 
The legal system in Thailand, however, has been influenced from many sources. 3 Though 
first influenced by English common law, it has a body of codified French civil law. The 
commercial law, namely the Civil and Commercial Code, is derived from Germany via 
Japan, Slamwalla (2000): but the Thai Bankruptcy Act of 1940 appears to have been 
influenced by English bankruptcy law models. For example, it contains a series of 
4 presumptions of insolvency' which is similar to the English law concept of 'acts of 
bankruptcy' (Asian Development Bank, 2000a). Finally, following the 1997/8 financial 
3 Most of its judges are trained in the common law tradition 
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crisis, Thailand has adopted the model of the US Chapter 11 -typed reorganIsatIon process, 
as part of the structural reform programme by the IMF. 
There are, moreover, various sui generis factors in the Thai society that might limit the 
capacity to implement the law. We briefly consider two of them, namely patronage system 
and cultural influences. 
Norton (2000) provides a historical account for the prevalent use of 'connection' in the 
Thai society. He argues that "The society of Thailand still carries, in various socially 
indirect ways, the 'baggage' of the feudal system, the Sakdi Na system, that burdened the 
poor and benefited those well-bom and well-connected", (p. 17). He explains that under 
this system, the monarch owned land, labour and other economic resources. There was no 
private land ownership but the monarch could grant aristocrats the right to use and benefit 
from land. So the amount of land would reflect the power, rights and obligations of the 
aristocrat. Since trade was monopolised by the monarch, businessmen needed to conduct 
their business under the auspices of an aristocrat. A patron-client relationship between the 
aristocrats and businessmen was form in which the businessmen received protection from 
the aristocrats, and the aristocrats received pecuniary benefits in return. 
In recent times, businessmen- Senators use their influence in an attempt to resist legal 
reforms -- particularly the foreclosure bills that would force them to liquidate their assets to 
pay debts, Laird (2000). Norton (2000, p. 20) also reported that "when the bankruptcy law 
was being amended in March 1998, the legislation was unduly held-up in the Senate for 
several months. These legislation amendments would make it more difficult for a few 
143 
creditors to hold up the insolvency process and simpler for secured creditors to realize 
upon debtor's assets. " 
An interview with an ex Finance Minister of Thailand who was in charge during the time 
of the crisis confirmed that such stonewalling has carried away right up to present day. 4 In 
order to relieve the backlog in courts, he set up the court compromise process. It consists 
of a group of mediation experts to sort out the debt renegotiation problem between debtors 
and lenders, the so-called Mediation Centre for Financial Disputes (MCFD). (However, 
such process appears to play relatively small role, compared with out-of-court debt 
restructuring which is the subject of our discussion in the next section. ) 
In addition, commercial society in Thailand is dominated by a cultural attitude that may 
restrict dispute resolution and the use of strict legal procedures. As described in Asian 
Development Bank (2000a, p. 79): "Thais are characteristically non-confrontational and 
conflict averse in their approach to business. Negotiation and compromise are the 
expectation and practice". Moreover, Laird (2000) wrote that: Thai culture is considered a 
4soft' culture as opposed to the 'hard' one like Singapore, which has more rigid values 
regarding good and bad. Enforcers of the law in Thailand always face a dilemma of 
whether to uphold the principle or to be compromised. 
Litigation is also reverted to relatively infrequently, although more so in recent years e. g. it 
is common practice for banks to require and directors to give personal guarantees as 
security for corporate lending, but there has been a notable reluctance for banks to sue on 
such personal guarantees, as opposed to looking at other alternatives - extending the term 
4 As listed in Appendix 111, the interview with the ex Finance Minister (November 1997-February 200 1), 
Mr. Tarrin Nimmanhaeminda, was conducted on 4 th September 2000. 
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or repayments, etc. This cannot be explained by legal difficulties for creditors, as there are 
few defences available to guarantors under Thai law, Asian Development Bank (2000a). 
5.3.2 Creditor vs debtor and efficiency of judicial system 
The Thai bankruptcy law, prior to 1998 was oriented towards a liquidation procedure and 
there was no legal protection or new financing for financially-distressed firins. Since the 
only way to deal with financially distressed firms was to liquidate, it might appear that the 
Thai law was strongly in favour of creditors. This is not the case, however, when account 
is taken of legal process of enforcing property rights and the built-in delays it involves. 
To put this into perspective, we use data from La Porta et al. (1998) who presented country 
scores for measuring quality of law enforcement. Table below provides comparative 
information for measuring efficiency of judicial system and creditor rights protection for 7 
Asian countries plus the United States and the United Kingdom. The US and UK provide a 
benchmark score of 10 for efficiency. But note that score for creditor rights is I for the US 
and 4 for the UK, reflecting the fact that the US has debtor-oriented law while the UK has 
creditor-oriented law. As shown in the table, Thailand appears to have a relatively strong 
creditor rights protection with the score of 3 (out of 4) while the overall average creditor 
rights score for 49 countries is 2.3. However, the quality of judicial process in Thailand 
was given a score of 3.25, compared with the average of 7.67 in 49 countries around the 
world. This implies that the speed of enforcement is very slow in Thailand. 
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Table 5.2: Efficiency of judicial system and creditor rights 
Efficiency of 
Judicial System 
Creditor Rights 
Indonesia 2.5 4 
Malaysia 9 4 
Philippines 4.75 0 
Thailand 3.25 3 
Singapore 10 4 
South Korea 6 3 
Japan 10 2 
United Kingdom 10 4 
United States 10 
Average of 49 countries 7.67 2 ý-, ] 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
Clearly from the creditor perspective, there is a trade off between nominal strength of 
property rights and the speed of enforcement. Heuristically, using data from the table 
above, this can be seen in the figure below. The vertical axis represents the efficiency of 
judicial process; the higher the judicial efficiency, the faster the speed of enforcement. The 
horizontal axis measures the strength of creditor rights. To understand such a trade off, we 
draw a benchmark line for "creditor's indifference curve between bankmptcy regimes". 
Shown as AB, which passes through the average score of 49 countries, above this line, 
creditors are better off, below this line creditors are worse off. Its negative slope reflects 
that creditor is willing to substitute the strength of property rights for the speed of 
enforcement on a one-to-one basis. As shown in the figure, Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia creditors are worse off that the average of 49 countries. From the creditor point 
of view, UK is the best and Philippines is the worst in this sample. 
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Figure 5.1: Trade-offs between bankruptcy regimes C-7 
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In addition, we can use the figure to illustrate some important points relating to financial 
stability. As stressed by Eichengreen (1999, p. 3 1), "threat to financial stability arises not 
from the letter of the law but from how the law is (or is not) enforced. " From the figure, 
when line AB moves vertically upwards, creditors are better off as it becomes more 
efficient in speeding up recovery of loans secured with collateral. But when AB moves 
downward -- despite strong creditor's property rights -- debtors are better off since they 
could enjoy the benefits from the delays in the actual provision of the assets (i. e. by hiding 
their assets or output elsewhere). During financial crisis, incentives to pay debt may well 
be undermined by such a weak legal regime. Mako (2001, p. 4) observes that "In Indonesia 
and Thailand, which had debtor-friendly legal environments, debtors achieved financial 
stabilization on a do-it-yourself basis, simply by unilaterally imposing a moratorium on 
debt servicing. " Furthermore, as a number of insolvent cases are rising which might exceed 
the capacity of the court to handle, then AB could move to downward to reflect lowing 
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quality of judicial process. According to the World Bank's calculation reported above, 65 
percent of Indonesian firms and about 23 percent of Thai firms were technically 
bankruptcy in 1998. So it is not difficult to see from the figure that any reduction in the 
judicial efficiency in Indonesia and Thailand would push it close to zero, implying that 
there is little chance for creditors to recover their loans back. 
5.3.3 Legal and Judicial Reform in Thailand 
Formal insolvency mechanisms in Thailand are currently governed by the Bankruptcy Act 
1940. This legislation went through five amendments. The first three amendments were 
mainly on specific details (concerning minimum threshold of debts required to file for a 
bankruptcy petition, for example). Prior to 1998, bankruptcy law contained only 
liquidation process (Chapter 7-styled) .5 It gave no prospect for reorganisation, particularly 
there was no legal protection to new financing for financial ly-di stressed firms. Following 
the financial crisis which began in July 1997, Thailand reformed the law by introducing a 
Chapter II -typed rehabilitation procedure to prevent business from being driven into 
unnecessary bankruptcy because of temporary liquidity problems. This reforni was made in 
April 1998 (Bankruptcy Act No. 4) and came into operation from August 1998. In April 
1999, further amendments to the Act (Bankruptcy Act No. 5) were made to strengthen the 
rehabilitation process and to reduce impediments pertaining liquidation process. In 
addition, the Thai government established a specialised court, the Bankruptcy Court, to 
handle all bankruptcy and reorganisation cases, removing these cases from the jurisdiction 
of civil courts. The Bankruptcy Court commenced its operations in June 1999. 
5 There was also a composition process for debt to be compromised but 50 percent of the creditors and 75 
percent of the total claims of creditors must support a petition and the court must approve the petition. This 
make the contract renegotiation to be costly, Foley (2000). More importantly, debtor- in-posses sion finance 
was not allowed. 
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It should be noted that such problems were recognised before the crisis, but there had been 
little incentive to refonn the laws. As observed by Siamwalla (2000, pp. 10- 11): "Decades 
of continuous growth before 1997 meant that the problems posed by the bankruptcy of 
firms were never serious enough to-warrant a close examination of Thai bankruptcy laws. " 
More importantly, he argues that "Worse than the bankruptcy laws were the foreclosure 
procedures - an important consideration, given the important role that collateral played in 
Thai banking. It could take from three to five years to foreclose on a mortgage. [I]n the era 
of high growth, this created little problems, because the carrying cost caused by the delay 
would be partly, and sometime more than compensated by the appreciation of the land 
price". 
In what follows, we examine the 'Thai- styled' liquidation procedures, before considering 
the new reorganisation law influenced by the US-typed Chapter 11. 
(a) Liquidation procedures 
In Thailand, a secured creditor is not entitled to automatically enforce the secured property 
even though the debtor is in default of payment. The creditor requires the judiciary to 
exercise its rights. In contrast, liquidation cases in Britain, for example, are generally 
managed by secured creditors rather than by the bankruptcy court. When the firm defaults, 
the creditors have the right to appoint receivers. Only when there are assets left over does 
the bankruptcy court appoint a liquidator, who takes charge of selling the remaining assets 
to repay unsecured claims, White (1996). In Thailand, however, two main steps are 
required for the debt collection process: first the creditor requests a court order for seizure 
of collateral; and second proceeds from the sale of the collateral under court-administered 
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process of appraisal and public auction will be directly distributed to the creditor to the 
extent of the value of the secured debt, Asian Development Bank (2000b). 
Under this process, there are two options for creditors to enforce their claims. They can go 
to the civil court (under the Civil and Commercial Code) to force debtor to sell assets to 
pay back loans or they can file for the bankruptcy case (under the Bankruptcy Act). The 
distinction between these two channels is fundamental. The main purpose of the 
foreclosure law under the Civil and Commercial Code is to provide means for collection of 
a single default debt. So it deals with action on the complaint of one single creditor and 
provides creditor an avenue to pursue payment of the obligation owed to it. In enforcing 
the rights of one creditor, however, this foreclosure law used in the civil court does not 
address the collective action problem. So there is a strong incentive for each secured 
creditors to be the first in line (i. e grab race), which would force solvent fin-n into 
premature liquidation. 
In bankruptcy case, however, there is an automatic stay. This is because it deals with a 
4 presumption' of default on every obligation the debtor owes; the creditors must prove 
insolvency of the debtor. 6 While normal ground for this presumption is simple i. e. the 
failure to pay debts after a statutory demand set by a creditor, the determination of 
insolvency is not. Under Thai law, debtor will not be adjudicated bankrupt if s/he can 
prove that his or her assets exceed liabilities. Therefore, creditors can be prevented from 
seizing debtor's assets if the default debtor can show that s/he is solvent. This feature 
appears to be in contrast to modem bankruptcy laws elsewhere; so long as debtor is unable 
6 The original Thai text in the 1940 Bankruptcy Act, the term 'insolvency' may literally be translated as 
excessive indebtedness'. World Bank office in Thailand (1999, p. 19) reports that: There have 
been very few 
instances between 1940 and 1997 in which courts have had to interpret this criterion. " 
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to repay its debts when they fall due, the proceedings can automatically be commenced, 
IMF (2001). 
While the liabilities of a debtor can easily be identified, the determination of asset values 
can become the major source of uncertainty, especially during the period of financial crisis. 
As argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1992), for example, when the industry- or economy- 
wide experiences an adverse shock, valuation of assets is difficult and can fall below their 
value in first best. This is because potential buyers in the same industry would also suffer 
themselves. In this situation, the ambiguity can happen when debtor prefers to use the 
'first-best value' but creditors would use the 'current market value' which, during the 
crisis, could well below debt outstanding to prove insolvency of the debtor. Ultimately the 
judgement remains at discretion of the court; as mentioned earlier, Thai courts are 
generally reluctant to adjudge debtors as insolvent. For example, Foley (2000, p. 3) notes 
that "The Thai Supreme Court has on more than two occasions upheld the additional 
requirement that total liabilities exceed total assets. Therefore creditors cannot use the law 
to threaten bankruptcy if a solvent firm fails to make a debt repayment. As seen in the 1998 
Nikko Hotel Mahanakom case, this interpretation has prevented creditors from placing into 
bankruptcy or reorganization a recalcitrant debtor that has significant land holdings". 
Once insolvency of a debtor is established, the liquidation procedures under bankruptcy 
f 011OWS. 
7 law areas I The court will issue a receiving order appointing an official receiver to 
take charge over the debtor's property. The debtor may propose a composition to the 
creditor's meeting during this time, but requires a special resolution at the creditors' 
7 Detailed processes can be found in Ministry of Justice (2000). 
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meeting. 8 If the debtor fails to secure a composition, the court will adjudicate the debtor a 
bankrupt. The official receiver will sell the property belonging to the debtor's estate and 
distribute the proceedings to creditors. Note that bankruptcy disputes, in contrast with the 
foreclosure law, do not share the debtor- versus - creditor orientation but the disputes centre 
on who is entitled to shares of the debtor's assets and how these shares are to be divided. 
This liquidation process under Thai bankruptcy law is similar to that of Chapter 7 In the 
us. 
In sum, there are two main reasons that secured creditors prefer to exercise their property 
rights outside the bankruptcy law. First, the bankruptcy process, which is designed to 
consider the rights of more than two parties, would be costly and time-consuming. It 
requires more detailed factual inquiries into both the circumstances of the debtor and the 
conflicting claims of many creditors than does the foreclosure process under the Civil and 
Commercial Code in the civil courts. Second, more importantly, the main test for 
insolvency in Thailand has been a comparison of assets against liabilities. If assets exceed 
liabilities, the firm is judged to be solvent and the case will be no longer a matter for the 
bankruptcy court, so the creditor would have to take their claims to a civil court instead. 
Unsurprisingly, as shown in the figure below, the civil court plays a major role in debt 
collection and enforcement of security rights in Thailand. The utilisation of the civil court 
is much grater than that of the bankruptcy court, as evidence by around 120,000 cases at 
the end of September 2000, compared with less than 20,000 cases at the bankruptcy court 
over the same period. 
8 Le. one-half of the creditors in number and three-fourths of the creditors in value. 
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Figure 5.2. - Liquidation cases in Thailand C) 
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However, one major impediment to the enforcement of property rights in the civil court is 
the delay in the judicial process. While the 1999 amendments have shortened the 
completion time of all court processes down to 33 from 42 months (from 60 to 42 months 
if the case is appealed), it still takes longer than three years if the process of auctioning 
collateral is included, World Bank (2003). 
Nevertheless, given the extent of macroeconomic shocks that hit Thailand in 1997/8, delay 
may not socially inefficient. It should be noted that the new reorganisation procedures did 
not exist in Thailand until August 1998, i. e. one year after the crisis began in mid 1997; 
and there is no automatic stay in enforcing property rights in the civil court. If there were 
no delay, not only non-viable companies but viable firms (which would otherwise be re- 
organised) would have been liquidated. In this situation, strengthening Chapter 7-typed 
153 
97 98 99 00 
Fiscal year (October-September) 
liquidation and speeding up the judicial process in civil court without ensuring that Chapter 
11 -typed reorganisation law is in place, can lead to vicious spiral of loan recalls and 
co apsing asset prices. The figure below clearly illustrates the potential danger of speeding 
up the process of enforcing property rights. Since April 1999, when the enforcement of 
property rights began to be strengthened, collateral foreclosed by the Thai commercial 
bank has increased considerably; however this was one year after the introduction of the 
reorganisation law in April 1998. 
To be sure, the costs of such delay depend on proportion of viable firms in the economy. If 
a number of firms are economically non-viable, the delay will result in unjustified 
postponement of liquidation of these firms and thus preventing re-allocation of resources. 
But, if majority of firms are viable but temporarily unable to repay debt, the delay in the 
judicial process would help to avoid inefficient liquidation. In systemic crisis, excessive 
delay may, however, leave creditors unable to resolve their own balance sheets and hence 
incapable of resuming normal lending which is necessary for economic recovery, 
Westbrook (200 1). This justifies the need for the Chapter- II type reorganisation law. 
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Figure 5.3: Property foreclosed by Thai commercial banks 
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(b) Court-supervised reorganisation law 
The process of business reorganisation under the new law is most similar to Chapter II of 
the US Bankruptcy Code. The aim is to promote reorganisation of economically viable 
fin-ns as going concern and thereby avoid inefficient liquidation of distressed firms. The 
procedures under the new law start with the filing of a petition for restructuring (by either 
itor or government agencies) but insolvency test is also required as a trigger debtor, cred* I 
mechanism of the process. (Figure 4.4 below provides a summary of the reorganisation 
process, together with the liquidation process under the new Thai bankruptcy law. ) In what 
follows, we describe the main elements of the new bankruptcy law 
9, before turning to 
discuss their implications during the crisis. 
Detailed processes can be found in Ministry of Justice (2000). 
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1. Automatic Stay: When the court approves the application, it gives the debtor protection 
by declaring an automatic stay. The stay will prevent both secured and unsecured creditors 
from pursuing their debts by enforcing their civil judgment or filing a bankruptcy petition 
against the debtor. During the stay but before the reorganisation order is issued, the 
existing management remains in control of the company subject to the limitation that it can 
only conduct company on the ordinary course of business. The stay will be effective until 
(a) the expiration of period of time for implementation of the plan, (b) the date on which 
the plan is accomplished successfully, or (c) the date on which the court dismisses the 
petition, disposes the case, repeals the order for a business reorganisation, cancels the 
business reorganisation, or issues a receiving order. 
2. Debtors-in-possession finance: A creditor who advanced funds to an insolvent debtor for 
the purpose of allowing the debtor to continue its operations, has the priority to file a claim 
in bankruptcy to recover such funds. 
3. Planner selection and the plan: If the court is satisfied that the debtor is insolvent and has 
the potential of achieving success in business, the court will then issue the reorganisation 
order. Once the reorganisation order is issued, the court will have to appoint a planner to 
form a reorganisation plan. Unlike the US Chapter II (in which incumbent debtor 
generally runs the company) and the UK Administrative Receivership (in which 
independent practitioner takes control), 10 the Thai reorganisation law gives priority to 
debtor in choosing his/her planner but creditors can reject this and select their own planner 
with a vote amounting two-third of the debt value. The plan must be prepared within three 
10 This feature is one of the main differences between the US and the UK reorganisation laws, Hart (1995). 
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months of appointment. The planner will also have the power the run the business during 
the reorganisation under the supervision of official receiver and the court. 
4. Classification of creditors and 'cram down': If the plan receives the approval from 
creditors (passed by any creditor class or a group of creditors owed at least 50 percent of 
the total debt), it will then be submitted to court for a confirmation. The time period 
limitation for the plan is five years but may be extended by the court. If the process fails to 
help the business, the court could declare the enterprise bankrupt and the liquidation under 
the bankruptcy law will follow. 
Despite the reform, the utilisation of c ourt- supervised reorganisation law in Thailand has 
been very low. Since the establishment of the Central Bankruptcy Court in June 1999, the 
total number of filings for business organisation from June 1999 to December 2002 was 
only 316 cases (i. e. 8 cases per month). One of the main reasons is that debt enforcement 
mechanisms in Thailand are subject to a long delay and hence debtors do not face an 
immediate threat of having their assets seized by creditors. 
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Figure 5.4: Summary of the Thai Bankruptcy Law 
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Source: Foley (2000). 
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5.4. Dealing with systemic bankruptcy 
While reforming bankruptcy procedures is necessary so as to ensure that debts have been 
worked out in an orderly fashion, they have played a limited role in the resolution of 
corporate debt crisis in Thailand. This is because time will be required for the bankruptcy 
rules and institutions to become effective in the country where they have only recently 
been introduced, Claessens et al. (2001). Second, cultural and political factors may have 
reduced the capacity to implement to law. 
Third and more importantly, the nature of the bankruptcy law itself is not designed to deal 
with the large scale debt problems. Specifically, Stiglitz (2001), and Miller and Stiglitz 
(1999) argue that even though a perfect bankruptcy system has been in place, it would not 
be sufficient to deal with large macroeconomic shocks, so procedures for handing 
bankruptcies in normal times and during crises should be different. This is because normal 
bankruptcy procedures which deal with individual cases might fail to internalise the price 
effects of the asset fire-sales. They argue for a case of a "super Chapter IF -- a new 
provision where firms can automatically write off debt increases, due to devaluation, in 
excess of a given limit. However, such proposal has not been put into test. Furthermore, 
Claessens et al. (200 1) observe that a super Chapter II may be unnecessary for East Asia. 
This is because not many firms were prematurely liquidated or had gone through 
bankruptcy procedures, as the normal bankruptcy regime ceases to work properly due to 
overwhelming cases in court and hence no significant loss of value seems to have occurred 
as a result of not adopting such a super bankruptcy rule. 
In this section, we examine the actual policy response used in Thailand to address the 
systemic debt problems, i. e. the establishment of an out-of-couit framework for debt 
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restructuring. This framework is a variant of the 'London Approach', developed by Bank 
of England in 1970s. In what follows, we begin with some brief background on the London 
Approach and then discuss in details on the modified framework used in Thailand. 
5.4.1 A brief history of the 'London Approach"' 
The London Approach was first created by the Bank of England in response to the 
recession in the mid-1970s when a number of industrial companies was having problem 
servicing their debts to commercial banks. The aim was: to minimize losses to creditors 
and other parties; to avoid unnecessary liquidations of fundamentally viable debtors; and to 
prevent failure of attempts to provide financial support to viable debtors. The main role of 
the Bank was by co-ordinating among banks and debtors; and arranging major bank 
lenders to play the lead role. Then, at the meetings, the position of all banks was put on the 
table so as to see what actions needed to be done. Not only banks who wished to call their 
loans were persuaded not do so, they were also asked to provide the new money to 
companies in trouble (with or without security or priority of claim). Company's 
management often had to change either by agreement or a condition imposed by bank 
creditors or institutional shareholders. In this case, the Bank of England also helped to find 
suitable people to take the appointment. It should be noted that the success of the London 
Approach appears to depend on the level of 'trust'. As noted by Kent (1997, p. 3): 
44 companies are normally, and properly, reticent about discussion their affair with anybody 
except their professional advisers and their bankers. When approached, however, they were 
willing to confide in the Bank of England for two reasons. First, the Bank was trusted. 
11 Further detai Is on the London Approach can be found in Kent (1997), where this section draws heavily 
from. 
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Second, they knew that the Bank's approach would be impartial, independent and 
confidential. " 
During the 1980s, financial environment in the UK had changed, in particular many 
corporate firms found themselves benefited from competitions among banks and hence 
leveraged up their balance sheets by short-term borrowing (associated with the financing of 
mergers and acquisitions). Consequently, towards the end of the decade but before the 
onset of the recession, many firms were highly leveraged and had their sources of 
financing from many banks. On another side of the coin, Kent notes that "many banks 
entered the recession with a corporate loanbook which had grown rapidly during the 
previous five years and which included exposures to companies which they knew little 
about", (p. 5). When the economic downturn began in 1989, banks began to protect 
themselves by calling in loans which created severe liquidity problems for firms. In 
contrast with the 1970s experience, the Bank of England reduced its direct contact with 
companies in trouble but instead designed a generally-agreed restructuring framework so 
as to leave it entirely with financial institutions and companies in trouble. Note that the 
Insolvency Acts had just been revised and the changes had not been put into place. Kent (p. 
6) writes that: "An important consideration for the Bank of England was whether any role 
ying an was justified. Was there a market failure which crated a public interest justif 
official role? It concluded that there was". 
At this time, there was a debate whether the Bank of England should formalise its 
framework into a written document. However, "many foreign banks felt that if the 
framework were formalised in this way, it would invite legal challenge, and perhaps 
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scrutiny from their own domestic supervisors", Kent (p. 7). So the Bank decided to leave 
the framework unwritten and flexible. 
The London Approach, therefore, is a general guidance on how bank creditors should 
response when their borrowers are in financial troubles. The main elements of the London 
Approach are: (i) bank should keep in place the facilities of their borrowers and not 
appoint receivers; (ii) decisions should only be made on the basis of comprehensive 
information; (iii) banks should work together on what terms firms should be given a 
financial lifeline; (iv) the seniority of claims should be recognised. 
Since the London Approach were voluntary by nature and involvement of the central 
bank's intervention was limited, the need for a quick resolution had led many Asian 
countries to modify the framework in many ways: for example, by adopting time-bound 
deadlines and penalties for non-compliance, and creating formal arbitration mechanisms, 
Asian Development Bank (200 1). 
But such modifications are varied between countries. As shown in the table below, both 
Korea and Thailand appear to be the most advanced framework, followed by Malaysia 
which provides only a platform for renegotiation but the committee does not have legal 
powers. Note also that severity of penalties has varied among countries. 
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Table 5-3: Overview of out-of-court workouts in East Asia (1212000) 
Out-of-court procedures Indonesia South Malaysia Thailand 
Korea 
All or the majority of financial No Yes Yes Yes 
institutions signed on to accord 
Fon-nal process of arbitration, Yes Yes Yes Yes 
with deadlines 
Provision of penalties for non- No Yes No Yes 
compliance 
Source: Asia Economic Monitor (2001) 
5.4.2 The Bangkok Approach 
The Thai Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC), setting up in June 
1998, works as a special out-of-court mediator to restructure debt of target groups of 
businesses proposed by members of CDRAC. 12 In the first stage, they were principally 
large businesses, ranked by level of debt outstanding. After one year of operation, the 
scope of target groups was later expanded to include small and medium businesses. 
Since Thailand has never experienced such a large-scale debt restructuring before, CDRAC 
has initially adopted a set of principles for voluntary workouts (the so-called "Bangkok 
Rules", see Appendix I for details) based on the London Approach, as mentioned above. 
The aim is to provide a guideline for debt restructuring involving multiple creditors and 
large debtors. This framework is a market-based approach and has no legal binding for 
debtors and among creditors. The Bangkok Rules contains the following 3 important 
elements: (1) Automatic stay of existing financial facilities; (2) Appointment of lead 
institution or steering committee to co-ordinate the entire process and discussion; (3) 
12 It consists of five associations, namely representatives from the Federation of Thai Industries; the 
Thai 
Bankers' Association; the Foreign Bankers, Association; the Finance Companies' Association; and the Board 
of Trade. 
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Debtor- in-possess ion finance so that new loans can be extended during the restructuring 
process and receive either priority or fair treatment status. In addition, since the main 
objective of CDRAC is to reduce non-perfon-ning assets in the financial sector, the 
restructuring process focuses only on creditors that are financial institutions and trade 
creditors are excluded. 
To speed up the resolution of conflicts among creditors and so to expedite the restructuring 
process, in March 1999, the Bangkok Approach was further complemented by (i) Debtor- 
Creditor Agreement on Debt Restructuring Process (DCA) and (ii) Inter-Creditor 
Agreement on Restructuring Plan Votes and Executive Decision Panel Procedures (ICA). 
Note that while these two agreements are on voluntary basis but once signed they are 
legally binding. The ICA is a process for inter-creditor arbitration within certain time limits 
and has enforcement mechanism for non-complying creditors (e. g. the penalty of up to 50 
percent of their claims if breaching the contract). In addition, if creditors are unable to 
agree on restructuring plan, CDRAC can use its special authority to resolve disputes 
among financial institution creditors, and fine creditors (up to 10 percent of their claims if 
failing to vote either for or against a proposed plan or to support an approved plan). Such 
agreement aims to reinforce out-of-court debt workout of large businesses and to reduce 
conflicts among multiple creditors. 
The DCA has also set out the limit timeframe for debtors and creditors to complete debt 
restructuring (a five-to seven-month schedule for developing and agreeing on a workout 
plan) and the requirement that debtors are exempted from being charged at default rate 
during debt restructuring. In order to press for full participation and cooperation, debtors 
who refuse to sign the DCA will be filed for bankruptcy by creditors within two months 
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from the agreement date. In addition, debtors are required to provide full information as 
regards all their financial status and obligations so that debtors and creditors have a clear 
timeframe to prepare restructuring plans. Note that the ten-ns and conditions in the ICA and 
DCA are basically set up along -the line with the court-supervised reorganisation 
procedures, but the out-of-cour-t workout by CDRAC contains less procedures and the 
approval process of a restructuring plan is easier than that of a case filed in court. CDRAC 
also requires creditors to choose between voluntary restructuring, court-supervised 
reorganisation or bankruptcy within 90 days of the initial meeting between main or lead 
creditors and debtors. This process is intended to produce agreement on a restructuring 
plan, submission to inter-creditor arbitration, or petitions for foreclosure or insolvency 
within six to eight months. 
Furthermore, a number of incentives to attract both creditors and debtors to come to 
negotiating table are introduced. 13 The main measures include the following: (1) Financial 
institutions are allowed to reclassify their non-performing loans back to normal/perfon-ning 
loans once a restructuring agreement is signed among creditors and debtor. This 
permission could significantly lessen banks' non-performing loans and hence their loan 
loss provision requirements. (2) Regulatory forbearance on equity ownership: to facilitate 
debt-equity swap as one solution for debt workout, equity participation by banks in 
debtors' companies above the regulatory ceilings is now permitted for up to 3 years. 
Normally, banks are not allowed to invest over 10% of a company's equity, and altogether 
over 60% of their own capital. (3) Tax andjee relaxation: various taxes and fees on the 
transactions ansing from debt restructuring (usually involving deals and transactions on 
collaterised properties) are exempted to lessen the cost of debt workout. 
13 See Appendix 11 for more details. 
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CDRAC has played a very active role in helping to resolve the non-performing debt 
problem in Thailand. CDRAC targeted 689 cases for debt restructuring under DCA process 
in the. These 689 companies represent around 1.5 trillion baht, i. e. 56 of the total non- 
performing in Thailand (as of July 1999). The remainder of Thai non-performing loans 
were in small and medium-sized or individual cases. In the year 2000, the number of 
restructuring cases resolved total 178,487 cases, compared to 148 reorganisation cases in 
the bankruptcy court over the same period. 
5.4.3 CDRAC as 'filtering device' 
How out-of-court restructuring might improve efficiency in resolution of the crisis in 
Thailand can be illustrated graphically in the figure below where vertical axis represents 
reorganisation and the horizontal axis is liquidation. As noted in Hart (1995), a good 
bankruptcy procedure should preserve: (i) ex post efficiency so as to maximise value of the 
proceedings available to creditors (and debtors); and (ii) the bonding role of debt by 
penalising firms adequately in bankruptcy states. 14 Moreover, it should balance the rights 
between creditor and debtor; so any point lying on the 45 degree line OA should ensure 
that bankruptcy procedures deliver efficient outcome i. e. a firm should be reorganised if its 
continuation value is greater than liquidation and should be liquidated otherwise. Any 
point above OA would give rise to strategic default by debtors and any point below OA 
would lead to excessive liquidation. 
14 and (iii) preserve the absolute priority of claims 
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As previously mentioned, the liquidation process was subject to a long delay and, prior to 
the crisis, there was no reorganisation prospect for economically viable fin-n, point B In the 
figure captures this situation, implying that all firms would be liquidated. Point C in the 
figure illustrates the situation when Thailand has introduced a new reorganisation law and 
strengthened its judicial process. However, given the widespread corporate distress, the 
attempt to speed up debt collection has been undermined by increasing number of cases. 
So in this figure, we assume that the time required to liquidate non-viable firms essentially 
remain unchanged. However, the out-of-court workouts through CDRAC contain less 
procedures and the approval process of a restructuring plan is faster than that of a case filed 
in court. Even though the capacity of CDRAC to facilitate debt restructuring cases would 
also limit, the selection of only large and viable companies that have the most impact to the 
economy can greatly improve efficiency, corresponding to point D in the figure. 
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5.4.4. Some practical issues 
(i) Despite the renegotiation progress through CDRAC has been fast, the method in which 
debts have been restructured may be of concern. It appears that the focus primarily was on 
temporary easing of debt servicing rather than operational restructuring (e. g. asset sales, 
debt/equity swaps and debt write-downs). As shown in the Table below, during the past 
three years, more than 60 percent of debt outstanding had been through maturity extension 
and grace period. In many such cases, there is concern that corporate debt classified as 
restructured could return to non-perfonning status once grace periods have been exhausted. 
Table 5.4: Summary of debt restructuring approaches (in percent of total debt) 
1999 2000 2001 
Rescheduling 41 41 40 
Grace period 20 21 24 
Interest rate reduction 22 20 17 
Debt writedowns 6 6 9 
Debt-to-asset swap 6 5 6 
Debt-to-equity swap 3 4 3 
Others 2 3 2 
Source: CDRAC. 
(ii) Although the Bangkok Approach framework and ICA and DCA agreements were well 
developed, there are still weaknesses. The critical one is the degree of enforcement, 
especially the power to enforce debtors to cooperate. As noted in Hart et al. (1997, p. 6): 
e. & even when out-of-court settlements can be agreed, the bargaining position of creditors is 
compromised by the lack of an effective collective procedure. " 
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5.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter examines some key issues that could arise in coping with large-scale 
corporate bankruptcy. The Thai experience has shown that the extent to which an 
insolvency system to be effective depends crucially not by the letter of law but whether 
they can be implemented. It also needs to consider along with factors regarding political 
and cultural influences which are varied in each countries. Thailand has a long history of 
pro-debtor bias - together with cultural attitude that restricts dispute resolution; this was 
further aggravated by the limited efficacy of the judicial system. While some of these 
deficiencies have since been corrected and the formal reorganisation procedure has now 
been introduced, it is not adequate to resolve the systemic debt problems. 
As for macroeconomic implication of bankruptcy reform, we suggest that sequencing 
foreclosure and reorganisation laws needs to be delicate. By strengthening enforcement 
mechanism without ensuring that reorganisation procedures are in place can set in motion 
the general equilibrium effects of loans recalls and falling asset prices. However, it is also 
important that once reorganisation law has put into place, the enforcement mechanism will 
need to be 'activated'. 
We have shown that when the efficiency of legal system is taken into account (particularly 
the built-in delay involved in the judicial process), a creditor-oriented bankruptcy law may 
effectively turn into debtor-friendly regime. In the case of systemic debt crisis, while such 
build-in delay may help prevent fire-sales of assets, it can also create efficiency losses as 
efficient firms are prevented from being restructured. This justifies the need for Chapter 
II -style reorganisation law. But the latter played a minor role in the resolution of the 
debt 
crisis in Thailand. An alternative mechanism that turned out to be effective in Thailand is 
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the establishment of out-of-court restructuring framework. We find that there are two 
important features in this Thai-style framework that can greatly help increase efficiency 
and might be an alternative to the court-supervised reorganisation; namely (i) first pnority 
in restructuring is given to large and efficient companies that have the most impact to the 
economy; (ii) the focus is on resolving debt owned by financial institutions, so that normal 
lending can be resumed and economic recovery facilitated. 
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Appendix I 
Framework for Corporate Debt Restructurinj! in Thailand: A Summarv 15 
A. The "Bangkok Approach" 
This framework is non-binding and non-statutory but is a statement of the approach that is expected 
to be adopted in corporate workouts involving multiple creditors. The framework exists based on 
general market acceptance and its practices may be altered or amended to serve the needs of the 
business and financial communities. The basic premise is to ensure that a business can survive if 
there is a reasonable possibility that it is viable. The framework is designed to promote a spirit of 
timely co-operation amongst concerned stakeholders for their mutual benefit. There is no intention 
within this approach to force any creditor to forgo any rights. The aim is to (1) minimise losses to 
all parties through co-ordinated workouts; and (ii) avoiding companies being placed unnecessarily 
into liquidation, thereby preserving jobs and productive capacity wherever feasible. 
The guidelines containing 19 principles are as follows: 
1. Any corporate debt restructuring should achieve a business, rather than just a financial 
restructuring to further the long term viability of the debtor. 
2. Priority must be given to rehabilitate assets to performing status in full compliance with Bank 
of Thailand regulations. 
3. Each stage of the corporate debt restructuring process must occur in a timely manner. 
4. From the first debtor-creditor meeting, if the debtor's management is providing full and 
accurate information on the agreed schedule and participating in all creditor committee 
meetings, creditors shall "standstill" for a defined, extendable period to allow informed 
decisions to be made. 
5. Both creditors and debtors must recognise the absolute necessity of active senior management 
involvement throughout the duration of the debt restructure. 
6. A lead institution, and a designated individual within the lead institution, must be appointed 
early in the restructuring process to actively manage and coordinate the entire process 
according to defined objectives and deadlines. 
7. In major multi-creditor cases, a steering committee representative of a broad range of creditor 
interests should be appointed. 
15 Source: CDRAC, Bank of Thailand 
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8. Decisions should be made on complete and accurate information which has been independently 
verified to ensure transparency. 
9. In cases where accountants, attorneys and professional advisors are to be appointed, such 
entitles must have requisite local knowledge, expertise and available dedicated resources. 
10. While it is normal practice to request the debtor to assume all the costs of professional 
advisors, lead institutions and creditors committees, creditors have a direct economic interest, 
and hence a professional obligation, to help control such costs. 
II- The Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Bank of Thailand (BoT) should be kept informed on 
the progress of all debt restructuring to aid the review and regulatory and supervisory 
framework and to facilitate corporate debt restructuring. 
12. The role of the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee (CDRAC) (i) shall follow- 
up developments in debt restructuring; (ii) shall review and implement policies to facilitate 
debt restructuring for the public good; and (iii) may also act as an independent intermediary in 
the restructuring process where cases are particularly difficult or where other efforts have 
failed. The committee may well be a catalyst to activate sluggish negotiations. 
13. Creditors existing collateral rights must continue. 
14. New credit extended during the restructuring process above existing exposures as of the 
standstill date on reasonable terms in order that the debtor may continue operations must 
receive priority status based on title orientated security, inter-creditor agreements or 
indemnities. 
15. Lenders should seek to lower their risk and hence their requisite returns, through an improved 
security package and profitability-based benefits rather than increased interest rates and 
imposition of restructuring fees. 
16. Debt trading is appropriate under certain conditions but the selling creditor has the professional 
obligation to ensure the buyer does not have a detrimental effect on the restructuring process. 
17. Restructuring losses should be apportioned in an equitable manner which recognizes legal 
priorities between the parties involved. 
18. Creditors retain the right to exercise independent commercial judgement and objectives but 
should carefully consider the impact of any action on the Thai economy, other creditors and 
potentially viable debtors. 
19. Any of the principles or implementing policies contained in this framework can be waived, 
amended or superceded in any particular restructuring with the consent of all participating 
creditors. 
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B. The Debtor-Creditor Agreement 
1. Allows any creditor, the debtor, or CDRAC to convene the first meeting of creditors to attempt 
a restructuring under the two agreements. 
2. Requires the debtor to sign the Debtor-Creditor Agreement prior to the first meeting of 
creditors or face liquidation or collection lawsuits. 
3. Requires the appointment of a lead institution and a designated individual to manage the 
workout process according to a fixed schedule of approximately 5-7 months, extendable by up 
to 2 months. 
4. Provides standard confidentiality, debtor standstill and indemnification undertakings. 
5. Requires the debtor to submit preliminary information within 7 days, and all other information 
and a draft business plan within 2 months, of the first meeting of creditors. 
6. Provides for mediation between debtors and creditors in the event of an impasse in 
negotiations. 
7. Requires all creditors to seek the debtor's liquidation or reorganisation under new management 
in the event of three unremedied breaches by the debtor. 
8. Imposes penalties of up to 10% of a creditor's claim only for failure of a creditor to vote either 
for or against a proposed plan or to support an approved plan. 
C. The Inter-Creditor Agreement 
The Inter-Creditor Agreement addresses the second part of the restructuring process and covers 
votes by creditors if and when a proposed restructuring plan is developed under the Debtor- 
Creditor Agreement. 
1. Requires creditors voting against a proposed restructuring plan to provide specific objections. 
2. Requires creditors signing the agreement to support in any future proceedings a proposed plan 
approved by such number of creditors holding such percentage of all outstanding credit to a 
debtor that would bind all creditors to a court-approved plan under the Bankruptcy Act. 
3. Refers a proposed plan for a binding decision to be made by the independent executives (one 
appointed by each of the three creditor associations) if the plan obtains approval from at least 
50% of all creditors but does not meet the plan approval requirements. 
4. Requires that the executives' decision be a simple, unanimous approval or disapproval of a 
proposed plan. 
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5. Requires creditors to commence legal action against the debtor if a proposed plan (after one 
possible modification) cannot achieve approval by the creditors or executives. 
6. Imposes penalties of up to 50% of creditor's claim in the workout for a material breach of the 
Inter-Creditor Agreement by a creditor. 
7. Allows any creditor to opt-out of the Inter-Creditor Agreement (including the provisions 
concerning fines) whenever the relevant debtor's total credits to all creditors of any kind 
exceed one billion baht in principal obligations. 
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Appendix 11 
Legislative Measures to Facilitate Debt Restructurin 
Legislative Measures Effective Date 
1. Tax concessions for the debtor, financial institution creditors, and I Oct 99-31 Dec 01 
other creditors on income received from debt restructuring with 
regards to income tax, VAT, specific business tax, and stamp duties. 
2. Financial institution creditors and other I Oct 99-31 Dec 01 
creditors may use the amount of debt forgiven in debt restructuring as 
a tax-deductible expense in calculations of taxable income. 
3. The establishment of reasonable grounds which the Revenue I Oct 99-31 Dec 00 
Department may take account of in tax calculations, for example, a 
creditor's reduction of interest rates for a debtor. 
4. The Purchase Tax from the construction of a building which is a I Oct 99-31 Dec 01 
taxable item for companies liable for VAT, may be used as a tax- 
deductible item on the sale or rental of the building to a firm not liable 
for VAT. 
5. Allow financial institution creditors and other creditors to use Sales I Oct 99-31 Dec 01 
Tax calculated from loan losses on debt restructuring as a tax- 
deductible item in the month that loan losses were written off. 
6. With regards to tax calculations, financial institution creditors shall From I Jan 98 onwards 
stop using the accrual income recognition principle where debtors 
have failed to make repayments for over 3 cumulative months 
(changed from 6 months). 
7. Tax concessions for debt restructuring From I Jan 98 onwards 
following court reorganisation of the debtor under the Bankruptcy 
Act. 
- Income arising from debt forgiveness 
- Income from the transfer of assets, sale of goods or services, and 
issue of financial instruments. 
8. Creditors under court reorganisation of the debtor under the From 10 April 98 
Bankruptcy Act may use the amount of debt forgiven in debt onwards 
restructuring as a tax-deductible expense in calculations of taxable 
income. 
9. Registration fee concessions on the transfer of land, property or 5 Nov. 99 - 31 Dec. 01 
condominium ownership with regards to debt restructuring as follows. 
- Financial institutions, for the transfer of land, property, or 
condominiums from a debtor, or the return transfer of land, 
property, or condominiums to a debtor. 
- Financial institution 
debtors, for the transfer of land, property, or 
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condominiums to a third party for repayment of debt owed to 
financial institutions. 
Financial institutions, for the registration of additional mortgage 
of land, property, or condominiums from the debtor. 
Non-financial-Institution creditors with common debtors to 
financial institutions, for the transfer of land, property, or 
condominiums from a debtor, or the return transfer of land, 
property, or condominiums to a debtor. 
Creditors, for the transfer of land, property, or condominiums 
from a debtor, or the return transfer of land, property, or 
condominiums to a debtor under the Bankruptcy Act. 
10. - Allow finance companies to purchase or hold a greater 4 April 01 -31 Dec 04 
proportion of equity in limited companies than that allowed under 
existing legislation. 
- Allow commercial banks to purchase or hold a greater proportion of 
equity in limited companies than that allowed under existing 16 Mar 98-31 Dec04 
legislation. 
11. - Allow commercial banks to undertake hire-purchase and hire- 9 Dec 99-31 Dec 01 
purchase leasing businesses ensuing from debt restructuring. 
- Allow IBFs to undertake hire-purchase and hire-purchase leasing 
businesses ensuing from debt restructuring. 
- Allow finance companies to undertake hire-purchase and hire- 9 Dec 99-31 Dec 01 
purchase leasing businesses ensuing from debt restructuring. 
I Jan 00-31 Dec 01 
12. Allow financial institutions to use debt write-offs as tax- From 21 Sept 99 onwards 
deductible items in tax calculations where institutions have written-off From and including the 
debts classified as Loss or Doubtful of Loss with 100% provisioning accounting period ending 
in line with BOT regulations. 31 Dec 99 
13. Registration fee concessions for ownership transfers of rental Varies on a case-by-case 
rights over crown property to be considered on a case-by-case basis. basis 
15. Allow the transfer of BOI privileges to a new equity investor in 
the debtor company. 
1. Cases covered by existing regulations. 
1) For ownership transfers of machinery aged over 5 years, the 
recipient is not liable for tax on the machinery. From 15 Mar 95 onwards 
2) Exemption of stamp duty on import of 
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machinery for debtors under the BOI assistance scheme in cases 
where machinery is transferred to the creditor as part of a leasing or 
hire-purchase contract. 
3) The recipient of a company or business under the BOI assistance 
scheme may benefit from remaining BOI privileges on continuation of 
the firm's business operations. 
2. The BOI shall consider concessions with regards to ownership 
transfers of machinery aged under 5 years to financial institutions or 
another company not intending to continue original business 
operations on a case-by-case basis. 
From 29 July 98 onwards 
16. Financial institutions should reclassify problem loan accounts From the first accounting 
under the Pass asset classification following debt restructuring period of 1999 onwards 
without waiting for repayment test period of 3 months or 3 
installments where debt restructuring of cases satisfies any one of the 
following conditions. 
1) The Debtor is able to repay interest at a rate equal to or above the 
market rate without need of a grace period; 
2) Debtors for which financial institutions have taken a 20% haircut or 
higher based on the book value of credit outstanding. 
3) Debt restructuring is for a multi-creditor syndicate loan 
4) The court has passed verdict following the out-of-court agreement 
between debtor(s) and creditor(s), or the court has issued a writ 
accepting a request to restructure or a debtor's business reorganisation 
plan. 
5) The financial institution has undertaken debt restructuring with the 
approval of the Bank of Thailand or the Corporate Debt Restructuring 
Advisory Committee. 
17. Allow commercial banks, finance companies, and finance and From 24 Dec. 99 onwards 
securities companies to increase their holding period for land, 
property, and condominiums up to 10 years, effective from I st 
January 97 to 31" December 200 1. 
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Appendix III 
Research visit to Thailand: List of interviews 
With the financial support from the Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regional isation, Prof. 
Marcus Miller and Mr. Pongsak Luangaram visited Thailand for research purposes. Thanks to the 
expert help of Dr. Teerana Bhongmakapat (Chief Economic Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Dr. Supachai Panichpak) and Mr. Sunthom Arunanondchai (Chief Executive Officer of the CP 
Land Limited), seven visits were arranged: for the first four visits, Prof Miller and Mr. Luangaram 
were both present; for last three visits, Mr. Luangaram was on his own. 
Date Place People met 
30" August 2000 Office of Corporate Debt - Mr. Pakorn Malakul Na 
Restructuring Advisory Ayudha (Deputy Governor of 
Committee (CDRAQ, the Bank of Thailand) 
Bank of Thailand. Mr. Tumnon Dasri (Director of 
CDRAQ 
I" September 2000 Department of Economics, Academic faculties 
Chulalongkorn University 
4th September 2000 Securities and Exchange - Mr. Prasarn Trairatvorakul 
Commission (SEC) (Secretary-General) 
- Dr. Pichit Akrathip (Director 
of Research) 
4 th September 2000 Ministry of Finance -Mr. Tarrin Nimmanhaeminda 
(Finance Minister) 
12 th September 2000 Financial Restructuring Data collection 
Authority (FRA) 
13 th September 2000 Central Bankruptcy Court and Data collection 
Legal Execution Department, 
Ministry of Justice 
15 th September 2000 Agency for Real Estate Affairs Data collection 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have examined the nature and mechanisms of the Thai financial crisis in 
1997/8. In the first part, we have employed the model of credit cycles developed by 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to study both the dynamics of financial contraction and 
techniques of crisis management. The framework used is one where collateral plays a 
central role and adverse exogenous shocks can trigger a vicious spiral of falling asset 
values and loan recalls. The second part of the thesis looks at the case of Thailand, 
examining developments in financial sector and property markets from boom to bust, and 
discussing macroeconomic implications of bankruptcy law reform in the aftermath of the 
crisis. 
In Chapter 2, we have analysed the role of highly-leveraged institutions in contributing to 
the severity of economic downturn. Specifically, when an asset price bubble bursts which 
cuts the value of land being used as collateral, the sudden fall in collateral value can create 
the possibility that firms' net worth is entirely wiped out and the whole financial system 
collapses. This is due to the powerful feedback effects in that forced selling may well 
further depress prices, setting in motion a downward spiral of asset prices and loan recalls. 
We then show how wholesale financial collapse can be avoided by co-ordinated loan roll- 
overs in the form of a general financial freeze; and how the breathing space gained in this 
way can be used to arrange for loan write-downs or capital injections. 
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In Chapter 3, we have modified the basic KM model used in the previous chapter. We find 
that, by reducing the sensitivity of land prices to land sales and by imposing a margin 
requirement on loans (requiring borrowers to hold some equity margin), robustness of the 
model improves considerably. Numerical exercises are based on two kinds of temporary 
unexpected shocks, namely the bursting of an asset bubble and a sudden increase in real 
interest rates. We find that the knock-on effects arising from monetary policy shocks are 
much more profound than the case of bubble's bursting, given that both shocks lead to the 
same initial fall in net worth of the credit-constrained firms. The reason is that the latter's 
borrowing capacity is tightened further from the fact that with higher interest rates, the 
amount of loans being rolled over -- calculated from the discounted value of collateral -- 
declines. In addition, we show that the higher is the degree of financial leverage, the higher 
is the impact of monetary policy shocks on asset prices. Regarding the debate on the use of 
high interest rates to stabilise the currency, while we cannot provide a definite answer to 
this, our analysis indicates that if the economy is highly leveraged as in Asia, raising 
interest rates by small amount can have powerful impacts on asset prices and may cause 
widespread bankruptcy of the credit-constrained sector. 
In addition, we use our modified framework to shed light on the current debate on the role 
of prudential regulatory policies as a means of mitigating the impact of an asset price 
shocks. Our simulation exercises show that the 'regulatory forbearance' policy by way of 
relaxing 'margin requirement' can be effective in avoiding and/or mitigating the knock-on 
effects. 
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In Chapter 4, we provide a detailed account of economic developments in Thailand from 
1988-1998. The aim is to examine some key structural changes in the period prior to the 
crisis and to examine what actually happened during the crisis. We argue that the nature of 
the Thai financial crisis lies in the profound boom and bust in real estate sector which 
played a central role in creating tensions in the financial system and causing severe 
contraction of the economic activity. 
In Chapter 5, we have explored some main issues relating to systemic bankmptcy in 
corporate sector in aftermath of the Thai crisis. Two key lessons can be drawn: (1) the 
extent to which an insolvency system to be effective depends crucially not on the letter of 
law but on how it is implemented; (ii) when the efficiency of the legal system is taken into 
account (particularly the built-in delay involved in the judicial process), a creditor-oriented 
bankruptcy law may effectively turn into debtor-friendly regime. In the case of systemic 
debt crisis, while such build-in delay may help prevent fire-sales of assets, it can also 
create efficiency losses as efficient firms are prevented from being restructured. This 
justifies the need for Chapter II -style reorganisation law. But the latter played a minor role 
in the resolution of the debt crisis in Thailand. An alternative mechanism that turned out to 
be effective in Thailand is the establishment of out-of-court restructuring framework 
(CDRAC). We find that there are two important features in this Thai-style framework that 
can greatly help increase efficiency; namely (i) first priority in restructuring is given to 
large and efficient companies that have the most impact to the economy; (ii) the focus is on 
resolving debt owned by financial institutions, so that normal lending can be resumed and 
economic recovery facilitated. 
181 
Future research 
The research carried out in this thesis suggests three lines for future study. 
(1) As mentioned previously, Aghion et al. (2000) combines exchange rates with balance 
sheet problems in form of dollar exposure. They find that raising interest rates can stabilise 
exchange rate if the proportion of foreign currency debt is high and credit supply is not too 
sensitive to changes in nominal interest rate. The framework of Kiyotaki and Moore could 
be an alternative, micro-founded model for the third generation model of currency crises. 
(ii) In the context of the Kiyotaki and Moore model, we have shown that a wholesale 
financial collapse can be avoided by debt roll-ups, write-downs and temporary finance. 
While the model can be solved to find the minimum amount required, it is based on the 
assumption that the equity base of the lending institution is able to sustain the shock. In 
systemic crisis, however, banks may not be able to write the debts down to realistic levels 
without themselves becoming insolvent. To study this, it would be necessary to 
disaggregate the financial intermediary from the ultimate wealth owners. This should allow 
treatment of issues like bank recapitalisation and role of the capital adequacy ratios (which 
have played an important role in the Japanese debate). See, for example, Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) and Chen (2001). It may also raise issue of moral hazard in banking, as in 
Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000). 
(111) The shocks we considered above are once-for-all events. If, however, the shocks are 
repeated, this raises an interesting issue of institutional design where the 
distinction 
between idiosyncratic and macroeconomic shocks needs to be made more clearly. While it 
makes sense for creditors to provide loans up to 100 percent of the collateral value 
in the 
case of idiosyncratic shocks, our results indicate that for macroeconomic shocks, margin 
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requirements are needed to prevent financial collapse (and if the shock is far too large, the 
government need to step in). If the only instrument is collateral, there appears to be a trade- 
off between low margin requirements to promote economic activity in the small business 
sector in the face of idiosyncratic shocks and the high margin requirement needed for 
systemic stability. So it will be interesting to analyse this trade-off by looking at the impact 
of margin requirements on the speed of adjustment and stability as a function of the 
variance of macro shocks 
183 
Bibliography 
Aghion, Philippe, Bacchetta, Philippe and Banedee, Abhijit (1999). Financial 
Liberalisation and Volatility in Emerging Market Economies. In P. Agenor, M. Miller, D. 
Vine and D. Weber (eds), The Asian Financial Crises: Causes, Contagion and 
Consequences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bachetta and Abhijit Baneijee (2000). "A Simple Model of 
Monetary Policy and Currency Crises". European Economic Review, vol. 44, pp. 728-738. 
Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta, Abhijit Baneijee (2001). "Currency Crises and 
Monetary Policy in an Economy with Credit Constraints". European Economic Review, 
vol. 45, pp. 1121-50. 
Aiyagari, S. Rao and Mark Gertler, (1999), " 'Overreaction' of Asset Prices in General 
Equilibrium, " Review ofEconomic Dynamics, vol. 2, pp. 3-35. 
Alba, Pedro et al. (1999). "The Role of Macroeconomic and Financial Sector Linkage in 
East Asia's Financial Crisis". In P. Agenor, M. Miller, D. Vines and A. Weber (eds), The 
Asian Financial Crisis. - Causes, Contagion and Consequences. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2000). "Bubbles and Crises". Economic Journal, vol. 
110, pp. 235-255. 
Arellano, Cristina and Enrique G. Mendoza (2002). "Credit Frictions and 'Sudden Stops' 
in Small Open Economies: An Equilibrium Business Cycle Framework for Emerging 
Markets Crises", Mimeo. 
Asian Development Bank (2000a). Law and Policy Reform, Volume 1. Asian Development 
Bank, Manila. 
184 
Asian Development Bank (2000b). Law and Policy Reform, Volume 2. Asian Development 
Bank, Manila. 
Asian Development Bank (2001). "Corporate Restructuring in East Asia", Asian Economic 
Monitor, Asian Development Bank, Manila. 
Bank of Thailand (1996). Annual Economic Report, Bangkok. 
Bank of Thailand (1997). Annual Economic Report, Bangkok. 
Bank of Thailand (1998). "Focus on the Thai Crisis". Economic Focus, Volume 2, Number 
2 (April-June). 
Bank of Thailand (2000). Supervision Report 2000. Bank of Thailand, Bangkok. 
Bernanke, Ben (1983). "Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of 
the great depression", American Economic Review, vol. 73, (June), pp. 257-276. 
Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler (1989). "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business 
Fluctuations". American Economic Review, vol. 79, pp. 14-3 1. 
Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler (1999). "Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility", in 
New Challenges for Monetary Policy: A Symposium Sponsored by the Federeal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 77-128. 
Bernanke, Ben, Mark Gertler and Simon Gilchrist (1996). "The Financial Accelerator and 
the Flight to Quality". Review ofEconomics and Statistics, no. 1, pp. 1- 15. 
Bernanke, Ben and Mark Gertler (1995). "Inside the Black Box: The Credit Channel of 
Monetary Policy Transmission". Journal ofEconomic Perspectives, Vol. 9, pp. 27-48. 
185 
Boonprakaikawe, Juntip and Sayantan Ghosal (2002). "Public Signal and Risk Dominance 
Equilibrium Section". Mimeo. University of Warwick. 
Borio, Claudio, Craig Furfine and Philip Lowe (2001). "Procyclicality of the Financial 
System and Financial Stability: Issues and Policy options". BIS Paper, No. 1. Bank for 
International Settlements. 
Bosworth, Barry and Susan Collins (2000). "From Boom to Crisis and Back Again: What 
Have We Learned? " AD13 Institute Working Paper, no. 7. Asian Development Bank. 
II Burnside, Craig (1998). "Discussion of Asset Bubbles, domino effects and lifeboat . 
Mimeo. 
Burriside, Craig, Martin Eichenbaurn and Sergio Rebelo (2001). "Prospective Deficits and 
the Asian Currency Crisis". Journal ofPolitical Economy, vol. 109, pp. 115 5-97. 
Cargill, Thomas, Michael Hutchison and Takatoshi Ito (2000). Financial Policy and 
Central Banking in Japan. Mass: MIT Press. 
Cecchetti, Stephen, Hans Genberg and Sushil Wadhwani (2003). "Asset Prices in a 
Flexible Inflation Targeting Framework". In W. Hunter, G. Kaufman and M. Pomerleano 
(eds. ), Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary, Regulatory, and International 
Policies. Mass: MIT Press. 
Chang and Velasco (I 998a). "Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: A Canonical Model" 
NBER Working Paper No. 6606. (June) 
Chang and Velasco (1998b). "The Asian Liquidity Crisis". Mimeo. New York University. 
(July) 
Chang, Roberto and Andres Velasco (2002). "The 1997-98 Liquidity Crisis: Asia versus 
Latin America". In L. Hernandez and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (eds), Banking Financial 
Integration, and International Crises. Santiago, Chile. 
186 
Chen, Nan-Kuang (200 1). "Bank Net Worth, Asset Prices and Economic Activity" 
Journal ofMonetary Economics, vol. 48, pp. 415-436. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov and Giovanni Ferri (1999). "Corporate distress in East 
Asia 111) , Public Policyfor the Private Sector, no. 172 (January), World Bank, Washington 
D. C. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov and Lixin Colin Xu (2000). "Corporate Performance in 
the East Asian Financial Crisis". World Bank Research Observer, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 23-46. 
Claessens, Stijn, Simeon Djankov and Ashoka Mody (2001), Resolution ofFinancial 
Distress: An International Perspective on the Design ofBankruptcy Laws. Washington, 
DC: World Bank. 
Corsetti, Giancarlo (1998). "Interpreting the Asian Financial Crisis: Open Issues in Theory 
and Policy". Asian Development Review, vol. 16, pp. 1-45. 
Corsetti, Giancarlo, Paolo Pesenti and Nouriel Roubin, 1998. "Paper Tigers: A Model of 
the Asian Crisis". Mimeo. 
Dewatripont, Mathias and Jean Tirole (1994), The Prudential Regulation ofBanks, 
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Diamond, Douglas W. and Philip H. Dybvig (1983), "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, " Journal ofPolitical Economy, vol. 9 1, p. 401-19. 
Dooley, Michael and Carl Walsh (2000). "Academic Views of Capital Flows: An 
Expanding Universe". Mimeo. 
Dooley, Michael (2000). "A Model of Crises in Emerging Markets". Economic Journal, 
vol. 110, pp. 256-272. 
187 
Drees, Burkhard and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu (1998). "The Nordic Banking Crises: Pitfalls in 
Financial Liberization". IMF Occasional Paper, No. 16 1, International Monetary Fund. 
Edison, Hali, Pongsak Luangaram and Marcus Miller (2000). "Asset Bubbles, Leverage 
and Lifeboats: Elements of the East Asian Crisis". Economic Journal, vol. 110, pp. 235- 
255. 
Eichengreen, Barry (1999). Toward A New International Financial Architecture. 
Washington, D. C.: Institute for International Economics. 
Fiscal Policy Office and Office of Industrial Economics (1999). "Thailand: The Road to 
Corporate Recovery". Mimeo. 
Fischer, Stanley (2001). "The International Financial System: Crises and Reform". The 
Robbins Lectures, October 29-3 1. 
Fisher (1933). "The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions". Econometrica, vol. 1, 
pp. 337-57. 
Flood, Robert and Peter Garber (1984). "Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Some Linear 
Examples". Journal of International Economics, vol. 17, pp. 1- 13. 
Foley (2000). "Going Bust in Bangkok: Lessons from Bankruptcy Law Reform in 
Thailand". Mimeo. Harvard Business School. 
Furman, Jason and Joseph Stiglitz (1998). "Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from 
East Asia". Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 2, pp. 1- 114. 
Gavin, Michael and Hausmann, Ricardo (1996). "The roots of banking crises: the 
macroeconomic context". In Hausmann and Rojas-Suarez (eds), Banking crises in Latin 
America. Washington, D. C.: InterAmerican Development Bank (distributed by Johns 
Hopkins University Press). 
188 
Goldstein, Morris and Turner, Philip (1996). "Banking crises in emerging economies: 
origins and policy options. ' BIS Economic Papers, No. 46, Basle: BIS. 
Goodhart, Charles (2003). "The Historical Pattern of Economic Cycles and Their 
Interaction with Asset Prices and Financial Regulation". In W. Hunter, G. Kaufman and M. 
Pomerleano (eds. ), Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications for Monetary, Regulatory, and 
International Policies. Mass: MIT Press. 
Hart, Oliver (1995). Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford. 
Hart, Oliver (2000). "Different Approaches to Bankruptcy". NBER Working Paper, No. 
7921. 
Hart, Oliver and John Moore (1994). "A Theory of Debt Based on the Inalienability of 
Human Capital". Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, vol. 109, pp. 841-79. 
Hart, Oliver, Rafael La Porta Drago and Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes (1997). "A New 
Bankruptcy Procedure that Use Multiple Auctions". NBER Working Paper, no. 6280. 
Hellman, Thomas, Kevin Murdock and Joseph Stiglitz (1999) "Llberallzatlon, Moral 
Hazard in Banking and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough? " 
American Economic Review, vol. 90, pp. 147-165. 
Herring, Richard and Susan Wachter (1999). "Real Estate Booms and Banking Busts: An 
International Perspective". Mimeo, University of Pennsylvania. 
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole (1997). "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds and 
the Real Sector". Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112, pp. 663-91. 
Hunter, W, G. Kaufman and M. Pomerleano (2003). Asset Price Bubbles: The Implications 
for Monetary, Regulatory, and International Policies. (eds) Mass: MIT Press. 
189 
IMF (1997). "Capital Flow Sustainability and Speculative Currency Attacks". Finance and 
Development, pp. 8-11 (December). 
IMF (1999). "Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures". Report prepared by Legal 
Department, International Monetary Fund. 
IMF (2000). "Capital controls: Country Experiences with Their Use and Liberalization" 
Ocassional Paper, No. 190. 
IMF (200 1). "Thailand: Selected Issues". IMF Country Report No -0 1/ 147. 
Ito, Takatoshi (1998). "The Development of the Thailand Currency Crisis: A 
Chronological Review". Mimeo. Hitotsubashi University. 
Ito, Takatoshi (1999). "Capital Flow in Asia". NBER Working Paper No. 7134 (May). 
Jansen, Karel (200 1). "Thailand: The Making of a Miracle? " Development and Change, 
Vol. 32, pp. 343-70. 
Kaminsky, Graciela and C. Reinhart (1999). "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking 
and Balance of Payment Problems". American Economic Review, Vol. 3, No. 89, pp. 473- 
500. 
Kaminsky, Graciela and Reinhart, Carmen (1996). 'The twin crises: The causes of banking 
and balance of payments problems. ' Mimeo, Washington, D. C.: Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, (August). 
Kaosa-ard Mingsarn (1998). "Economic Development and Institutional Failures in 
Thailand". TDRI Quarterly Review, vol. 13, pp. 3-11. 
Kawai, Masahiro and Hong Joo Hahm and Giuseppe Iarossi (2000). Corporate Foreign 
Debt in East Asia: Too Much or Too Little? In Asian Corporate Recovery 
190 
Kawai, Masahiro and Ken-ichi Takayasu (1999). "The Economic Crisis and Financial 
Sector Restructuring in Thailand". 
Kent, Pen (1997). "Corporate Workouts -A UK Perspective". Mlmeo, Bank of England. 
King, Mervyn (1994). 'Debt deflation: theory and evidence. ' European Economic Review, 
vol. 38, pp. 419-445. 
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Moore, John (1997). 'Credit cycles. ' Journal of Political Economy, 
vol. 105, (April), pp. 211-248. 
Kletzer, Kenneth and Brian Wright (2000). "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter" 
American Economic Review, vol. 3, pp. 621-639. 
Krueger, Anne (2001). "International financial architecture for 2002: A New Approach to 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring. " Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Krugman, Paul (1979), "A Model of Balance-of-Payment Crises, " Journal ofMoney, 
Credit, and Banking, vol. 11, p. 311-25. 
Krugman, Paul (1998). 'What happened to Asia. ' Chulalongkorn Journal o Economics, ýf 
vol. 10, no. 1, (January), pp. 69-87. (Also available at http: //web. mit. edu/krugman/www. ) 
Krugman, Paul (1999). "Balance sheet effects, the Transfer Problems, and Financial 
Crises". In P. Isard, A. Razin and A. Rose (eds. ), International Finance and Financial 
Crises, Essays in Honor of Robert P. Flood. Boston: Kluwer. 
Krugman, Paul (200 1). "Crises: The Next Generation? ". Mimeo (March). 
Kwon, Eunkyung (1998). "Monetary Policy, Land Prices, and Collateral Effects on 
Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from Japan" Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies, vol. 12, pp. 175-203. 
Laird, John (2000). Money Politics, Globalisation, and Crisis. Singapore: Graham Brash 
191 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de- Si lanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny 
(1998). "Law and Finance". Journal o Political Economy, vol. 106, pp. 1113-55. )f 
Lindgren, Carl-Johan et al. (1999). "Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring: Lessons 
from Asia". IMF Occasional Paper, No. 188. 
Mako, William P. (200 1). "Corporate restructuring in East Asia: Promoting Best 
Practices". Finance and Development, vol. 3 8, no. 1. International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D. C. 
Marion, Nancy (1999). "Some Parallels Between Currency and Banking Crises". In P. 
Isard, A. Razin and A. Rose (eds. ), International Finance and Financial Crises, Essays in 
Honor of Robert P. Flood. Boston: Kluwer. 
McKinnon, Ronal and Huw Pill (1996). "Credible liberalisation and International Capital 
Flows: The 'Overborrowing Syndrome'. In Takatoshi Ito and Anne Kruger (eds), 
Financial Deregulation and Integration in East Asia. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Mendoza, Enrique G. and Katherine A. Smith (2002), "Margin Calls, Trading Costs and 
Asset Prices in Emerging Markets: the Financial Mechanics of the 'Sudden Stop' 
Phenomenon, " NBER Working Paper, No. 9286. 
Miller, Marcus (2002). "Sovereign Debt Restructuring: New Articles, New Contracts or 
No Change? ". International Economic Polic Briefs, no. PB02-3, Institute for International y 
Economics. 
Miller, Marcus and Luangaram, Pongsak (1998). 'Financial crisis in East Asia: bank runs, 
asset bubbles and antidotes. ' National Institute Economic Review, no. 165, 
(July), pp. 66- 
82. 
192 
Obstf eld, Maurice (1994), Logic of Currency Crises, " Cahiers Economiques et 
Monetaires, 43,189-213. 
Obstfeld, Maurice (1996), "Models of Currency Crisis with Self-fulfilling Features, " 
European Economic Review, vol. 40, pp. 103 7-48 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kennett Rogoff (1997), Foundations ofInternational 
Macroeconomics, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Pomerloano, Michael (1998). "The East Asia Crisis and Corporate Finances: The Untold 
Micro Story". Mimeo. 
Quigley, John (200 1). "Real Estate and the Asian Crisis". Journal ofHousing Economics, 
Vol. 10, pp. 129-16 1. 
Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs (1998), "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis, " 
mimeo, Harvard Institute for International Development, March. 
Rajan, Rarrikishen S. (2001). "(1r)relevance of Currency Crisis Theory to the Devaluation 
and Collapse of the Thai Baht". Princeton Studies in International Economics, No. 88 
(February). 
Renaud, Bertrand, Ming Zhang and Stefan Koeberle (2000). "How the Thai Real Estate 
Boom Undid Financial Institutions: What Can be Done How? " Mimeo, World Bank. 
Shiller, Robert (2000). "Margin Calls: Should the Fed Step In? " Wall Street Journal, April 
i oth. 
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1992). "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity". Journal of 
Finance, vol. 47, pp. 1343-66. 
Siamwalla, Ammar (2000). "Anatomy of the Thai Economic Crisis". Mjmeo, Thailand 
Development Research Institute 
Siamwalla, Ammar (200 1). "Picking up the pieces: Bank and corporate restructuring in 
post- 1997 Thailand. " Mimeo, Thailand Development 
Research Institute (TDRI), 
194 
Claessens et al (eds), Resolution ofFinancial Distress: An International Perspective on the 
Design ofBankruptcy Laws. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
White, Michelle (1996). "The cost of Corporate Bankruptcy". In J- Bhandari and L. Weiss 
(eds), Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
World Bank (1993). The East Asian Miracle, Economic Growth and Public Policy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank Report (1997). Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries: The Road to 
Financial Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1999). "Thailand Economic Monitor", World Bank Thailand Office, 
February. 
World Bank (2001). "Thailand Economic Monitor", World Bank Thailand Office, July. 
World Bank (2003). "Thailand Economic Monitor", World Bank Thailand Office, May. 
196 
Siamwalla, Ammar, Yos Vajragupta and Pakorn Vichyanond (1999). "Foreign Capital 
Flows to Thailand: Determinants and Impact. Mimeo, Thailand Development Research 
Institute. 
Stiglitz, Joseph (1998). "Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic 
Policy and Economic Advice". Mimeo. Speech delivered at the World Bank's I Oth Annual 
Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE). 
Stiglitz, Joseph (2001). "Bankruptcy Laws: Basic Economic Principles". In Stijn 
Claessens et al (eds), Resolution offinancial Distress: An International Perspective on the 
Design ofBankruptcy Laws. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Stiglitz, Joseph (2002). Globalization and its Discontents. London: Penguin. 
Thaicharoen, Yunyong and Prapan Kiatikomol (2002). "Corporate Balance Sheet 
Adjustment and Restructuring in Thailand". Paper presented at BOT Symposium 2002, 
Bangkok, Thailand. 
Tinakorn, Pranee and Chalongphob Sussangkarn (1996). "Productivity Growth in 
Thailand". Research Monograph No. 11, Thailand Development Research Institute, 
Bangkok. 
Vajragupta, Yos and Pakorn Vichyanond (1998). Thailand'S Financial Evolution and the 
1997 Crisis. Thailand Development Research Institute, Bangkok, Thailand. 
Vichyanond, Pakorn (2000). Financial Reforms in Thailand. Thailand Development 
Research Institute, Bangkok, Thailand. 
Warr, Peter and Bhanupong Nidhiprabha (1996). Thailand's Macroeconomic Miracle: 
Stable Adjustment and Sustained Growth. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Westbrook, Jay (2001). "Systemic Corporate Distress: A Legal Perspective". In Stijn 
195 
Miller, Marcus and Joseph Stiglitz (1999). "Bankruptcy Protection Against 
Macroeconomic Shocks: A case for a super Chapter I I". Mimeo, University of Warwick. 
Miller, Marcus, Paul Weller and Lei Zhang (2002). "Moral Hazard and the US Stock 
Market: Analysing the 'Greenspan put"'. Economic Journal, Vol. 112, pp. 171-86. 
Milnes, Gayle (1998). 'Explaining the East Asian crisis: the search for a new paradigm. ' 
MSc. Dissertation, University of Warwick, (September). 
Ministry of Finance (1999). "Thailand Economic Reform 11". Bangkok, Thailand. 
Ministry of Justice (2000). Formal Insolvency Mechanisms. Legal Execution Department, 
Thailand. 
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (1998). "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self- 
Fulfilling Currency Attacks" American Economic Review, vol. 88, pp. 587-597. 
Nabi, Ij az and Jayasankar Shivakurnar (200 1). Backfrom the Brink: Thailand's response to 
the 1997 Economic Crisis. Washington D. C. World Bank. 
Nijathawom, Bandid (1995). "Central Banking Policies in Thailand in the 1990s. " Bank of 
Thailand Quarterly Bulletin, Vol. 35, No. 4, pp. 15-23. 
Nijathawom, Bandid and Thanisom Dejthamrong (1994). "Capital flows, Exchange Rate 
and Monetary Policy: Thailand's Recent Experience". Bank of Thailand Quarterly 
Bulletin, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 35-49. 
Norton, Joseph (2000). "Banking Reform in Emerging Economies: In General and in 
Reality - The Case of Thailand". 
Mimeo. Queen Mary College (London). 
Nukul Commission (1998). Analysis and Evaluation on Facts Behind Thailand's 
Economic Crisis. Bangkok. - Nation Publishing 
193 
Obstfeld, Maurice (1994), "Logic of Currency Crises, " Cahiers Economiques et 
Monetaires, 43,189-213. 
Obstfeld, Maurice (1996), "Models of Currency Crisis with Self-fillfilling Features, " 
European Economic Review, vol. 40, pp. 1037-48 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kennett Rogoff (1997), Foundations ofInternational 
Macroeconomics, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 
Pomerloano, Michael (1998). "The East Asia Crisis and Corporate Finances: The Untold 
Micro Story". Mimeo. 
Quigley, John (200 1). "Real Estate and the Asian Crisis". Journal ofHousing Economics, 
Vol. 10, pp. 129-16 1. 
Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs (1998), "The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis, " 
mimeo, Harvard Institute for International Development, March. 
Rajan, Ramkishen S. (2001). "(1r)relevance of Currency Crisis Theory to the Devaluation 
and Collapse of the Thai Baht". Princeton Studies in -International Economics, No. 88 
(February). 
Renaud, Bertrand, Ming Zhang and Stefan Koeberle (2000). "How the Thai Real Estate 
Boom Undid Financial Institutions: What Can be Done How? " Mimeo, World Bank. 
Shiller, Robert (2000). "Margin Calls: Should the Fed Step In? " Wall Street Journal, April 
1011. 
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1992). "Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity". Journal of 
Finance, vol. 47, pp. 1343-66. 
Siamwalla, Ammar (2000). "Anatomy of the Thai Economic Crisis". Mimeo, Thailand 
Development Research Institute 
Siamwalla, Ammar (2001). "Picking up the pieces: Bank and corporate restructuring in 
post- 1997 Thailand. " Mimeo, Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). 
194 
Siamwalla, Ammar, Yos Vajragupta and Pakorn Vichyanond (1999). "Foreign Capital 
Flows to Thailand: Determinants and Impact. Mimeo, Thailand Development Research 
Institute. 
Stiglitz, Joseph (1998). "Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic 
Policy and Economic Advice". Mimeo. Speech delivered at the World Bank's 10th Annual 
Bank Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE). 
Stiglitz, Joseph (2001). "Bankruptcy Laws: Basic Economic Principles". In Stijn 
Claessens et al (eds), Resolution offinancial Distress: An International Perspective on the 
Design ofBankruptcy Laws. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Stiglitz, Joseph (2002). Globalization and its Discontents. London: Penguin. 
Thaicharoen, Yunyong and Prapan Kiatikomol (2002). "Corporate Balance Sheet 
Adjustment and Restructuring in Thailand". Paper presented at BOT Symposium 2002, 
Bangkok, Thailand. 
Tinakom, Pranee and Chalongphob Sussangkam (1996). "Productivity Growth in 
Thailand". Research Monograph No. 11, Thailand Development Research Institute, 
Bangkok. 
Vajragupta, Yos and Pakorn Vichyanond (1998). Thailand's Financial Evolution and the 
1997 Crisis. Thailand Development Research Institute, Bangkok, Thailand. 
Vichyanond, Pakom (2000). Financial Reforms in Thailand. Thailand Development 
Research Institute, Bangkok, Thailand. 
Warr, Peter and Bhanupong Nidhipmbha (1996). Yhailand's Macroeconomic Miracle: 
Stable A djustment and Sustained Growth. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. 
Westbrook, Jay (2001). "Systemic Corporate Distress: A Legal Perspective". In Stijn 
195 
Claessens et al (eds), Resolution offinancial Distress:. An International Perspective on the 
Design ofBankruptcy Laws. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
White, Michelle (1996). "The Cost of Corporate Bankruptcy". In J. Bhandari and L. Weiss 
(eds), Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
World Bank (1993). The East Asian Miracle, Economic Growth and Public Policy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank Report (1997). Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries: The Road to 
Financial Integration. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
World Bank (1999). "Thailand Economic Monitor", World Bank Thailand Office, 
February. 
World Bank (2001). "Thailand Economic Monitor", 'World Bank Thailand Office, July. 
World Bank (2003). "Thailand Economic Monitor", World Bank Thailand Office, May. 
196 
